Reviews for Security: A New Framework for Analysis

The average rating for Security: A New Framework for Analysis based on 2 reviews is 4 stars.

Review # 1 was written on 2016-04-14 00:00:00 Justin Bloom Security: A New Framework for Analysis is a very important book in many schools of the social sciences, even if its origins lie in international relations. The securitization that it defines has become, through several evolutions, one of the dominant lenses through which security and insecurity are studied. "Security" and "insecurity" have a lot of meanings, but one easy way to think of this is that the feeling of security means one perceives no threats. So security studies are an examination of what is threatened, and by whom. The securitization framework in the book lays out an explicit methodology intended to identify the components that go into that threat. It starts by locating "securitization" on the spectrum of politicization. At one end lie topics which aren't politicized at all. For example, whether parents read bedtime stories to their children is not currently something that is part of public debate. Formerly, child abuse or spousal rape weren't either, but they've since been politicized, and so are discussed as things which are, potentially, subject to public policy. Securitization lies at the other end of the spectrum, when something becomes so threatening that "normal" discussions need to be avoided. As in: "The house is on fire; now is not the time to worry about whether we've got enough fire insurance coverage." Or, more pertinent: "Hannibal is leading his elephants over the Alps. Do you really think it is useful to discuss our relationship with Carthage?" There are two key elements in that transformation that Buzan et al. make explicit many times in the book. First, there must be an existential threat that kicks the issue out of normal political debate. Second, the situation must be an emergency, not just threatening. While climate change might indeed be an existential threat for civilization, for existence, discussion about how to deal with it goes on, ergo it hasn't been "securitized" as an issue. (Although those living on an island sinking below sea level might feel differently.) The emergency aspect also permits, critically, permission for "breaking the rules" ' violating established norms, procedures, or even laws. Securitization contains its own methodology as well. There are a number of specific components which should (must?) be identified in the analysis. Underlying this is the idea that insecurity is an emotion ' something humans have, not something organizations have. Since it is essentially subjective, and shared, the term "intersubjective" raises its unruly grin. Securitization ' at least as it is officially defined in this book ' is the result of an intersubjective agreement between whoever raises the concern that there is a threat and the appropriate audience, who approves that message as well as the conclusion that "breaking the rules" is appropriate. So the components are: • The securitizing actor. This is the individual who points to the threat and makes a lot of noise about it. It actually doesn't have to be a human individual; it could be a committee or other group acting in unison. But that's still the term. • The threat. What is it that is being pointed at as threatening? Be specific, dammit! • The referent object. What is being threatened? This will often be something tightly affiliated to the securitizing actor, but not necessarily. For example, when the United States was gathering partners and approval for the 1991 Gulf War, the actor was (nominally) George H.W. Bush, whereas the referent object was the territorial integrity of the Middle East, with the entailed risk of destabilization of the price of oil. • The speech act. This is the sales pitch wherein the securitizing actor makes clear what that threat is. Does it have to be one explicit and unitary speech? Well, no, and not even actually a speech. The devil, it turns out, is in the details. More on that later. • The audience. The community that receives the speech act and approves of the need for emergency action to deal with the existential threat. • Facilitating conditions. These are other factors with either are necessary or contributory to the success of the securitization. For example, the Soviet Union or China could have vetoed the United Nations sanction of the counterattack against Iraq via a Security Council veto, but they didn't. • The intended outcome. Well, strictly speaking, this book never mentions this. It might be implied in the speech act, but some theorists using this framework want this separated. Given that the component analysis is one of the strengths of this methodology over a holistic security analysis, this makes sense. An especially crucial aspect of Buzan et al.'s securitization theory is sectoral widening. In most of the history of Security Studies, the focus has been on the country, and specifically the offensive and defensive use of the military. This pattern came under stress due to a lot of modern changes, foremost among them the economic "insecurity" from globalized trade patterns, environmental "insecurity", and social insecurity that arose as the European Community struggled to become the European Union, and especially salient as migrants and refugees transform societies. This book makes quite clear that this securitization framework can be applied to other contexts:Generally speaking, the military security concerns the two-level interplay of the armed offensive and defensive capabilities of states, and states' perceptions of each others' intentions. Political security concerns the organizational stability of states, systems of governments and the ideologies that give them legitimacy. Economic security concerns access to the resources, finance and markets necessary to sustain acceptable levels of welfare and state power. Societal security concerns the sustainability, within acceptable conditions for evolution, of traditional patterns of language, culture and religious and national identity and custom. Environmental security concerns the maintenance of the local and the planetary biosphere as the essential support system on which all other human enterprises depend (page 8). Using the framework in a state-centric analysis is pretty clear. In the run-up to the 1991 Gulf War, the components were: • The securitizing actor. The primary actor in this role was the U.S. President, although sometimes others took part, too. Thomas Pickering, the United States ambassador to the United Nations, would have been negotiating with China and the Soviet Union, for example. • The threat. Saddam Hussein had just invaded another country, Kuwait, which meant that someone who thought territorial expansion via war was a pretty cool idea. At the time, he controlled one of the largest armies in the world, and now he was sitting right next to Saudi Arabia, and would have no problem overwhelming that country as well. He claimed he wasn't interested in that, but that's what Hitler said, wasn't it? • The referent object. President Bush quite explicitly said that the "acquisition of territory by force is unacceptable", but everyone knew the world looked the other way quite often. He also happened to mention the global dependence on oil, and everyone nodded, yup. • The speech act. Lotsa speeches were made. The book makes a big point of how speech acts are performative, and can create "social magic", and there's a really interesting discussion in footnote 5 on page 46, pulling in Bourdieu and Butler and Derrida. This could point to a speech Bush made on television to the United States, but it doesn't seem too useful to narrow it down, although in other cases a textual analysis of a speech or speeches could be very interesting. • The audience. The citizens of the United States were pretty supportive of the invasion, but then it turned out Kuwait had paid a U.S. public relations firm to create some really nasty anti-Iraq propaganda. The Senate approved action 52 to 47, and later complained they'd been swayed by that same propaganda. Which audience was important? • Facilitating conditions. As mentioned earlier, the Soviet Union or China didn't veto this. Why? It's believed that the Soviet Union, facing imminent dissolution, wanted to play nice with the developed nations they might soon need help from, and China was still mending their relationship after Tiananmen. It would be difficult to find empirical evidence to support either of those, perhaps, but the assertion can still be useful. • The intended outcome. The go-ahead to counterattack Hussein's forces was the goal. In some alternate reality, this might have been enough to persuade him to retire his forces, avoiding war. So war, per se, wasn't the goal, although it was the obvious outcome of that permission and Hussein's intransigence. But it is illustrative to use the same framework in non-military sectors: Consider the takeover in early 2016 of the Malheur Wildlife Refuge. » The securitizing actor was Ammon Bundy, et al.; » The threat was an over-powerful Federal government; » The referent object was an idealization of "real America"; » The speech acts were the manifestos and proclamations calling for an uprising; » The audience was the collection of "true Americans" Bundy et al. thought only needed a push to revolt; » Facilitating conditions included mistrust of Obama and the Federal government; and » The intended outcome was a grassroots "Constitutional" revolution. In this case, the securitization failed because the expected audience either didn't exist, or wasn't persuaded that the situation wasn't yet dire enough to warrant this kind of "breaking the rules". Consider the effort to prevent Donald Trump from securing the GOP nomination, specifically through manipulation of the primary process, perhaps including a brokered convention. » The securitizing actors were the GOP elites; » The threat was of a Trump nomination; » The referent object was the Republican identity; » The speech acts were the overt and covert #StopTrump and #AnyoneButTrump campaigns; » The audience was the GOP delegates who might cooperate in the manipulation; » Facilitating conditions included media complicity; and » The intended outcome was the denial of the nomination of the presumptive candidate. In this case, the securitization failed because it would have required Trump to only have a plurality, and the withdrawal of all the other candidates guaranteed him a pure majority. Consider the pro-life/anti-abortion movement, specifically the violence that is associated with that movement; » The securitizing actors are the extremists among pro-life leadership; » The threat is of the societal tolerance of abortion; » The referent object is "pre-born children"; » The speech acts are the explicit association of abortion with murder; » The audience is extreme believers among conservative Christians; » Facilitating conditions include the ambivalence of U.S. society on the ethical nature of abortion; and » The intended outcome is the killing of those performing or assisting abortion, and the deterrence of abortion. In this case, the securitization has largely succeeded, resulting in sporadic violence, which is then dismissed as aberrant and the result of disturbed individuals and unconnected to the overall campaign. Securitization as a methodology is a powerful forensic tool. Examination of the components that make up a securitization event creates a finer-grained analysis than in most analyses, and a subsequent discussion can involve disagreements at the component level. Even so, many situations won't permit that level of granularity. For example, when the Bush administration "broke the rules" with "extraordinary renditions" and torture, there was clearly something akin to a securitization happening, but it was hidden within the workings of the military and security agencies. Securitization as an explanatory theory has different problems. Buzan et al. claim in some places that it isn't a securitization unless there is an intersubjective agreement the actor and appropriate audience, but in other places state that the critical elements are just the existential threat and emergency. While all the ideas herein are powerful and provocative, there's quite a bit of theoretical and practical confusion. Of course, this book is almost twenty years old, so a lot of this has been discussed. (See, for example, 2010's Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve , by Thierry Balzacq). Unfortunately, there doesn't seem to be a revised edition that addresses these concerns, so any social theorist using securitization needs to start with this book, and discover those critiques and their answers that are most pertinent to their cases. Hopefully this oversight will someday be remedied, although I think it is more likely that the accumulation of problems is insurmountable, and the usages of these concepts will sadly continue to propagate and diverge. ­

Review # 2 was written on 2008-11-22 00:00:00 Henry Lupori emm, buzan's is my favourite text book. eventhough published years ago, i find it really usefull to understand the contemporary security studies. please try to read this book, mate. u'll get a usefull point of view, and theoretical approach on contemporary security. regards, mh.