Game theory and politics Book

	Preface to the Dover Edition	ix
	Preface	xi
	Introductory Note	xv
	List of Tables	xvii
	List of Figures	xix
1.	International Relations Games	1
1.1.	Introduction	1
1.2.	Two-Person Zero-Sum Games with Saddlepoints	2
1.3.	Information in Games	8
1.4.	Two-Person Zero-Sum Games without Saddlepoints	13
1.5.	Pure and Mixed Strategies	17
1.6.	Interpretation of Mixed Strategies	20
1.7.	Two-Person Nonzero-Sum Games	26
1.8.	Prisoner's Dilemma and the Theory of Metagames	30
1.9.	Chicken and the Cuban Missile Crisis	39
1.10.	Summary and Conclusion	47
2.	Qualitative Voting Games	51
2.1.	Introduction	51
2.2.	Voting Procedures	52
2.3.	Sincere Voting	56
2.4.	Straightforward Strategies and Voting Procedures	60
2.5.	Equilibrium Choices and Vulnerability	63
2.6.	Desirable Strategies and Equilibria	67
2.7.	The Relationship between Desirable and Admissible Strategies	69
2.8.	Sophisticated Voting	73
2.9.	Coalitions and Information	78
2.10.	Voting on Voting Procedures	82
2.11.	The Paradox of Voting	85
2.12.	Empirical Examples	88
2.13.	Summary and Conclusion	96
3.	Quantitative Voting Games	101
3.1.	Introduction	101
3.2.	Requirements for a Voting System of Proportional Representation	102
3.3.	Rules that Meet the Requirements	104
3.4.	Interdependence of the Requirements	106
3.5.	The Effects of Size	108
3.6.	Information and the Choice of Strategies	111
3.7.	Empirical Examples	116
3.8.	Summary and Conclusion	121
4.	Vote-Trading Games	125
4.1.	Introduction	125
4.2.	What the General Possibility Theorem Precludes	126
4.3.	Judgments about Vote Trading	129
4.4.	Definitions and Assumptions	131
4.5.	Sincere and Insincere Voting	133
4.6.	Initial Trades and the Paradox of Vote Trading	137
4.7.	Subsequent Trades and the Instability of Vote Trading	140
4.8.	The Consequences of Refusing to Trade	142
4.9.	The Consequences of Forming Coalitions	144
4.10.	Conditions Limiting Vote Trading	148
4.11.	Empirical Examples of the Paradox of Vote Trading	151
4.12.	Summary and Conclusion	154
5.	Voting Power	157
5.1.	Introduction	157
5.2.	The Shapley-Shubik Index of Voting Power	158
5.3.	The Banzhaf Index of Voting Power	164
5.4.	Coalition Models of the Two Power Indices	167
5.5.	Calculation of the Power Indices	171
5.6.	Three Paradoxes of Voting Power	176
5.7.	Empirical Applications of the Power Indices	182
5.8.	Summary and Conclusion	195
6.	Coalition Games	199
6.1.	Introduction	199
6.2.	Power and Coalitions	200
6.3.	Restrictions on Coalition Alignments	202
6.4.	The Stability of Alignments	204
6.5.	Empirical Conclusions of the Luce-Rogow Model	209
6.6.	The Concept of Winning	213
6.7.	The Size Principle	216
6.8.	The Information Effect	220
6.9.	Empirical Evidence for the Size Principle	222
6.10.	Criticisms of the Size Principle	226
6.11.	An Alternative Goal: Maximizing One's Share of Spoils	232
6.12.	Summary and Conclusion	240
7.	Election Games	243
7.1.	Introduction	243
7.2.	The Need for Models to Assess the Consequences of Electoral Reform	244
7.3.	Presidential Campaigns and Voting Behavior	247
7.4.	The Goals of Candidates	249
7.5.	The Popular-Vote Model	251
7.6.	The Electoral-Vote Model	255
7.7.	The 3/2's Allocation Rule	257
7.8.	Why the Large States Are Favored	260
7.9.	Testing the Models	263
7.10.	Campaign Allocations and Biases through 1980	266
7.11.	Limitations and Extensions of the Models	272
7.12.	Summary and Conclusion	275
	Glossary	279
	Annotated Bibliography	291
	Index	295