Reviews for The Battle of the Crater

The average rating for The Battle of the Crater based on 2 reviews is 3.5 stars.

Review # 1 was written on 2011-01-03 00:00:00 David Puma Not very good. The idea of analyzing why the South lost the Civil War will probably be timeless as long as there's a government in North America. But, the book is not good otherwise. First, it's from the mid 1980's so its historiography, i.e. ruminating on the works which came before it is badly dated. Second, the book almost completely ignores social and cultural factors in why the Confederacy lost. Everything is filtered through the strainer of military history. Limited as that is, the book focuses on how the sides allegedly used, or didn't use, the allegedly prevalent military doctrines of the theorist of the time. Since I'm not a fan of military history or battles, this made the book very boring for me. Furthermore, the book takes a contrary view of Civil War history. I won't spoil the argument by posting it here, but suffice to say, it goes against the grain. That's fine insofar as it goes, but the limited perspective of the book, the almost exclusive focus on the military, means the argument isn't well supported. The organization and writing don't help the book either. Both are redundant and tedious. I've already spent a paragraph outlining the flaws of the content above. In sum, I was extremely disappointed in the book and wonder why I invested the time to read it. So, I give this a 2. Liked the concept, but the execution was poor all round.

Review # 2 was written on 2013-02-17 00:00:00 Greg Lattig Why the South Lost the Civil War by Richard V. Beringer, Herman Hattaway, Archer Jones, and William N. Still, Jr. is a chronologically organized explanation of the reasons that the Confederacy failed to win the United States Civil War although they had the advantage over the North in regards to manpower and resources. In their thesis, the authors argue that it was not any sole factor but a combination of factors that led to victory by the North. The authors write that the major reasons are rapid degradation of morale and the resulting lack of the will to win. The book is neatly organized into five sections and separated into seventeen chapters. The prologue contains only one chapter that deals with the explanation of the historiography of the result of the Civil War. Here, the authors downplay many historians' theories that economic and industrial factors were the only factors that decided the outcome of the war. Instead, they state their aforementioned thesis here attributing the South's loss to the diminishment of morale and the resulting lack of will to make war. They also summarize their argument here and explain how they will prove it. Part II, "Physical and Moral Factors" is separated into four chapters. The first, titled, "Military Performance and Responsibilities" explains the strength of each army, the standing of each of their leaders, Abraham Lincoln and Jefferson Davis. In the next chapter, the authors downplay the significance of the Union blockade and show that it was not successful because it was weakly organized and inefficient. They write that because of the problems that the blockade had, that it did not have an effect on the outcome of the war. Third, in "Southern Nationalism," the authors explain their belief that the South lacked nationalism and was separated into distinct local societies. They write that they, "believe that the Confederacy functioned as a nation only in a technical, organizational sense, and not in a mystical or spiritual sense" (66), implying that the South was not strongly tied together and led to their demise. Finally, "Religion and the Chosen People" discusses how the South's religious beliefs led to their loss in the Civil War. The authors write that both sides thought that God was on their side in the beginning, and eventually when the South began losing, they saw their losses as God's work and as a sign that they were supposed to lose the war. The third part of the book, "Military Stalemate and Internal Problems" deals with the fighting and strategy of both sides throughout the war and relates the consequences of events on the South's morale. In "First Blood," the authors write about the early strategies of both sides and declare that after victories neither side would follow the retreat of the losers, creating bloody battles and large loss of life as well as the stalemate that created the four-year long war. "Trial by Battle" deals with much of the same and describes the strategy of both sides that contributed further to the stalemate between the North and South attributing it to the defensive strategy or either side. In, "The Politics of Dreams," the authors explain Jefferson Davis' attempt to destroy the North's morale by invading Maryland and Kentucky and having them join the South. Northern victories in response to the raids by the South helped to do the opposite of what Davis wanted and solidified morale in the North. In the next chapter, the authors deal with the Union Navy's dominance in the West and the positive effect it had on the North by creating more victories and reducing southern morale. The rest of the part III deals with the State-Rights conflict that contributed to the localism and the lack of unity in philosophy led to another mark on morale in the South. Part IV, "The Dissolution of Military Power and Public Will: The South Reconciles Itself to Defeat," deals with exactly what it says. In the first chapter of the section, the authors explain the last battles of the war and how that was the final stamp on the morale of the South. The next two chapters talk about the effect that religion had on the way that the South dealt with losing the war and how they found solace in the fact that their loss was God's doing and that it was his will for slavery to be ended. Finally, in the last chapter in the section, the authors explain the effect that the war had on the South including how the end of slavery created and forced whites to reinforce their slavery with the new Black Codes and that the South gained victory by further industrializing and gaining a sense of unity. The book ends with a reiteration of the author's thesis and states that the South lost the Civil War because of a variety of factors, not limited to economic and industrial issues, but also because of morale problems and the lack of unity in the Confederacy. Why the South Lost the Civil War is an important piece of the historiography of the Civil War because it views the war from a different perspective. The authors have created a different look at the reason that the South lost the war by explaining that the South lacked the will to continue, although they could have, and that morale was the reason for that. Of course, this is opposite to the major thesis of many historians who write that the South lost primarily because of economic and/or industrial reasons. Reviews of the book are mixed. Some write that the thesis is strong and well supported while others say the opposite. The book is heralded by all as an intriguing look at the cause for the South's loss in the Civil War, but they point out some problems. One is that the book, which according to the authors is to prove their thesis in a set of short essays, turns out to be lengthy and long-winded. Next, reviewers state that some of the supporting evidence that the authors use is bent to support their thesis and does not portray what they are meant to. Another criticism is that the states-rights argument is on shaky footing and lacks support. Those who praise the article argue that it is an excellent piece of revisionist work that has its place in the discussion on the result of the Civil War. The book is well written and well organized. Its thesis is strong and the support that the authors give to support it is pertinent and provides sufficient support as proof. Contrary to the beliefs of some reviewers, the evidence that the authors use does not seem to be out of context. The states-rights issue in the book is the lengthiest section, showing that the authors realized that it needed the most support and with that, they made it believable that the South was plagued by the localism that created the lack of support and common cause for winning the war. Overall, Beringer, Hattaway, Jones, and Still provide an interesting and revisionist thesis and provide enough evidence and detail to persuade their audience enough to consider their viewpoint.