Reviews for Theoretical Concepts and Hypothetico-Inductive Inference (Synthese Library Series)

The average rating for Theoretical Concepts and Hypothetico-Inductive Inference (Synthese Library Series) based on 2 reviews is 3 stars.

Review # 1 was written on 2020-11-30 00:00:00 Devra Leonard To understand the tale that Stewart Candlish is presenting us it is important to know that at the end of the nineteenth century almost every philosopher in the English-speaking countries was an idealist. And they continued to be the largest group in the philosophical departments until 1945. (See p. 182) Candlish quotes from a Thomas Hardy novel to show that idealism was if not the default view in non-philosophical cycles it was at least very well known. Somerset Maugham called one of his short story collections Appearance and Reality and he could be sure that his readers would know that this was also the title of the magnum opus of Francis Herbert Bradley the leading proponent of British idealism. The decline and fall of British idealism was due to two man, Bertrand Russell and George Edward Moore. At least that is what I learned as a student and it is certainly the view Bertrand Russell in his numerous writings was able to establish. History is written by the victor and Russell surely was the victor of the Russell/Bradley dispute that is the subject of this book. This does not mean, and this is the conclusion of Candlish, that he won the dispute by the force of his arguments. On the contrary, Candlish seems to think that Bradley was the stronger philosopher. Although not a very good writer. When he developed his theories over hundreds of pages, Candlish says, it is "hard to distinguish from a real incapacity." (p. 24) Russell won by better rhetoric and propaganda. This is, it seems to me, an exaggeration going in the other direction. But maybe necessary to make a point. Candlish does not even think that Bradley was right he is not even saying that philosophy needs a Bradley revival (p. 188). His point is, and it is an excellent one, is that things are more complicated than history tends to present them and that prominent figures from the past like Bradley deserve some sympathy or benefit of the doubt and some careful reading. Candlish starts with a chapter on the stereotypical picture of the dispute (meaning mainly the Bradley view). So he quotes from a couple of textbooks to show how what is "common knowledge" about Bradley is passed from one generation of philosophers to the next who will not take the trouble to read his works. This is great. (And of course not surprising. One cannot read everything. So you do have to trust history. And maybe in some bizarre dialectical sense, they create new truths.) But it is very important to be reminded from time to time that what you think you know is probably only true to some degree and maybe even a distortion of the truth. (And reading, does not even help. I know, because I did read Bradley and that only confirmed the stereotypes. You must read with sympathy. That is not easy. And Candlish accomplished it.) He lists 18 commonly held opinions about Bradley that he thinks are all wrong or at least very misleading. Among them that Bradley was (unlike Russell) a "metaphysician in some pejorative" sense ( p. 5) that he rejected relations, that he denied contingency, that he confused predication and identity that he thought that relations can be reduced to predicates etc. And then he shows that all this is more or less wrong. Interesting but I do think that Candlish lets himself be getting carried away at times. To give just two examples. The distinction between predication and identity "was then not as obvious as it now seems" (p. 38) That is an odd argument because even if true, it is something one can and should point out when talking about Bradley. Then he informs us that Bradley did not hold a truth theory of coherence at all. That left me speechless. I really did fall for a stereotype then? Well, coherence, understood as including comprehensiveness, was to Bradley a test of truth. Not the nature of truth. This might be right but then I do not think that a pragmatist really thinks it is the "nature" of truth to be of certain usefulness for me (my clan, humanity). Instead, Bradley had an identity theory of truth. Just like Russell at the time of the Principles of Mathematics where he said that just like some roses are red some propositions are true and some not. Of course, not just like Russell - Bradley's identity occurs at a different level, namely "at the end". That is Bradley's favorite phrase. And it makes a dispute really difficult, if not impossible. For example, regarding the "reality" of relations, one finds quotes where he seems to admit the reality of relations. They can be "relatively real and true" and at other times he says that "such relations remain unthinkable". (see p. 159) The problem is that "at the end" not even predicates are real for him because then we have only a "whole". We are talking about monism. So how can you argue? There is, says Candlish, a stalemate because of a language problem. If you look at a billiard-ball for example we already have an abstraction - "to have divided that total situation into object plus (possibly unmentioned) surroundings. Once we have made this abstraction than of course some relations will be external to the object..." (p. 154) Then he quotes Warnock: "it would ... be historically improper to give the impression that idealism perished of refutation. ... metaphysical systems do not yield, as a rule, to frontal attack..... Such systems are more vulnerable to ennui than to disproof..." In between the introduction and the conclusion Candlish alternates chapters dealing mostly with either Russell's or Bradley's views. There it gets really complicated. Russell is notorious for having changed his mind a lot of times and it is not easy to keep track. We follow him going from the early "primitivism" to the full "zoo" of objects (like logical forms) we have to be "acquainted" with in order to see the world correctly. I cannot describe this journey in detail here. I do think though, that some of the remaining problems were handled adequately by Wittgenstein in the "Tractatus" (and Candlish seems to agree). Like I said, sometimes, I think, Candlish exaggerates the problems and underestimates the power (and depths) of Russell's thoughts. I also am not convinced when Bradley is presented as a thinker who was ahead of his time. He is even supposed to have anticipated Wittgenstein's rule-following-problem, for example. This is a book well worth reading for anyone interested in the genesis of analytical philosophy. And a warning to not go into believing stereotypes. 9/10

Review # 2 was written on 2016-11-28 00:00:00 Bryan Colegate Read: F.W.J. Schelling, "Ideas on a Philosophy of Nature as an Introduction to the Study of This Science"