Reviews for Horizons Mathematics 2 Book Two

The average rating for Horizons Mathematics 2 Book Two based on 2 reviews is 3.5 stars.

Review # 1 was written on 2015-05-28 00:00:00 Scott Baguley This is about all the reading I can handle right now! For a history text, it is very well written and pretty interesting. Not a lot of emphasis on specific names and dates, more of a general overview of basic themes. I actually ended up reading this entire History text and I enjoyed it.

Review # 2 was written on 2016-08-23 00:00:00 Jamie Erhard I found this book in a used bookstore on New Year's Eve in Taipei. The title is a bit ironic because actually the book was first published in 1960 (although revised in 1961,1968, 1972, 1976, and 1982). This book is similar in scope to another book that I read a few years ago called "Inventing Japan". Both books are about how Japan used to be a closed-off country, but in around 1850 the United States forced the Shogun to open the country up to trade, triggering the rapid (relative to other Asian countries at the time) modernization of Japan, which in turn led to the Japanese colonialism, which then led to the war in the Pacific. In both books the fallout from the war in the Pacific - which I think would be interesting as a book all on its own, isn't discussed much - the focus instead being on what happened to post-war Japan. This book was a bit thicker than the previous one and as such was able to cover these topics in greater depth. For example, it was explained that the reason for Japan's policy of isolation from 1603-1868 is because the ruler that came into power at the beginning of this period was relatively weak. In particular, he knew that if his enemies banded together, they could overthrow him. So he needed to implement a number of measures in order to keep them weak and divided, of which Japan's policy of isolation was just one (the logic being that if Japan was not isolated, then western powers might secretly ally with or supply arms to the enemies of the shogun). This book also helped to give a bigger picture about the opening up of Japan. Most of the accounts that I have heard give exclusive credit to Admiral Perry from the USA, but this book explains that many western powers were having the same idea around this time, and Perry just got there first. "It looked as if either Russia or Great Britain would be the first to compel the shogunal government to open its doors. The betting, we might say, was on the Russians. For in October 1852, there set off from Europe on the long voyage to the Far East the Russian Admiral Putyatin, empowered to persuade the Japanese to sign a commercial treaty. However, when the four vessels of Putyatin's expedition approached Nagasaki in August 1853, an American squadron under Commodore Matthew Perry had already presented what amounted to an ultimatum to the shogunate." I found the part about the Pacific war a little bit confusing. I'm still not clear exactly why Japan decided to go to war with China - the book makes it sound like the war with China just kind of evolved organically. To the best of my understanding, the war with China evolved like this: 1. 1894-1895: Japan and Qing China go to war. Although both countries were opened up by the west around the same time (Japan as above and China by the Opium war), Japan took advantage of trade with Europe and rapidly modernized its military, whereas China, for various reasons, did not. China, who had been the dominant power in the region since antiquity, is easily beaten by Japan. Although technically a war between Japan and China, the real issue of this war seems to be Korea, which was a vassal state of China at the time. It's not clear to me if Japan at this time already wanted to take complete control of Korea or just wanted to have more influence (and the ability to trade with Korea), but the outcome of the war was that Korea became recognized as independent from China, while China gave up Taiwan* as well as a part of Manchuria (the Liaodong peninsula) to Japan. *side note: When Qing China gave Taiwan to Japan, it is more accurate to say that it gave the *portion* of Taiwan under its control to Japan. Because actually, China had never been able to bring the Eastern side of the island under control, as the natives there were too fierce. It was Japan, and not China, that was the first to control Taiwan in its entirety. Right after the war, a few European powers (including Russia) convinced Japan to give up its claim on the Liaodong peninsula (which it did, but only under duress). Five years later, Russia took it for itself. Japan was understandably pissed off about this. 2. 1905 Japan goes to war with Russia in Manchuria. After taking the Liaodong peninsula, Russian influence in Manchuria continued to grow (part of the reason Russia wanted Manchuria is that the port of Vladivostok, which was part of Russia, was harder to reach if you have to go around Manchuria). After taking the Liaodong peninsula, Russia used the boxer rebellion in China as an excuse to move a large number of troops into the region, and was eyeing Korea. Japan felt threatened, and a few years later went to war with Russia and won. This was considered a big deal because it was the first time an Asian power defeated a European power. Japan won the Liaodong peninsula and a small piece of Manchuria, as well as Russia's promise not to interfere with Korea. 3. 1904 - 1907 Japan takes control of Korea. This part is better explained in another book of mine, but I forgot the details. Nevertheless, by 1907 the Korean King abdicates and Japan is in control of Korea from then until the end of WWII. So, now we have this situation where Japan controls Korea, Taiwan, and part of Manchuria. At this point, as we'll see below, it would be natural for Japan to attack either China or Russia. But there are deep internal divisions within Japan (a theme which we will keep coming back to). 4. 1931 - The Manchurian Incident: This step illustrates the divisions stated above. The Prime minister of Japan finds out that officers in Manchuria are planning a coup. He tells the Emperor, who tells the minister of war that the army needs to be reigned in. The minister of war then writes an urgent letter to the army commander in Manchuria, telling him to cancel any plans the army might have. But then the person whose job it is to deliver the letter takes a deliberately long time to get to Manchuria (taking the train instead of flying, and then well he gets there instead of immediately delivering the letter, he goes to a Geisha-house). While he is at the Geisha house, the coup takes place. Interestingly, the courier was someone known to be involved in a previously planned coup in Manchuria, making him a seemingly obvious poor choice, unless the minister of war didn't actually want the letter to be delivered. The result of this is that within a year Japan has taken control of most of Manchuria. The Manchurian incident is often considered the trigger of the war with China. But, according to the above, it was carried out by a rogue faction of the military against the explicit instructions of the emperor. It's worth mentioning that the divisions between the Japan army and government ran so deep that on multiple occasions factions within the military planned to eliminate the latter by simply bombing them out of existence while they were in session: "The Saito cabinet, before it resigned in the summer of 1934, had survived a murderous conspiracy as sensational as any that had been known before. The plot, like the 'October Incident' of 1934, included preparations for the liquidation of the government at one blow by bombing from the air. The military cabinet to be established by a coup d'etat was to be headed by a prince of the imperial house." Here's another quote illustrating the divide between the army and government, when the league of nations asks Japan to withdraw from Manchuria: "There now followed weeks of public embarrassment and secret humiliation for the Wakatsuki government. While the army in the field boldly extended the scope of its operations, Japanese representatives at the League of Nations in Geneva, and at London, Washington, and other capitals, declared that these military measures were only temporary and would soon cease. Indeed, on 30 September Japan accepted a resolution by the Council of the League calling for the withdrawal of Japanese troops to the South Manchurian Railway zone. So far from withdrawal taking place, further advances were made...This blatant contrast between Japanese promises and the action of Japanese troops spreading fan-like through Manchuria led the world to suppose that the cabinet in Tokyo had adopted a policy of deliberate chicanery and deceit. This was not so. What was happening was the breakdown of coordination between the civil and military wings of the Japanese structure of state power. The position of the Wakatsuki administration is best summed up in the words of Saionji's secretary, who in a private talk at the time to members of the House of Peers declared: ' From the beginning to end the government has been utterly fooled by the army.' " 5. 1932 Japan creates the puppet state of Manchukuo Japan declares Manchuria an "independent state", giving it the new name Manchukuo, and installs the former Qing emperor Puyi as its ruler. In reality, Manchukuo is a puppet state and Puyi is a puppet emperor. There is a great movie about this, called "The Last Emperor". Relations between Japan and the League of Nations break down and Japan withdraws from the League. 6. 1937 - Japanese invasion begins in earnest. Here is where the book really makes it sound like the invasion just kind of happened: "Early in July fighting broke out near Peking between Japanese and Chinese troops. The situation deteriorated, and the minister of War - a tough-minded Tosei-ha [Tosei-ha refers to one of two major factions within the army] general named Sugiyama - proposed to make it worse by the dispatch of reinforcements from Manchukuo and Korea. Konoye [the prime minister], backed by the Navy and Foreign Ministers, tried to resist this demand. Sugiyama was adamant; so, dreading the political crisis that would occur if the War Minister resigned, Konoye gave way. Thus the clash near Peking was allowed to widen into what became in fact an invasion of China. Undoubtedly this accorded with the plans of the Tosei-ha. While there is no convincing evidence, as in the case of the Mukden coup [The Manchurian Incident], that hostilities in North China originated from an incident planned by Japanese officers on the spot, there is reason to believe that at General Staff Headquarters in Tokyo there was a feeling, especially among colonels and below, that the time had come to settle accounts with Chiang Kai-shek." So this paragraph at least makes it sound like the invasion of China is mainly the idea of the Tosei-ha faction within the army and something opposed by both the government and the emperor. Interestingly, the other major faction within the army wanted to ignore China and instead saw Manchuria as a launch pad for war with Russia: "The Kodo-ha...were obsessed by the prospect of war with the Russians, and they were not very interested in plans for a Japanese advance south of the Great Wall into China. On the other hand, the Tosei-ha thought it wise to maintain friendly relations with the Soviet Union and to make China the main target of Japanese expansion once Manchuria had been secured. These internal stresses within the Japanese army were of course hidden from the contemporary world." 7. The Pacific War Then there is the question of why Japan, for whom things were going so well (with China now largely under its control and none of the allies directly opposing it), decided to embark on a suicidal war against the USA and the UK at the same time. Here, the short answer seems to be that when Japan invaded Saigon, she had finally gone too far, and the United States, the UK, and Holland imposed crippling economic sanctions on it (in particular regarding oil). Japan could either back down, or secure its own source of oil by attacking the Dutch East Indies. It went with the latter, but rather than just attacking the Dutch East Indies, decided to also launch surprise attacks on Hawaii, Hong Kong, Malaya, Singapore, and the Philippines. But the deeper answer is that this again comes down to divisions within the Japanese power structure. "...yet even now the navy was reluctant to engage in war with the United States. In fact, if the Navy Minister and the Chief of the Naval General Staff had possessed the courage of their inner convictions and had openly resisted Tojo, the Minister of War, it is possible, even probable, that with the backing of the emperor and of Konoye they might have saved Japan at the 11th hour by advising acceptance of the American demands regarding China." To me, the most interesting things about the book is how the decisions of a few key individuals at critical moments shaped Japan's war with China and subsequent war in the Pacific. Had Japan gone the other way and attacked Russia instead, it's hard to imagine how different the world might be today. It seems unlikely that the Chinese communists could ever have come to power without the unwitting help of the Japanese army. This, in turn, makes the rise of communism in Vietnam and Cambodia less likely. Instead of a divided Korea we might have a united, but communist, Korea, since if attacked by Japan the USSR would likely have attacked Manchuria and then continued on into Korea (as it did at the end of the war), in this version of history unopposed by the United States.