Reviews for Reasons (for Faith) Philosophy in the Service of Theology

The average rating for Reasons (for Faith) Philosophy in the Service of Theology based on 2 reviews is 4 stars.

Review # 1 was written on 2008-08-28 00:00:00 Abraham Guerra Reasons for Faith is Scott Oliphint's (O, hereafter) foray into a Reformed approach to philosophy of religion (PR, hereafter). He represents the presuppositionalist school. Though he barely mentions Van Til, "his fingerprints are on every page." Since Van Til merely claimed to stand on the shoulders of the giants of the Reformed faith, O represents traditional Reformed orthodoxy, as is seen by his copious quoting and footnoting of men like Calvin, Turretin, and Vermigli. O also relies heavily on the work of Richard Muller in this book. But, O isn't content to stay within the comfortable halls of Reformed orthodoxy. He interacts with many non-Reformed philosophers too. He interacts with the usual suspects, viz., Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, and Kant, but also with more contemporary names, viz., W.L. Craig, J.M. Fischer, Helm, Plantinga etc. O tries to show the (Reformed) Christian position is "not simply a plausible alternative," "but the consistent, cogent, and altogether reasonable position that is able to offer solutions to the problems posed" famously and traditionally in the PR. He holds that philosophy is minister to theology, not magistrate. Thus "Theology, therefore, provides the parameters in which philosophy must work. It does not define all of philosophy's content; it does not define the specific method(s) that philosophy must use; it does not define the specific details of a philosophical system. But it does provide the ground, as well as the boundaries, from within which philosophy must work." With this I agree. This is where the book excels, in my opinion. I think it is much better in what it attempts to do (and the heart in which it attempts it), than what is actually ends up doing. Paul Helm notes these points in his review of the book: Paul Helm's Review A rough summary of the chapters might go like this: * In 1 O discusses faith and reason. O surveys the history of the discussion, giving a general description of how those terms have historically been understood as denoting different sources of knowledge. He then shows that the Reformed have had their own say in the matter. That say has not assumed unaided reason's capacity to know God but placed that knowledge in revelation. A distinction between implanted and acquired knowledge of God was employed by the Reformers. They meant both of these as given by God - either implanted or acquired through creation. Later enlightenment categories did away with that distinction. O then places the current faith/reason discussion in the evidentialist objection to faith and shows that two main ways have been invoked to deal with the challenges. He presents Aquinas and Plantinga as two proponents of those ways. * In 2 O "reforms" reason and offers arguments for its staus as minister or servant to theology, relying heavily on Turretin. He notes 4 uses philosophy has for theology and four dangers. * In 3 O notes that the concepts of the relationship between being, essence, changing and unchanging, were and are basic questions in metaphysics with many different answers by almost everyone. Problems were created when trying to relate those concepts to the "Ultimate" or "God." * In 4 O notes that relationships between God, being, the world, and how we know are central issues of the PR. Metaphysics and epistemology are intimately related. Kant's program was important in the history of this discussion. Kant sent our knowledge ion sense perception but also included necessary presupposed categories of the mind as knowledge had a priori. But things outside experience cannot be known. Thus God, the self, the thing-in-itself, could not be known. This is in the tradition of earlier views about God and his being (if he has one) being unknowable. There's nothing like a consensus on these issues, so O, taking some cues from van Inwagen, sets out to go looking for something better. * In 5 O claims that the doctrine of creation is the best place to start when saying something Christian about the nature of things. Things are either creator or creature. We need to take revelation as our source of knowledge about God and world. Reason and philosophy are ministerial to the task of theology. In knowing God, the doctrine of simplicity is important. God has no parts and his attributes are identical to his essence. O discusses Aquinas and some problems he had. * In 6 O continues with problems for Aquinas mainly due to his transcendental notion of being. O tries to answer these problems by keeping simplicity and applying creator/creature distinction. So there are different kinds of being or ways of existing. We only know God by revelation. It is God's way of signifying who he is. It is based on his knowledge of who he is. Since simple, his knowledge is identical to his essence. * In 7 O hints at a sketch of revelational epistemology. He beings by discussing Plantinga. He detours from Plantinga on the sensus divinitatis SD taking it to be knowledge rather than a capacity for knowledge. The knowledge is implanted directly in us by God through nature. Since it is knowledge it is automatically warranted. Since it is given by God, he doesn't leave it up to us to reason from scratch to his existence. O then briefly discusses Plantinga's objection to foundationalism and his own version of Reidian foundationalism. He ends by asking if this approach is sufficient for Christian epistemology. * 8 discusses the problems with Scottish Common Sense Realism. SCSR attempted to ground knowledge in knowledge, not reality. A Christian Reformed approach should ground knowledge in reality - of God and creation. O also notes it is also important to note that our knowledge is given by God, not obtained by fallible processes. It cannot be liable to error, then. * 9 is a good chapter. O takes his "two-being" approach as essential for PR. God is original and all else is image. He introduces an essential feature of his system - the Eimi/eikon distinction. He again discusses philosophy's relation to theology as one as minister. * In 10 O uses his Eimi/eikon structure and applies it to a traditional question in the PR: Does God have an essence and how is the decision to place x or y into the "essence" box grounded? To help answer O uses possible worlds semantics as a helpful way to approach the question. To this he appeals to aseity. * In 11 O looks at a popular and thorny problem in the PR: how can God have contingent properties. This question is borne out by various "incompatibility" arguments. O discusses time/eternity and impassibility. He claims that it is the relationship with creation that creates (!) the problem. In creation God determines to bring something into being that is metaphysically different than himself. In trying to deal with these thorny problems O charges that many philosophers have demoted God. * 12 tries to answer the problem of the last chapter. O introduces the doctrine of covenantal condescension to show how God could have contingent properties. By deciding to create God voluntarily takes on contingent properties by way of covenantal relationship. He doesn't lose what he is but "adds" something(s) he is not. O sees a good analogy in the Incarnation. * In 13 O calls the problem of evil the toughest challenge to the faith. He briefly describes it and goes over Plantinga's defense of Christianity to the (logical) PoE. He notes Plantinga requires libertarian free will to make his argument go through. This minimizes God's sovereignty (as defined by the Reformed). So Reformed thinkers must look elsewhere for an answer to the PoE. * In 14 O tries to show how a Reformed free will defense could be given that keeps God's essential properties the same. He first provides a model that shows how the incompatible can be made compatible. He shows how this model works for Christ, who had incompatible properties made compatible. If this could be compatible what prima facie, non-arbitrary reason is there to think sovereignty/free will cannot be so made? * 15 continues to elaborate on his notion of compatibility, using the incarnation as the exemplar, in showing how we can be free yet determined. He interacts with Fischer and charges him with ignoring a orthodox view of God. * 16 distinguishes the kind of necessity involved in Reformed views of foreknowledge/freedom. He agrees with Turretin et al. in affirming necessity of consequence. This is not incompatible with liberty or contingency. Seems to solve PoE without demoting God. Concludes by looking at why God would create this world with all its evils. Answers with some good Reformed views on the matter. Some problems I had: i) My friend James pointed out one in to O's attempt to show how God could have contingent properties. It seems O makes a modal error. It would appear that God had (or would have had) contingent properties even without creating and thus condescending. For example, "before" creation God had the property of being identical with every other concrete entity that existed (IOW, he was identical to himself). Since we deny pantheism, God is not identical with all concrete entities "after" he decided to create. ii) Another problems is that one might appeal to magic beans as the unifying factor that makes incompatible things compatible. It seemed O just asserted that "God did it" in regard to anything incompatible. God just "makes them" compatible. And, could God make a square and a circle unified and neither lose their essential properties? If not, why not? The human mind can't determine this, says O. iii) I think he was generally dismissive of some of the philosophers he discussed, and his discussion on free will will hardly be convincing to the non-Calvinist. He failed to take on the biggest challenges from the libertarian action theorist.

Review # 2 was written on 2020-07-11 00:00:00 John Constantine Too technical, especially toward the end, for laymen.