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Reviews for Free Will: A Guide for the Perplexed

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The average rating for Free Will: A Guide for the Perplexed based on 2 reviews is 4 stars.has a rating of 4 stars

Review # 1 was written on 2016-04-22 00:00:00
2011was given a rating of 4 stars Ron Minor
Continuum has published another book in the Guide for the Perplexed series. In an era where academic research proliferates, this series fills a real need. Timothy Mawson's book is a valuable contribution to this series, introducing the readers to the fascinating but often complex philosophical issues pertaining to the discussion of free will. Perhaps somewhat surprising, this book clearly advocates one side in the discussion (libertarianism), rather than trying to give a more descriptive overview of the competing views and their respective arguments. This does not imply, however, that Mawson's exposition is unfair. But being one of the 'perplexed' of the intended readership, it is not clear to me after reading this book, what the relative sizes are of e.g., the compatibilist vs. incompatibilist academic communities. One could question the added value of this book, however, as there already exists an introduction advocating a similar view, a book Mawson points out and commends in the 'Further Reading' section: Robert Kane. A Contemporary Introduction to Free Will. Oxford: OUP, 2005. The argument throughout the book is well structured. Each section or chapter builds logically on the previous one. The conclusion to each chapter is always a clear recapitulation of the main points established. The overall conclusion, which is very brief, does the same for the whole book. A more developed use of subtitles, however, would have enhanced the reading experience and the usefulness of this book for quick reference. This is all the more remarkable as some chapters easily lend themselves to further subdivision. The writing style is informal, making continuous use of entertaining examples that make the abstract arguments concrete. The style would have benefitted from a more strict editing, however, as the reader is often lost in long sentences containing bracketed side-thoughts and clarifications between dashes (cf. the 10 line sentence at the end of p. 165 continuing on p. 166). A short introductory chapter sketches the reason why there is a free will discussion through an extended example. Chapter Two really sets the stage for the book in outlining the five building blocks that constitute the common sense view of humans being free agents. Together they form the tradition called 'Libertarianism.' These views are (1) Indeterminism, (2) Moral Responsibility, (3) Incompatibilism, (4) Ultimate Authorship, and (5) being well-informed, un-rushed and un-coerced. These views are helpfully and repeatedly referred to through 5 sentences: "Sometimes I could do something other than what I actually do. Sometimes I'm morally responsible for what I do. If I couldn't do other than what I actually do, then I wouldn't be morally responsible for what I do. If I wasn't the ultimate author of my actions, then I wouldn't be morally responsible for them. To the extent that I did not will an action under the morally salient description, I am not fully morally responsible for it" (52, 169, 174). It is the claim of Mawson that these thoughts are "independently licensed by common sense even if they are perhaps not licensed thereby to the same extent" (51). View 2 and 5 are primarily discussed in Chapter Two, but the other views each get assigned a separate chapter. Chapter Three through Five discuss arguments that challenge elements of this common-sense view. Chapter Three (Incompatibilism) starts with arguments for and against the incompatibilist thesis, and constitutes the longest chapter of the book. The chapter starts with the meta issue of where the 'dialectical balance' falls on the issue of Incompatibilism: Mawson discusses whether Incompatibilism is innocent until proven guilty. He makes the case that belief in Incompatibilism is properly basic because there are good arguments for the truth of Incompatibilism, and the arguments against it can be successfully countered. Having argued that Incompatibilism is true, Indeterminism is tackled in Chapter Four. Here as well, the meta-issue shows that Indeterminism is innocent until proven guilty. Mawson rightly points out that neither Determinism nor Indeterminism can be proven from a scientific basis, even if the current state of the art of the sciences seems to favour Indeterminism. However, Indeterminism can be defended by the positive argument that "given Incompatibilism and our moral responsibility, Indeterminism must be right" (142). The final chapter (5 Ultimate Authorship) discusses the problem of the ultimate authorship of human actions. This chapter is the shortest (apart from the Introduction and Conclusion). This is understandable as this book contains a cumulative argument, with this chapter building on the previous ones. The book ends with a short glossary explaining key terms and definitions, followed by the endnotes and a bibliography. The endnotes give ample reference to alternative views, but without substantiating the alternative. Overall, the endnotes are very much worth the read, as they often contain substantial information or comments. The 'Further Reading' section would be more helpful to the reader new to the field if it was an annotated bibliography. For theologians interested in the free will discussion, it is worth noting that the whole issue of divine foreknowledge and free will is not tackled. And although the issue of 'soul' is touched upon briefly, one would have wished for more. But one cannot blame Mawson for making the reader to wish for more. Having introduced the perplexed reader ably and skilfully into the discussion, he is to be commended for whetting our appetite.
Review # 2 was written on 2015-01-21 00:00:00
2011was given a rating of 4 stars Matthew Laramore
I can't justify this rating, but I do have one comment: I wish that this volume had included (more?) passages referenced by Derrida in Speech and Phenomena. Perhaps it did, since there were a couple of passages about signs and some others about time-consciousness, but from what I remember I thought that more could have been included.


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