Reviews for ADA LOUISE HUXTABLE (Garland Reference Library of the Humanities)

The average rating for ADA LOUISE HUXTABLE (Garland Reference Library of the Humanities) based on 2 reviews is 3 stars.

Review # 1 was written on 2014-04-27 00:00:00 John Canfield Originally published in 1970, this is a fascinating book. Although it’s title is about sociology in general, thematically Elias is interested specifically in the division of labour (intellectual and otherwise) in society. While there’s certainly general theory about social development, it’s noteworthy that he focuses on science and how to understand it. One major criticism I won't bring up again is that this is clearly the work of a sociologist and not a historian - it constantly aims for generalization rather than pay careful attention to contextual difference. But perhaps, that is the price of admission to this kind of work. I. Summary of his views on non-ideological science vs. ideological pre-scientific thought I find it particularly interesting because of how close it comes (and doesn’t come) to research programmes like SSK, which I consider to be deeply productive. Like Barnes and Bloor would in a few years, Elias too uses traditional philosophy as a foil for his work of understanding science and society. He thinks explaining science by using notions like truth and falsity are unfruitful, but he is so in thrall to science’s lustre, that he simply posits new ideals: In each of these cases, it is crucial that criteria such as 'true' and 'false', 'right' and 'wrong', which were decisive in the traditional philosophy of science, have moved from the centre to the periphery of the theory of science. Of course, it is still possible for research findings to be proved absolutely wrong. But in the more developed sciences the main yardstick is the relationship of newer findings to older available knowledge. This is not something which can be expressed in static polarities like 'true' and 'false', but only by demonstrating the difference between old and new; this becomes apparent through the dynamics of scientific processes, in the course of which theoretical and empirical knowledge becomes more extensive, more correct, and more adequate(53). The ultimate problem is that, drawing from Comte, he is stuck considering successful sciences (his model is the natural sciences) as differing from pre-scientific thought by being purely cognitive, and non-ideological: If a sociological theory of knowledge is to be based not on the postulation of scientific utopias but on the investigation of sciences as observable social processes, then it must focus on the nature of the cognitive processes in the course of which first a few, then more and better organized groups of people succeed in bringing human knowledge and thought into ever closer agreement with an ever more comprehensive range of observable data. To recognize this task is to break away from both philosophical absolutism and the still widely prevalent sociological relativism. …Then, on the other hand, there is the sociological theory of science, which deals exclusively with the social determination of prescientific patterns of thought. Just as the philosophical theory of science has almost exclusively taken as its model scientific knowledge of natural events, so the sociological theory of knowledge has so far been concerned almost entirely with ideas about society and with political and social ideologies. It has not asked how and under what conditions non-ideological, scientific knowledge of natural and social relationships is possible. (53-4) Apparently any considerations of “extra-scientific considerations” would render it unscientific waste: The social nature of scientific research is demonstrated by the repeated demand that its findings be 'replicable' and 'testable'. Testability is always understood to mean testable by other people as well as the investigator. Certainly, no scientific method can in itself guarantee the validity of all results obtained by its application. If a researcher's attitudes and scientific criteria are to any extent shaped by heteronomous, extra-scientific considerations, whether political, religious or national -- or even considerations of professional status -- his efforts may all amount to a waste of time. (61) In particular, apparently science has a kind of autonomy from society that allows it to be non-ideological: Frequent reference has been made to the concept of 'relative autonomy'. This refers to three different but completely interdependent aspects of the sciences. First, there is the relative autonomy of the subject matter of a science within the whole universe of interdependent events. Division of the scientific world into a number of different types of sciences, primarily centred on physics, biology and sociology, would very much hamper scientists' work if the division did not correspond to an arrangement of the cosmos itself. Therefore the first level of relative autonomy, and the foundation for the other two, is the relative autonomy of the subject matter of one science with respect to the subject matter of the other sciences. The second level is the relative autonomy of scientific theory about this subject matter. This means two things. It is no longer closely bound up with prescientific conceptions of its subject matter, couched in terms of purpose, meaning and intention. It is also relatively autonomous in relation to theories about other fields of investigation. The third level is the relative autonomy of a given science within academic institutions conducting teaching and research. This also involves the relative autonomy of groups of professional scientists, the specialists in a certain subject, with respect both to groups representing other sciences, and to nonscientists. (59) II. Problems for his views – external and internal The problems for Elias are legion. External First, a wealth of historical, sociological, and anthropological work has shows how assuming science is non-ideological is simply dubious. Apart from the effects that science has on society, scientists, being part of society, have social identities and positions which certainly influence their own institutions and their own work! For example, Shapin points out that credibility for early British practitioners was tied to their identities as financially independent gentlemen, and these identities constantly had to be performed and made visible for work to be accepted. Such aspects, far from invalidating their work, was essential for them to be taken seriously! In addition, he buys too readily into Comte’s notion that are distinct ways of thinking that are pre-scientific (theological or metaphysical). While animistic explanations might resemble his model of pre-science, any sophisticated theological worldview wouldn’t. Of course, Elias might think these are insufficiently empirical or tested, but the point is that different practices have difference metrics of acceptable evidence! Internal But perhaps deeper, I suspect there’s some tensions in Elias’ ideal for sociology itself. As with Comte, Elias desperately wants to argue for some autonomous domain for sociology. Consider this statement: To put it another way, it is symptomatic of the transition from prescientific to scientific ways of gaining knowledge that the tools of thought people use should slowly cease to be concepts of action and become concepts of function. A growing recognition of the relative autonomy of a field of investigation as a special kind of functional nexus is a prerequisite of the two operations characteristic of scientific procedure. These are the construction of relatively autonomous theories about the relationships between observable details, and the testing of these theories against systematic observations. As long as people believe that events are the outcome of the more or less capricious plans and intentions of certain living beings, they cannot suppose it very reasonable to examine problems on the basis of observation. If events are ascribed to supernatural beings or even exalted humans, the 'mystery' can only be resolved by gaining access to the authorities who know about the secret plans and intentions. (56-7) His concept of function: …the concept of function is a concept of relationship. To put it at its simplest, one could say: when one person (or a group of persons) lacks something which another person or group has the power to withhold, the latter has a function for the former. Thus men have a function for women and women for men, parents for children and children for parents. Enemies have a function for each other, because once they have become interdependent they have the power to withhold from each other such elementary requirements as that of preserving their physical and social integrity, and ultimately of survival. To understand the concept of 'function' in this way demonstrates its connection with power within human relationships. People or groups which have functions for each other exercise constraint over each other. Their potential for withholding from each other what they require is usually uneven, which means that the constraining power of one side is greater than that of the other. (78) The problem is that a lot of the way that Elias fleshes out functions seems like it’s just about taking different people’s actions in concert. This is particularly stark when he introduces the perspectival nature of functions, suggesting they aren’t (at least always) about a high-level view of everything going on, but talking actor’s perceived (?) interdependencies seriously: Because the conventional concept of function is substantive in nature, it conceals both the fact that functions are attributes of relationships, and that they are matters of multiple perspectives… In the France of Louis XIV, for example, the office of king performed a function for Louis XIV himself which took precedence over its function for France. As a result of increasing democratization, the function of government posts for a state-society comes to take precedence over their function for those who occupy them, although the latter does not vanish altogether. (126) At other times, he talks about development of societies in sufficiently abstracted ways (although he would rather we talk of a “figuration” of people than an abstraction from them) that sounds like functions can be talked about without talk of individual actions (see p. 165), but there seem to be more plural practices contained here than he’s willing to admit. III. Miscellaneuous discussions A. A lot of the book is about trying to change language practices so there’s less assumptions of static, disconnected objects in the world, and instead he sees everything (including individuals) as processes: Consequently we always feel impelled to make quite senseless conceptual distinctions, like 'the individual and society', which makes it seem that 'the individual' and 'society' were two separate things, like tables and chairs, or pots and pans. One can find oneself caught up in long discussions of the nature of the relationship between these two apparently separate objects. Yet on another level of awareness one may know perfectly well that societies are composed of individuals, and that individuals can only possess specifically human characteristics such as their abilities to speak, think, and love, in and through their relationships with other people - 'in society'. (113) B. There’s also some discussion of how to talk about development of one type of society to the other, where it seems important to him to: 1. Avoid concepts of cause and effect (160-1) 2. “distinguish clearly between the proposition that figuration A must inevitably be followed by figuration B, and the proposition that figuration A was a necessary forerunner of figuration B. Connections of the latter kind will be encountered over and over again in investigating problems of social development [while the former will now].” (162) 3. Not stick to only considering a society/nation-state in isolation, but always consider its interior in connection to how it is one among many: “Whether it is a tribe or a state, the internal development of every attack-and-defence unit is always functionally connected with the development of the prevailing 'balance of power' within the wider figuration in which the several interdependent attack-and-defence units are bound together.” (168) Overall, it's certainly interesting enough as a historical text, and a lot of its concerns still seem important, but I think it's safe to say it has been decisively rendered outdated in the 50 years that have passed.

Review # 2 was written on 2017-11-27 00:00:00 Michael Thomas So, what is sociology? You would think that a bibliophile who’s decided to commit his life to the discipline would be able to muster a somewhat satisfactory answer, but the truth is I’ve demurred to such enquiries on more than a few occasions, not out of an proclivity for coquetry, but simply out of embarrassed ignorance. Did I have more to offer than a non-too-helpful answer of “we study people; we study societies”? (I probably do, but then I’ll ramble on for 2 minutes and lose my interlocutor: so I do have a response, just not the Christmas stocking version of it.) Sociologists study people; we study society. We’re committed to a certain sort of holism: the idea that society, social institutions, social interaction — whatever ‘social’ object of enquiry we choose to obsess over — individuals engage with and in cannot be duly understood without paying attention to the group. By corollary, we as a group believe that purely atomistic visions of human behavior miss something essential — humans are too interconnected, interdependent, social groups too closely integrated, for that to be possibles (shoot the exceptions at me). As that bromide from the old Masters goes: “No Man is an Island.”