Reviews for Introduction to statistics

The average rating for Introduction to statistics based on 4 reviews is 4.5 stars.

Review # 1 was written on 2015-08-16 00:00:00 Brian Borrero This book in my opinion joins the ranks of work by Regan, Singer, and Sapontzis. Pluhar is a proponent of 'the argument from marginal cases', and employs it effectively in arguing for from the moral considerability of non-human animals. She also defends the argument from marginal cases by showing how sophisticated attempts to defend speciesism are unsuccessful. There is also a chapter on the inadequacy of utilitarianism to provide protection for human and non-human animals due to the replacability argument. I particularly liked this chapter and the chapter on speciesism. The concluding chapter is likely the most controversial of the book as it contains Pluhar's attempt to outline her own theory of the attribution of rights to human and non-human animals. The book is littered with interesting and revealing thought experiments. Attack on animal minds by Frey, Carruthers, and Harrison are also dealt with in the first chapter. In summary, I think this is one of the very best and interesting books I have read in defence of animal ethics, dealing with the very best philosophical attacks-someone looking to dismiss the laypersons objections to animal ethics may find this book excessive and Singer's 'Animal Liberation' sufficient. The book however, is accessible, and while it might read easier if one is already familiar with some of the major publications to date of its release (e.g. 'The Case for Animal Rights', 'Practical Ethics', 'Morals, Reason, and Animals', 'The Animals' Issue' etc) I expect it is just as highly readable as a self-contained book for anyone looking to challenge or buttress their own views- a must read!

Review # 2 was written on 2015-08-16 00:00:00 Brandon Cocke This book in my opinion joins the ranks of work by Regan, Singer, and Sapontzis. Pluhar is a proponent of 'the argument from marginal cases', and employs it effectively in arguing for from the moral considerability of non-human animals. She also defends the argument from marginal cases by showing how sophisticated attempts to defend speciesism are unsuccessful. There is also a chapter on the inadequacy of utilitarianism to provide protection for human and non-human animals due to the replacability argument. I particularly liked this chapter and the chapter on speciesism. The concluding chapter is likely the most controversial of the book as it contains Pluhar's attempt to outline her own theory of the attribution of rights to human and non-human animals. The book is littered with interesting and revealing thought experiments. Attack on animal minds by Frey, Carruthers, and Harrison are also dealt with in the first chapter. In summary, I think this is one of the very best and interesting books I have read in defence of animal ethics, dealing with the very best philosophical attacks-someone looking to dismiss the laypersons objections to animal ethics may find this book excessive and Singer's 'Animal Liberation' sufficient. The book however, is accessible, and while it might read easier if one is already familiar with some of the major publications to date of its release (e.g. 'The Case for Animal Rights', 'Practical Ethics', 'Morals, Reason, and Animals', 'The Animals' Issue' etc) I expect it is just as highly readable as a self-contained book for anyone looking to challenge or buttress their own views- a must read!

Review # 3 was written on 2018-05-03 00:00:00 Tom Proko A "second generation" philospher writing about animals and ethics. Pretty tight. A summary: 1. HUMAN "SUPERIORITY" AND THE ARGUMENT FROM MARGINAL CASES A. Candidates for Inclusion into the Moral Community - full-fledged persons, persons lower on the autonomy scale, self-conscious beings who have little or no autonomy, merely conscious beings, living unconscious, natural objects - Rollin's argument: (1) in order to learn from experience, must recognize experience is happening to one, (2) in order to recognize experience is happening to one, one must be self-conscious, (3) nonhumans learn from experience, therefore (4) Nonhumans are self-conscious B. Frequently Held Views on Who Counts Morally: Homocentrism - defended by theology [circular, many religions], and sentience… - philosophical views matter to scientists (Descartes and logical positivists) - chimps have over 98% of our genes, yet are not 98% shakespeares [our brains 340% bigger, though bodies similar size] - Caruthers against sentience; animals have pains but don't "feel" pains; blindsight - intelligence: rats in narrow area, lick food off tail or exchange licks with others, honeyguides (birds) too weak to open hives lead others there and feed on remains - moral agency: most (unrelated) rhesus monkeys went hungry instead of shocking others (compare to Milgram), rats kept others from drinking salt water; virtious, not principled C. (FHVoWCM): The Full-Personhood View - incompatible with homocentrism (can be nonhuman persons [God, aliens, some animals], a lot of humans not persons [marginals]). D. The AMC: Two Versions - "marginal" means "nonparadigmatic" - 1) catorical version (Dombrowski calls it "strong version"): a) Equally same means equal significance, b) some animals and humans same, c) marginal humans are "maximally morally significant", d) therefore those animals are maximally morally significant (have rights). [Pc justified by Gerwith] - 2) biconditional ("weak") version: if marginals have rights than so do similar humans 2. RESPONSES TO THE ARGUMENT FROM MARGINAL CASES (amc) A. Unsuccessful Attacks on the AMC -underestimating marginals [opposite may be true: chimp Kanzi's favorite video is of his own mother; asked "Matata hide?" while checking old hiding spots, than hooted when shown video and requests often] - Coady says Washoe fails to be an "even moderately boring dinner guest" [chimp Lucy drank expensive wine, refused cheap stuff, than drank others instead] - endangerment argument: [societies with no concern for marginals tend to respect rights of normals more]; no,just self-preservation (triage) [affluent Japanese village had a lot of infanticide for convenience, well-off Greeks did similar] - Frey accepts biconditional (weak) form and allows vivisection on some marginals 3. SPECIESISM AND FULL PERSONHOOD -Most plausible form: membership in a species characterized by full personhood is enough for rights [what if chimp can go to college like Rachels said?] -Singer: when rights run exactly parallel to species line, this is speciesism -appeal to genetic kinship: [have as many obligations to adopted as biological kids, and maybe more to unrelated life mates as siblings; racism ok?]; relationships [Rawls' unaquired vs. acquired duties; can't take neighbor's car for friend; human family can't intentionally kill those outside the family any more than a traditional family can] -emotion: [goes both ways: a man in small lifeboat wouldn't throw own dog overboard for 2 other men; bigotry] -its rational. Brandt says irrational preferences are those that disappear when repeatedly exposed to vivid reflection on relevant info/logic; whatever survives is rational; [Brandt's rationality impossible to distinguish from extreme bigotry, hence sexism is ok for some]; ok, rational if some persons stop wanting/believing after reflection on info/logic [people have stopped being speciesists after reflection] -conclusion: most plausible form of speciesism is unsupported 4. UTILITARIANISM AND THE PROTECTION OF INNOCENT LIFE -killing innocents is sometimes ok and creatures are replaceable -total-view (count all, contraception is prima facie as wrong as killing child; we already seem to believe the repugnant conclusion, too many people for food!) - prior-existence-view (count those that already exist; the wretched child) - both views suck, give up utilitarianism 5. JUSTIFICATION AND JUDGEMENT: Claiming and Respecting Basic Moral Rights - Sapontzits says animal liberation furthers three common moral goals: a) improving character, b) reducing suffering/increasing happiness and , b) being fair; burden of anti-liberationists is on them. [assumes animals have significance {no, just that suffering, etc. has significance}] - Sumner on Rawls: circularity, presupposes morality - Regan needs initial agreement on intuitions, Gerwith attempts this initial justification. A. Justifying the Rights View - moral codes are action guides for agents, agents logically must accept and respect rights of others. (1) "I do X for end or purpose E" (2) "E is good"; agent has desires and values goals (3) "My freedom and well-being are necessary goods"; valued in/extrinsically (4) "I must have F and W-B"; needs F and W-B because wants E (5) "I have rights to F and W-B"; agent accepts she has these claims against others; to deny 5 is to deny 6 (6) "All other persons ought at least to refrain from removing or interfering with my F and W-B"; to deny 6 is also to entail 6' (6') "Other persons may (i.e., it is permissible) remove or interfere with my F and W-B"; this contradicts 2 (7) "I have rights to F and W-B because I am a prospective purposive agent" (8) "If the having of some quality Q is a sufficient condition of some predicate P's belonging to some individual S, then P must also belong to all other subjects that have Q"; accepts principle of universalizability (9) "All prospective purposive agents have rights to F and W-B" (10) "Act in accord with the generic rights of your recipient as well as of yourself"; principle of generic consistency - allows us past relativist impasse {?} - critics: prudential, not moral [start with agents acceptance of own rights, universalized to agents acceptance of other's rights; this is moral claim]; missiles have goals but do not regard as good -still, many are unmoved by logic; those that are fully committed to logic will accept rights for all {?}; psychologists: caring for others comes shortly after caring for selves; why not just appeal to emotion? Cuz bad stuff happens; Kant: reason without emotion is impotent, and emotion without reason is blind B. Respecting Basic Moral Rights: Obligations and Conflicts - as Rollin suggested, biological parameters must be respected if any individual is to receive respectful treatment - domestic animals: unacquired duty of noninterference unless threatened, and acquired duty to those who are alive or whose conditions are because of our choices; special obligations like those to our child, even though other kids are no more significant; possible to have respectful and mutually beneficial relationship with egg/milk producers; ok to eat naturally dead animals - wild animals: respectful nonintervention unless threat to us or we have acquired duties; Lucy the signing chimp released into the wild later to be found dead with hands and feet missing; we would violate more rights by meddling than by staying out; ½ of deer get away injured; we are after all, the original offenders (they were here first); hunters are not friends to animals, don't see them as distinct individuals, and kill a lot that don't overpopulate (birds) >killing ok sometimes: euthanasia, self-defense, scarcity of resources ( we don't have to draw straws anymore than flip a coin if a deranged person wants to kill us, even though equally morally significant; morals are action guides, not "chance guides"; may have psychological and prudential reasons for killing a nonhuman, but this doesn't mean they have less moral status) - lifeboat analogies and real dilemmas: Regan's version not too common (throw one out or all die, eat one or all starve), more common lifeboat is not enough for all > Regan's harm of death premise is egalitarian but incorrect; two prisoners varying in sophistication of desires both lose equally by imprisonment, death is same; age can be a factor in harm of death, intelligence works both ways > Lifeboat requires inhabitants innocently caught together; liberty principle doesn't allow you to take another's vital organ cuz you will be worse-off without, they have prior "property" right to the organ.

Review # 4 was written on 2018-05-03 00:00:00 Jason Du preez A "second generation" philospher writing about animals and ethics. Pretty tight. A summary: 1. HUMAN "SUPERIORITY" AND THE ARGUMENT FROM MARGINAL CASES A. Candidates for Inclusion into the Moral Community - full-fledged persons, persons lower on the autonomy scale, self-conscious beings who have little or no autonomy, merely conscious beings, living unconscious, natural objects - Rollin's argument: (1) in order to learn from experience, must recognize experience is happening to one, (2) in order to recognize experience is happening to one, one must be self-conscious, (3) nonhumans learn from experience, therefore (4) Nonhumans are self-conscious B. Frequently Held Views on Who Counts Morally: Homocentrism - defended by theology [circular, many religions], and sentience… - philosophical views matter to scientists (Descartes and logical positivists) - chimps have over 98% of our genes, yet are not 98% shakespeares [our brains 340% bigger, though bodies similar size] - Caruthers against sentience; animals have pains but don't "feel" pains; blindsight - intelligence: rats in narrow area, lick food off tail or exchange licks with others, honeyguides (birds) too weak to open hives lead others there and feed on remains - moral agency: most (unrelated) rhesus monkeys went hungry instead of shocking others (compare to Milgram), rats kept others from drinking salt water; virtious, not principled C. (FHVoWCM): The Full-Personhood View - incompatible with homocentrism (can be nonhuman persons [God, aliens, some animals], a lot of humans not persons [marginals]). D. The AMC: Two Versions - "marginal" means "nonparadigmatic" - 1) catorical version (Dombrowski calls it "strong version"): a) Equally same means equal significance, b) some animals and humans same, c) marginal humans are "maximally morally significant", d) therefore those animals are maximally morally significant (have rights). [Pc justified by Gerwith] - 2) biconditional ("weak") version: if marginals have rights than so do similar humans 2. RESPONSES TO THE ARGUMENT FROM MARGINAL CASES (amc) A. Unsuccessful Attacks on the AMC -underestimating marginals [opposite may be true: chimp Kanzi's favorite video is of his own mother; asked "Matata hide?" while checking old hiding spots, than hooted when shown video and requests often] - Coady says Washoe fails to be an "even moderately boring dinner guest" [chimp Lucy drank expensive wine, refused cheap stuff, than drank others instead] - endangerment argument: [societies with no concern for marginals tend to respect rights of normals more]; no,just self-preservation (triage) [affluent Japanese village had a lot of infanticide for convenience, well-off Greeks did similar] - Frey accepts biconditional (weak) form and allows vivisection on some marginals 3. SPECIESISM AND FULL PERSONHOOD -Most plausible form: membership in a species characterized by full personhood is enough for rights [what if chimp can go to college like Rachels said?] -Singer: when rights run exactly parallel to species line, this is speciesism -appeal to genetic kinship: [have as many obligations to adopted as biological kids, and maybe more to unrelated life mates as siblings; racism ok?]; relationships [Rawls' unaquired vs. acquired duties; can't take neighbor's car for friend; human family can't intentionally kill those outside the family any more than a traditional family can] -emotion: [goes both ways: a man in small lifeboat wouldn't throw own dog overboard for 2 other men; bigotry] -its rational. Brandt says irrational preferences are those that disappear when repeatedly exposed to vivid reflection on relevant info/logic; whatever survives is rational; [Brandt's rationality impossible to distinguish from extreme bigotry, hence sexism is ok for some]; ok, rational if some persons stop wanting/believing after reflection on info/logic [people have stopped being speciesists after reflection] -conclusion: most plausible form of speciesism is unsupported 4. UTILITARIANISM AND THE PROTECTION OF INNOCENT LIFE -killing innocents is sometimes ok and creatures are replaceable -total-view (count all, contraception is prima facie as wrong as killing child; we already seem to believe the repugnant conclusion, too many people for food!) - prior-existence-view (count those that already exist; the wretched child) - both views suck, give up utilitarianism 5. JUSTIFICATION AND JUDGEMENT: Claiming and Respecting Basic Moral Rights - Sapontzits says animal liberation furthers three common moral goals: a) improving character, b) reducing suffering/increasing happiness and , b) being fair; burden of anti-liberationists is on them. [assumes animals have significance {no, just that suffering, etc. has significance}] - Sumner on Rawls: circularity, presupposes morality - Regan needs initial agreement on intuitions, Gerwith attempts this initial justification. A. Justifying the Rights View - moral codes are action guides for agents, agents logically must accept and respect rights of others. (1) "I do X for end or purpose E" (2) "E is good"; agent has desires and values goals (3) "My freedom and well-being are necessary goods"; valued in/extrinsically (4) "I must have F and W-B"; needs F and W-B because wants E (5) "I have rights to F and W-B"; agent accepts she has these claims against others; to deny 5 is to deny 6 (6) "All other persons ought at least to refrain from removing or interfering with my F and W-B"; to deny 6 is also to entail 6' (6') "Other persons may (i.e., it is permissible) remove or interfere with my F and W-B"; this contradicts 2 (7) "I have rights to F and W-B because I am a prospective purposive agent" (8) "If the having of some quality Q is a sufficient condition of some predicate P's belonging to some individual S, then P must also belong to all other subjects that have Q"; accepts principle of universalizability (9) "All prospective purposive agents have rights to F and W-B" (10) "Act in accord with the generic rights of your recipient as well as of yourself"; principle of generic consistency - allows us past relativist impasse {?} - critics: prudential, not moral [start with agents acceptance of own rights, universalized to agents acceptance of other's rights; this is moral claim]; missiles have goals but do not regard as good -still, many are unmoved by logic; those that are fully committed to logic will accept rights for all {?}; psychologists: caring for others comes shortly after caring for selves; why not just appeal to emotion? Cuz bad stuff happens; Kant: reason without emotion is impotent, and emotion without reason is blind B. Respecting Basic Moral Rights: Obligations and Conflicts - as Rollin suggested, biological parameters must be respected if any individual is to receive respectful treatment - domestic animals: unacquired duty of noninterference unless threatened, and acquired duty to those who are alive or whose conditions are because of our choices; special obligations like those to our child, even though other kids are no more significant; possible to have respectful and mutually beneficial relationship with egg/milk producers; ok to eat naturally dead animals - wild animals: respectful nonintervention unless threat to us or we have acquired duties; Lucy the signing chimp released into the wild later to be found dead with hands and feet missing; we would violate more rights by meddling than by staying out; ½ of deer get away injured; we are after all, the original offenders (they were here first); hunters are not friends to animals, don't see them as distinct individuals, and kill a lot that don't overpopulate (birds) >killing ok sometimes: euthanasia, self-defense, scarcity of resources ( we don't have to draw straws anymore than flip a coin if a deranged person wants to kill us, even though equally morally significant; morals are action guides, not "chance guides"; may have psychological and prudential reasons for killing a nonhuman, but this doesn't mean they have less moral status) - lifeboat analogies and real dilemmas: Regan's version not too common (throw one out or all die, eat one or all starve), more common lifeboat is not enough for all > Regan's harm of death premise is egalitarian but incorrect; two prisoners varying in sophistication of desires both lose equally by imprisonment, death is same; age can be a factor in harm of death, intelligence works both ways > Lifeboat requires inhabitants innocently caught together; liberty principle doesn't allow you to take another's vital organ cuz you will be worse-off without, they have prior "property" right to the organ.