Reviews for Kant and the Scandal of Philosophy: The Kantian Critique of Cartesian Scepticism

The average rating for Kant and the Scandal of Philosophy: The Kantian Critique of Cartesian Scepticism based on 2 reviews is 3 stars.

Review # 1 was written on 2015-05-08 00:00:00 Rene Steffensen اهمیت تفسیر پیپین از هگل در اینجاست که هگل رو هم‌زمان هم نقاد کانت و هم ادامه دهنده راه اون می دونه. زبان خاص فلسفه هگل در برخورد اول_و یا حتی در یک عمر کلنجار رفتن با آن_ این تصور رو در ذهن ایجاد می کنه که انگار هیچ کسی چنان کانت پا به عرصه وجود نگداشته و هیچ گاه حدود عقل بشری مشخص نشده و انگار که با هگل دوباره در دام همان مابعدالطبیعه ای خواهیم افتاد که کانت نسبت به رهزن بودنش هشدار داده بود. برای من بخش مربوط به پدیدار شناسی واقعا جذاب بود اما باید اعتراف کنم که از دانش منطق هگل چیزی سر درنیاوردم و شرح پیپین هم کمک چندانی نکرد. لابد پیش زمینه هایی نیاز بوده که من نداشتم. درباره ترجمه باید بگم که عالی بود. فصل هایی از کتاب رو از روی نسخه اصلی خوندم و با متن ترجمه شده مقایسه کردم و واقعا اقای حسینی گل کاشتن. بسیار از ایشون آموختم. ای کاش باقی مترجمانی‌که از سر تفنن سراغ متون فلسفه می رن، کمی دقت نظر ایشون رو داشتن.

Review # 2 was written on 2020-07-12 00:00:00 David Tereschuck Quite a conundrum with this one, since it won't be much use to you if you haven't read Hegel, but if you've read Hegel you've probably read it with the exact opposite assumptions to those claims with which Pippin convincingly claims you should be reading. In short: Hegel should be read as a Kantian. The Phenomenology of Spirit shows that self-consciousness is needed for any form of knowledge, and discusses a variety of forms of self-consciousness, most of which fail in the goal of providing us with the opportunity to know anything. Only one doesn't: modern, absolute knowledge. This is, in a sense, what is then laid out in the Science of Logic, which is not about crazy metaphysical monism of the mind, nor a mere category theory (that is, a theory of the concepts *we* use). It's something in between: both an account of the concepts we use, and a defense of the claim that they are also really determinate of the possibility of knowledge. That's all pretty convincing, actually. The obvious flaw in the book is it's failure to look beyond Hegel at all: it's all well and good to claim that 'modern' Absolute Knowledge provides us with knowledge, but that's not actually a defense of modernity. That would require a defense of capitalism, amongst other unfortunate social features, or, alternatively, a critique of those features. But Pippin's dismissive attitude towards later Hegelians (e.g., the Frankfurt School) makes it impossible for him to take this next step. His book does, however, allow for the possibility of taking it.