Reviews for Nature as Reason: A Thomistic Theory of the Natural Law

The average rating for Nature as Reason: A Thomistic Theory of the Natural Law based on 2 reviews is 4.5 stars.

Review # 1 was written on 2016-03-25 00:00:00 Jim Lyza In Nature as Reason, Jean Porter draws on her extensive study of the medieval scholastics and Thomas Aquinas in particular to fashion an account of natural law which is both comprehensive and refreshing. This work draws together her previous scholarship, particularly her Natural and Divine Law and Moral Action and Christian Ethics, to present a systematic treatment which traces normativity from human nature through virtue to natural law. It is a dense work full of careful argumentation, but its lucid style and unique presentation of Aquinas make it compelling reading for theological ethicists and moral philosophers. Porter begins with a chapter summarizing the conclusions of her Natural and Divine Law regarding scholastic accounts of natural law and contrasting these with early modern and contemporary approaches to creation, nature and natural law. While scholastics sought to hold the authority of nature, reason, tradition, and scripture in creative balance, later approaches to Christian ethics have tended to jettison one or more of these sources. This has been particularly true of Catholic natural law theory where rationality has increasingly come to dominate accounts which aim to be rationally compelling to all people of good will. This tendency undermines the efficacy of natural law reasoning by both considering too little and promising too much. Instead Porter aims to demonstrate that studied consideration of the pre-rational roots of natural law and a willingness to be content with a more epistemically modest theory ground in explicit theological commitments, allows for a more illuminating theory truer to the spirit of Aquinas' work. To this end she spends her second chapter considering what she terms "nature as nature". This is the world of Thomistic and Aristotelian teleology where animals follow inclinations to ends appropriate to their forms. Porter utilizes the work of the scholastics to appropriate this framework with some important caveats. She is happy for human nature to provide a basis for realist ethic, even one which could from a certain vantage point be derived completely from first principles, but she does not think we are able to attain that vantage point in this life. Instead we come to recognize human nature in a rough and provisional way through discerning its influence in culture, reflecting on our continuities with other creatures, and attending to revelation. Porter believes that such reflection leads naturally to recognition of the teleological character of nature and a particular conception of human nature, but she recognizes that that this a claim that needs defending. She marshals to her aid recent work in science and philosophy which emphasize the importance of teleology for theorizing in biology and ethics. This is followed by a consideration of Aquinas' conception of human nature in which our distinctive character as rational animals is only arrived at after careful consideration of the normative significance of the normative implications of humans also falling under the categories of creature and animal. For some ethical naturalists, ethical reflection can proceed directly from a conception of human nature, but Porter resists this move. While human nature patterns the kinds of moralities and societies which humans inhabit, empirical observation demonstrates that this nature underdetermines the particular forms these take. How nature emerges into society is the subject of the third and fourth chapters where Porter deploys the cardinal virtues as a bridge between natural inclinations and natural law. She begins by making a conceptual distinction between well-being and happiness where well-being is associated with the satisfaction of pre-rational inclinations and happiness is defined as the rationally ordered perfection of a person. Porter follows Aquinas in allowing for different kinds of happiness, but focuses here and in the remainder of the work on what Aquinas calls imperfect happiness: the active life of acquired virtue. Through detailed and illuminating exploration of temperance and courage Porter is able to show how imperfect happiness is oriented in its actions toward well-being even as its ultimate fulfillment is in the life of virtue. This allows Porter to assert that virtues cannot be properly understood apart from their grounding in and ordering of pre-rational nature. This insight allows Porter to begin her fourth chapter with a devastating critique of much of modern moral philosophy. That such a critique has been rehearsed in a similar manner by Anscombe and MacIntyre before her does not take away from the brilliance of Porter's effort as she dissects inadequacies in traditions deriving from Kant, Bentham, and Hume. Porter's rival exponents of Aquinas and natural law, John Finnis and Germain Grisez, are dismissed as a subclass of Kantians who privilege autonomous rationality to the neglect of other aspects of human nature. Porter offers instead a version of natural law arising from the virtues of justice and prudence where precepts act as paradigmatic laws. This section dives deep into a Thomist theory of action in an attempt to find a place for the pre-rational, the rational, virtues, and the law-like nature of moral reasoning. It is the most technically difficult of the work and non-Thomists may find themselves reaching for additional references works in order to follow the argument. What emerges at the end is a conception of justice and prudence which underdetermine any particular social arrangement and which stand in need of perfection. This perfection Porter is ready to supply with Christian doctrine. In the fifth and final chapter Porter brings to the fore the theological content which has lurked in the background for much of the work. She draws on the theological motif of the Imago Dei, which she cashes out as ascribing to humans in a limited way something of the autonomy and freedom of the Creator. Christians recognize that using and respecting this ability is our God-given duty and this allows for a properly grounded account of natural rights and by extension Christian natural law. Porter takes natural rights as a case study of how her conception of natural law facilitates Christian advocacy and dialogue with non-Christians in a way which does not rely on sharing a fully developed moral ontology. Christians can simultaneously know that natural rights can only be properly grounded theologically while still relying on the God-given natural inclinations of non-Christians to recommend concepts such as natural rights to them even if they lack the conceptual structures to justify them. Porter concludes her work by considering the role of grace, arguing that her picture of natural law allows for a sharp distinction between it and nature even while allowing for continuity in modes of perfection between them. This explains how we are able to recognize the goodness of grace even while acknowledging its mystery. This is a rich work where much ground is covered and a broad array of contemporary philosophical and theological ethicists are considered and critiqued. In comparison to these thinkers, Porter demonstrates that her theory of natural law has considerable advantages. It opens up illuminating avenues of criticism of contemporary ethics, demonstrating how theories such as utilitarianism and Kantism fail to address the complexity of human nature. It also allows her to accomplish much of what theories of natural law have traditionally aimed to achieve, namely a realist morality which explains the existence and value of morals in societies which have not received revelation, but lets her avoid common pitfalls of natural law such as merely affirming conventional social order or attempting to ground morality apart from theology. Her exegesis of Aquinas, particularly her emphasis on the interrelated roles of the pre-rational, the virtues, his theory of action, and natural law serves as a helpful reminder that there is value in reading Aquinas as the systematician he was rather than just as a source for virtue ethics or natural law. Nearly every page of this fascinating work contains new insights and I look forward to re-reading it in future to discover more about the possibilities of Thomistic ethics in the twenty-first century. That said, there are a few points I wish Porter would have clarified or expanded upon. The second chapter is crucial for Porter and it is not clear it is altogether successful. In seeking to rehabilitate something resembling a Thomistic metaphysical biology she appeals to contemporary science and the reappraisal of teleological language in recent work in the philosophy of biology. While it is certainly true that some biologists have recognized the inevitability of teleological apparatus akin to formal causes, this is well short of an endorsement of Thomistic final causes in which every creature seeks its own perfection. If there is something resembling a final cause for an organism in contemporary biological explanation it is successful reproduction. Such a final cause need not entail any of the potential harmony and possibility for rational ordering which a Thomistic account of happiness requires. Porter bridges the gap between biological causality and perfectibility by simply asserting that we can tell when a being is function well and that this recognition is not just "arbitrary or wholly the product of cultural construction." It may be the case that Porter's example of a "happy ficus" is not a cultural construction, but it would be helpful if Porter presented arguments as to why this was the case rather than simply asserting it. Her strategy for engagement with non-Christians also leaves some questions unanswered. For example on the issue of rights, while it is obvious that Christians should work with non-Christians to avoid atrocities and put an end to torture, it is not so obvious that they should be excited about non-Christian appropriation of what Porter claims is a Christian concept. The danger lurks that removed from the theological tension in which it lives with duties to God and the Church, the concept of rights can be extended to argue for dangerous forms of moral autonomy. Would, for example, Porter be happy with the way rights language is used in the discourse about euthanasia? One suspects not, but it would be helpful if Porter offered some analysis of how, if at all, non-Christian appropriation of natural rights differ from the problematic secularizations of Christian ethics found in utilitarianism and Kantianism which she so skillfully dismantles earlier in the work. Finally, Porter's work is explicitly presented as an account of theological ethics. It is certainly theological as God has some work to do: guaranteeing the goodness of creation, delivering the decalogue and golden rule as revelation, and providing the opportunity for perfect happiness after death. It is not as clear that it is a particularly Christian ethic. Too often God feels like an ontological bouncer, there to guarantee that things do not get too out of hand but for the most part standing back while the major work is done by nature. The discussion of grace at the conclusion of the work is helpful in this regard, but its appearance only reminds the reader of how little it has featured in the rest of the work. This raises the question of whether discussions could have revolved around a more Christian axes with more of scripture being engaged. For example when Porter makes the distinction between well-being and happiness a natural source of reflection for Christians would be the Sermon on the Mount, particularly Matthew 6:19-34. As it is Porter keeps her theology fairly minimal. This fits with a strategy of engaging as wide an audience as possible, but also makes this significant work feel like something of a prolegomena to an as yet unwritten and even more significant work on what a Christian natural law ethic might be.

Review # 2 was written on 2019-06-06 00:00:00 Jack Claiborne III An excellent primer and introduction to Aqinas by a preeminent Thomist.