Reviews for Pet Pals: Learning the Short U Sound

The average rating for Pet Pals: Learning the Short U Sound based on 2 reviews is 3 stars.

Review # 1 was written on 2020-11-25 00:00:00 Paul Drake Mary Midgley is a treasure - an 0xford-trained philosopher who didn't publish her first book until middle age, she has a knack for clearing through academic rubbish. This slim little volume clears away a lot of the prejudices that prevent people from taking animals seriously as a moral question.

Review # 2 was written on 2020-11-25 00:00:00 Jamie Jonasson I have only just begun to read this book, however, I can tell from the outset, and from reading another of Midgley's essays, that this is first rate writing. *Spoilers* Midgley lays the foundation for the rest of the book in the first chapter. With respect to animal ethics, she names two categories of the dismissal of the consideration of animals: absolute dismissal, and relative dismissal. She argues quite well that the first position is merely a fall-back that most people actually do not subscribe to under closer scrutiny, and the the second position, which acknowledges the ethical consideration of animals, but only after 'man' (I am using the masculine gender here to emphasize a certain associated tendency to aggression, which although she does not point to explicitly in this chapter, she illustrates by the example of a rather graphic Edwardian 'elephanticide') she states actually does not come into conflict with man's ethical needs, therefore striking at the root of this argument as well. Midgley makes a very astute observations, that I expect will thematically recur in other of her works. For one, she points out that although the rational philosophers had a valid point to make by emphasizing the value of rationality for both political and scientific reasons with respect to the historical obstacles that they needed to overcome, that this in fact was an exaggeration that needs to be reassessed before it does harm, the critical time of its contextual validity having since passed. She goes on to highlight that even classical philosophers, such as Plato, did not attempt to divorce intellect from emotion, but saw them as a part of the whole of what it means to be human. Animals, while having a different capacity for reason than ourselves, still share emotions in common with us. Among the emotions that she gives as examples are feel fear, pain, and loneliness, as well as motherly compassion and tenderness. I think Midgley's work is of especial importance in the current decade (although this particular work was written in the 1980s). More than ever before we are coming to grips with the effects that rationality and massive amounts of information have on our emotional and spiritual lives. This is not to say that rationality is not good, but rather that instead of walking blindly into a tacit divorce of our emotional and spiritual identities in favor of the demand for reason (driven by the incessant data that has become injected into our everyday affairs), that we need to learn to care for not only the totality of who we are as human beings, but that we need to also recognize with compassion just how much we have in common with the ecology of which we are an intimately interconnected part, and with our empathic, intelligent, and wonderfully amazing animal fellows and friends. Update (3-25-18): I have just finished the second chapter. Midgley goes on to further discuss competition between humans and animals where life may be actually be at stake. She includes such examples as pests, ranging from insects and rodents to deer and even elephants, who might endanger critical food sources for remoter more agrarian societies. Although she says that killing animals in situations such as these, I would tend to disagree that this should resemble anything like a blanket rule of thumb. As she pointed out in the preceding chapter, we are usually not in a "life-boat" scenario, and even when we actually are, we are quite frequently possessed of such ingenuity as to avoid such circumstances. Yet while insects (and even rodents) might at currently present a real danger, it is also often the case that we can discern ways to spare larger animals, such as deer or elephants; and indeed, in many cases, we have. Curated game reserves in Africa, based on sustainable models, are a good example of one way in which we are able to do this. On the other hand, parasites, microbes, and bacteria are still a valid threat to which there is scarce alternative but to eliminate them as health risks. Update (4-13-18): I am in the midst of the 3rd chapter. Midgley makes some notable observations about types of argumentation contra emotion. She first validates emotions as being, quite often, rational and appropriate responses. She then begins to elucidate (using some actual arguments that she provides as examples) how certain arguments attempt to argue in various ways against emotional responses, and she shows how the arguments contra emotion are invalid, and to what extent they are invalid. One of my favorite analyses of hers is that of the use of "insincerity" (emotional hypocrisy) is invalidly leveraged against groups who benefit from a certain practice but who wish to complain about it. The argument goes something like this: "you are benefiting from this, therefore your complaint is hypocritical and invalid." But, as Midgley points out, anyone who benefits from a certain practice, and is therefore in some way responsibly tied to it, is entitled to criticize and/or complain because of the share of the responsibility so borne. She also points out that those who are in some way invested (they have some stake in continuing to do things a certain way) in the way something is done (or the means, as she puts it) have been shown through experience not to be trusted. Yet, she also points out, that such resistance to change is often unnecessary, due to the fact that changes are often beneficial to all or most parties involved, and have frequently negligible negative impacts to even the parties who are resistant to change due to their vested interest/s. As she puts it: "it is just that nobody thought of trying it before." I think that "open" business models, such as many online business do today (and even those who are not expressly online are still subject to online reviews through various independent sources, including social media, directories, search engines, etc) really embody the practice of being more open to change from bottom-up propagation of feedback. Organizations are not becoming increasingly aware of issues salient to their respective constituencies, and thus, through such awareness, are more open to beneficial and ethical changes and adjustments, as well as becoming more proactive and open about researching new ways of doing things that are both more beneficial and ethical. Update (4-24-18): I have just complete the fourth chapter, entitled, "The Rationalist Tradition (1): Absolute Dismissal." Midgley surveys Rationalist thought from the Early Modern era to the present day. She points out that the culmination of Rationalism in the Enlightenment, was to establish a conception of the rights of man. She shows how Descartes, Spinoza, Kant, Rawls are all absolute dismissers of the moral and ethical treatment of animals. She exempts Hume and Leibniz, and offers that Kant wanted to make a case for animals but seemed unable to do so based on any philosophical ground due to being confined to the rational tradition, whose end was the good of man. She covers topics such as justice, and duty, and shows how rationalist conceptions of these have failed to oblige us to the welfare of animals. Perspicaciously, she points out the lack of obligation that would exist in any social contract that exalts rationalism to the point that it would only be inclusive of those who are capable of articulating for themselves. We were assigned to read Rawls's Theory of Justice in my Introduction to Political Theory course when I was in school, but we never got to read him because we ran out of time. I have his book on my shelf, but have not yet read him. However, Midgely gives a good summary of him through distilling an important quotation from his book in this chapter. Midgley quotes Rawls as saying: "While I have not maintained that the capacity for a sense of justice is necessary in order to be owed the duties of justice, it does seem that we are not required to give strict justice anyway to creatures lacking this capacity." This quotation goes on to describe "duties" which Midgley describes elsewhere as "phantom duties" to be owed to those to whom "strict justice" is not owed. It is therefore interesting to note that Midgley includes both Rawls and Kant in her chapter whose title contains the words "absolute dismissal." Both Kant's and Rawls' arguments seem quite similar to the life-boat model that she uses to illustrate the problem of "relative dismissal." I believe then, that the answer to this quandary must lie in Rawls' insincerity with respect to "duties," and in Kant's failure to argue outside any conception in which animals are but mere objects for human utility. Hence, although some sense (or pretense) of sentiment exists in both Kant and Rawls, neither actually extends any ethical or moral duty to animals even under the most auspiciously abundant (not-in-a-life-boat) circumstances. Although I have yet to read either Kant or Rawls, I think that given Midgley's assessment of Kant, that we might excuse him somewhat due to the prevailing thought of his time; Rawls, however - given Midgely's anlysis, seems to me to be unforgivable, and quite possibly even monstrous. Update (10-6-18): I am now into the 7th chapter. The 5th Chapter discussed some of the problems inherent in the modern entrenchment of Rationalist thought with respect to animals, and how indirectly, as a result of Rationalist social contract theory, that animals tend to get left out on the basis of limitation of speech and therefore inability to participate in the same way that human beings do by the verbal expression of their desires and will. Chapter 6 gets more deeply into the implication of social contract theory with respect to animals. The theories of Hobbes and Rousseau are contrasted in order to more fully develop the discussion about how social contract theory can exclude not only on the basis of language but also on the basis of the supposed terms of the social contract. In Hobbes, the incentive for agreement is fear, whereas with Rousseau, the incentive for agreement is "the native capacity and wish for independence" (i.e. freedom), which serves as *an example* of a basis for agreement wherein there is a much more broad scope for rights to be extended (i.e., there is much much more to life than the mere fear of death and the mere base-line survival subsistence justified thereby). Additionally, Midgley delves into the problems that groups face when they want to lobby for inclusion in extant rights already enjoyed by other groups. One such problem is the Paradox of One-way Equality: groups seen as vertically above are more visible candidates for inclusion for rights than those seen as vertically below. Additionally, there also seems to be a zero-sum competition for minority groups who are simultaneously lobbying for inclusion. Minority groups tend to see each other as rivals rather than allies due to the perception that majority groups seem to have a limited tolerance for making changes. Thus far in chapter 7, Midgley explains how lack of inclusion occurred for women's rights prior to the 20th century, and explains how similar thinking has resulted in the same prejudices versus extending the inclusion of ethical treatment to animals. She also touches on psychological defenses based in symbolism, wherein a woman used to symbolize to a man the fears that he had about his own passions, and how as a result, men would project the responsibility (and blame) for their own passions and desires onto women, resulting in irrational arguments for the suppression of women's rights and liberties with respect to those of their own. She then carries this example over to extend to how animals have also been viewed and seen as projections of man's primal fears about his own passions, and how the fear of a lion (for example) would be psychologically balanced by the idealization of a lion for its strength in order to balance the sense of alarm that is felt about the lions potentially lethal prowess. She explains that these psychological defenses are not useful when considering the plight of animals because they distort how human beings perceive them.