Reviews for The Limits of coercive diplomacy

The average rating for The Limits of coercive diplomacy based on 2 reviews is 3.5 stars.

Review # 1 was written on 2021-02-28 00:00:00 Kelly Barclift "It is prudent as well as moral that the strong should protect the vital interests of the weak." "Skillful tactics can only capitalize on favorable conditions already latent in the situation: skill cannot compensate for the absence of these favorable conditions." Although somewhat dated (having been published in the early 70s'), The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy offers an excellent theoretical framework for both analyzing efforts at applying coercive diplomacy and studying which future situations will be amenable to the application of these strategies. The authors use three case studies to make their argument: The Laos Crisis of 1960-1961, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the early Vietnam Intervention from 1964-1965. The Laos Crisis came about as a result of American-Soviet jostling in Laos over the makeup of their government. The United States under Eisenhower ended up backing a military coup against the neutralist leader Prince Souvanna and supported the leadership of General Phoumi with exorbitant levels of military and fiscal aid. Souvanna eventually regained control, only to be forced out again in a counter-coup by Phoumi which succeeded in taking the capital but failed to secure Northern Laos, at the time controlled by the Communist organization Pathet Lao. The Pathet Lao, receiveing material from the Soviets, was able to begin winning consecutive battles against the Royal Lao army and threatened to overtake the entire country. This was the situation JFK encountered upon his attainment of the presidency. JFK was able to solve this crisis in a way amenable to U.S. interests by reducing U.S. demands while applying coercion. While Eisenhower had desired a total victory of anti-Communist forces in Laos, JFK publically asked only for a ceasefire and negotiations that would leave the Communists in control of much of the territory they had already taken. He coupled this with signals of clear determination that the United States would respond directly if loss of the capital at Vientiane and the Mekong Valley. To signal this, JFK had advisors to the Royal Lao army don their military uniforms and accompany the local forces to the front lines, an image which was broadcast to the world. In this way, JFK was able to get the Communist powers to the negotiating table and prevent the total loss of Laos to the Pathet Lao and ultimately institute a neutralist government. The second case study analyzed JFK's approach to the Cuban Missile Crisis. Again, the key to success lay in both demonstrating U.S. determination to act as while as offering both a carrot and a stick to bring the opposing side to the table. The blockade, along with efforts by the U.S. Navy to harrass nearby Soviet subs demonstrated that United States willingness to go to war over the issue of the missiles in Cuba. After Kruschev offered to remove the missiles in exchange for a public declaration the United States would not invade Cuba, JFK accepted the agreement and offered an ultimatum of 24 hours to get the agreement totally solidified. The third case and arguably the most complicated of them all was the 1964-1965 ramp up of hostilities in Vietnam. That this proved to be ineffective was due to several reasons. A principal issue was the problem of multiple objectives being pursued at once but ultimately in conflict with each other. Operation Rolling Thunder, a massive bombing campaign in Northern Vietnam, was undertaken largely to reassure the South Vietnam government of their support as well as undermine North Vietnamese morale but ultimately not only failed to damage morale but also sabotaged efforts being made along the diplomatic track to end the war. What's more, the bombing campaign was restricted by the fear that an intensive assault would bring the Chinese or the Soviets directly into the war. LBJ was unable to convincingly threaten a ramp up of bombing campaign as JFK had threatened escalation in Laos and Cuba. The carrot LBJ offered, a development program for all of Southeast Asia, was seen as a lie. Alexander George closes with a set of conditions that arguably are necessary for the successful application of coercive diplomacy by the United States. These are: Strength of United States motivation, Asymmetry of motivation favoring the United States, Clarity of American objectives, Sense of Urgency to Achieve the American Objective, Adequate Domestic Political Support, Usable Military Options, Opponent's Fear of Unacceptable Escalation, and Clarity Concerning the Precise Terms of Settlement. A good amount of improvisation and crisis management are also essential, even as the necessities of crisis management clash with the needs of coercion.

Review # 2 was written on 2010-04-02 00:00:00 Maria Borsch The authors note early on (Pages 18-19): "Coercive diplomacy seeks to make force a much more flexible, refined, psychological instrument of policy. Coercive diplomacy seeks to persuade the opponent to do something, or to stop doing something, instead of bludgeoning him into doing it or physically preventing him from doing it." In short, the use of threats or actual force as a tool of diplomacy, to get the other side to do what you want without resorting to full-scale combat. This book uses several case studies to explore how this approach can succeed--or fail. The three case studies: Laos (1960-1961), the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962), and the Vietnam Intervention (1964-1965). In hindsight, we can say that the Cuban Missile Crisis represented a successful use (for the United States) of coercive diplomacy. The combination of threats, the blockade, and back channel diplomacy worked. Vietnam? While one can argue that some benefits accrued, most would evaluate the effort at coercive diplomacy to have failed in that instance. The final chapter tries to develop "lessons learned" through comparison of the case studies. This 1971 book is somewhat dated. Nonetheless, it still provides food for thought on how to use force (threatened or actual) to achieve diplomatic goals without falling into full scale warfare.