Reviews for War in Kentucky: From Shiloh to Perryville

The average rating for War in Kentucky: From Shiloh to Perryville based on 2 reviews is 3.5 stars.

Review # 1 was written on 2012-03-29 00:00:00 Carol Gillespie James Lee McDonough's War in Kentucky: From Shiloh to Perryville is a noteworthy revisionist view of the Confederate invasion of Kentucky in 1862. McDonough provides a new perspective on the soundness of Confederate General Braxton Bragg's strategic transfer of military operations from northern Mississippi -- adroitly using railroad connections to Chattanooga -- into Kentucky in loose coordination with Edmund Kirby Smith's Army of East Tennessee. McDonough explores Bragg's strategic vision in the campaign's inception as well as the undeniable failure of its ultimate execution. The sanguine affair at Perryville was the culmination of the invasion; its only lasting effects being the relief of Federal General Don Carlos Buell by Lincoln and the manufacture of a poisonous atmosphere among Bragg and his officers. The book is well written, but suffers from too few maps of poor quality.

Review # 2 was written on 2013-02-14 00:00:00 Lance Reynolds Gary Gallagher has written/edited a number of books on the Civil War. This book is an edited volume, focusing on several aspects of the sanguinary battle at Antietam, fought in 1962. All told, there are ten essays in this volume, with Gallagher contributing the lead essay. As with all edited volumes, some of the works may not be up to the same standards as others. But, overall, this is a useful volume. It might best be used by reading it alongside one of the better histories of the battler, such as Stephen Sears' "Landscape Turned Red: The Battle of Antietam." Let's take a look at some of the essays to illustrate what the book is about. . . . Gallagher begins the book with an essay on how the south saw the aftermath of the battle. He notes that, in the final analysis, southerners were more likely than not to see Antietam as a plus for the cause. In the aftermath of the Peninsula successes of General Robert E. Lee and the remarkable victory by the Confederate forces at Second Manassas, this was seen as the denouement of a stretch of marvelous fighting by the Army of Northern Virginia. Brooks Simpson authored a more positive than usual account of Union General George McClellan's leadership at Antietam. McClellan was often accused of "the slows," because of his seeming inability to fight aggressively. Simpson argues that some of McClellan's arguments made sense, such as logistical problems associated with the movement of the Army of the Potomac toward Antietam. The last chapter is a nice counterpoint, examining how Antietam was used by the Army for training/education before World War I. This battle was one example used at the Army War College to prepare officers for command. They would go over maps and scenarios (e.g., what if McClellan had hurried toward Antietam after finding Lee's orders as opposed to his rather movements). The students and teachers were pretty much unanimous in concluding that McClellan had not generaled his forces very well--up to Antietam and at the battle site itself. Other chapters speak to addition key issues, such as: how poorly supplied Confederate forces were, the Confederate cavalry's and artillery's role in protecting the Confederate flank, the action at Bloody Lane, and the ineptitude of Confederate artillery chief William Pendleton. For those interested generally in Civil War history and, specifically, the battle at Antietam, this will be a welcome volume. While there is some unevenness across the chapters, all in all this is a solid volume.