Reviews for The 'Double Democratic Deficit': Parliamentary Accountability and the Use of Force under International Auspices

The average rating for The 'Double Democratic Deficit': Parliamentary Accountability and the Use of Force under International Auspices based on 2 reviews is 4 stars.

Review # 1 was written on 2018-03-09 00:00:00 Ross Powers "War is not just in transition, but in crisis!". Kalimat ini adalah tema yang sangat menonjol dipaparkan oleh Chirs Hables Gray, Ph.D dalam sistem perang postmodern yang ditulisnya pada buku "Postmodern War: The New Politics for Conflicts. Gray adalah seorang profesor di bidang Interdisciplinary Studies dan Computer Science/Cultural Studies of Science & Technology yang memiliki minat mendalam pada studi seputar iptek dan pengaruhnya terhadap negara, demokrasi dan politik postmodern yang bertitik berat pada perang dan upaya-upaya perdamaian. Secara umum, buku ini ditulis oleh Gray yang menghabiskan masa kecilnya di Vietnam sebagai usaha untuk memahami mengenai kekuasaan dan bagaimana hal itu dapat dicapai, terutama setelah ia melihat perkembangan geopolitik dan militer, terutama di Amerika Serikat, pasca perang Vietnam dan perang dingin: kekerasan terjadi di mana-mana dengan musuh dan ancaman yang semakin tidak jelas (unidentified enemy) sehingga menyebabkan AS mati-matian untuk menguasai teknologi dan "grasp at any new possible weapon." Menurut Gray, perang tidak akan berhenti dalam waktu dekat karena beberapa alasan (semakin majunya teknologi dan perkembangan senjata militer terbaru, semakin meluasnya ekspansi manusia dan industrialisasi terhadap lingkungan, berkembangnya teknologi komunikasi dan teknology cyber - kesemuanya berkembang bukan untuk memahami perang, tetapi untuk memenangkan perang! p. 3), dan karakteristiknya pun semakin berubah. Perang teluk merupakan contoh paling jelas untuk menggambarkan sistem perang portmodern: "low-intensity conflict" (LIC) in which advanced technology allowed the allies to kill their adversaries without personal contact and without empathy, a war of media as well as information manipulation." Sebagai kesimpulan, terlepas dari berbagai kritik terkait dengan konsep dan sistem perang postmodernisme itu sendiri dan dengan melihat keterlibatan teknologi dan media dalam perang sepertinya tidak salah kedua aspek tersebut sangat berperan dalam perang dan sangat berpotensi untuk menjadi hamba perang dengan berbagai penemuan yang semakin berisiko tinggi dan tidak mempertimbangkan konsekuensinya pada perikehidupan manusia.

Review # 2 was written on 2012-01-02 00:00:00 Donna Mitchell Modern Insurgencies and Counter-insurgencies: Guerrillas and their opponents since 1750 is precisely what its title suggests. It's written by Ian F.W. Beckett, who draws information from a diverse collection of books that deal with guerrilla warfare and conflict, like Anthony J. Joes' "Insurgency and Genocide" and Fellman's "Inside War," exploring a range of historical scenarios both past and recent. As such it gives an initial reading of his work the impression of a highly fragmented compendium of historical instances that are disorganised but relevant to a specific point at best. It is prima facie analytical however his elucidations are selective and modified to cater to the historical narrative of his preference, which will be demonstrated shortly. His work is a sundry of complexities that are contrasted from one example to the next, over varying times and places, however there is a degree of cohesiveness to his main argument which I will attempt to summarise. Ian F.W. Beckett shows through elaborate research, that a lack of thorough comprehension of the unconventional forms of warfare, such as guerrilla insurgencies and their modern substantiations, is attributed to history prior to the twentieth century. This is illustrated in his point that theorists between 1792 and 1815 often conflated guerrilla warfare with partisan warfare 'wars that involve fringe operations by detached units serving a conventional army. In interpreting the American civil war, namely between Confederate guerrillas and Unionists occupying Louisiana and Arkansas, he identifies that both parties identified with a set of commonalities ranging from ethnolinguistic to socio-economic interests and as such carried this 'partisan' nature. Moreover, to further support this he references Clausewitz's thoughts on guerrilla warfare in his elucidation of Vendée; Clausewitz viewed it as sustainable within rugged terrain and more importantly, coinciding with a strong national, partisan character. These were a few examples among others. In advancing this interpretation of history, he presents a case for the drastic evolution of insurgencies over time. His citations therefore serve to support a distinction between traditional and modern guerrilla warfare in that he suggests that modern guerrilla insurgencies are waged in pursuit of political ends, whereas the former is generally utilised for tactical purposes. It seems Beckett is identifying conventional militaries as reflecting partisan nature in that they represent a population with shared ideals, whether ethnic, nationalistic or otherwise. In doing so, he distinguishes between modern non-state actors that organise on shared political interests, irrespective of ethnic, nationalistic or religious partisanship. I concede that this may be the case for populations with specific grievances nurtured by socio-economic policies implemented by a modern state, however I am not convinced that this extends to all modern insurgencies. Are political pursuits of contemporary guerrilla insurgencies wholly divorced from partisan traits? Beckett's reflection on the IRA for instance attempts to trivialise their partisan concerns by stating they were, "[….] by no means entirely concert with the population they claimed to represent." The complexities of non-conventional resistances that emerge in power vacuums that exist when an empire is overthrown by another parallel that of modern non-state actors that organise around partisan ambitions, namely ethnic or religious. Without expounding on the details of their insurgencies, he briefly mentions Abd el-Kader's (1832-1847) guerrilla war against France, and Shamil's (1834-1859) resistance to the Russians, which were both insurgencies that emerged independently of the Ottoman empire's conventional army. In the case of Abd el-Kader, tribes were united along religious lines - a partisan approach that is no different from the modern insurgencies of Ansar al-Sharia, Al-Dawla al-Islamiyya, and al-Shabab to name a few. The operations according to jihadi theoreticians like Abu bakr al-Naji and Abu Mus'ab al-Suri are part of a long-term pursuit to economically exhaust states by threatening their areas of economic interests, compelling states to spend money to aggregate their forces for stability and continuously fund them; with the ultimate aim of destabilising the political establishment by coercing it to militarise. In contrast, the Houthi militia in Yemen are waging an insurgency for immediate political results that will ensure an increase in their role in the future of Yemen's governance' if President Hadi and his Saudi sponsors decide negotiation is in their interest. Therefore, I find his generalising argument to be lacking in consistency that extends to all past and modern insurgencies and suggest that he refine it to emphasise that what is characteristic of modern guerrilla warfare is the increasing numbers of emergent non-state actors with partisan traits. I also grant that political objectives alongside military have been increasingly prevalent in modern times however I likewise argue in the cases of Abd el-Kader, Shamil and Moros of the Philippines, which have resisted via guerrilla wars and possibly numerous other ones, that it again isn't characteristic of all past insurgencies to be lacking in political aspirations. The religiously partisan nature of the aforementioned are emergent and independent of conventional armies of any power, yet seek to govern by the Shari'a which delineates a system of jurisprudence that covers an array of areas from socio-economic to political. In fact, Abd el-Kader established a state for a period of time, albeit short-lived, where he implemented this sort of governance. Beckett also spends a considerable portion of the book discussing the responses to insurgencies over time. He contrasts and presents the older and newer policies as transcending time, which is apparent in the variety of approaches; concentration camps, pacification attempts, imposing of cultural values, military responses, summary executions, amnesties, divide and conquer, or scorched earth strategies. Nevertheless, he attempts to explain the diversity of responses as being distinct to their historical contexts'idiosyncrasies of colonial regimes that had their own set of experiences. He further tries to delineate how these responses shifted with modern insurgencies, which he hints as requiring both political and military responses, and painting the political aspects as being oft-neglected by past measures. This is evident in his mention of France employing concerted military and political responses in Algeria, West and Central Africa (1850-1860), however all the while also stressing that it gave 'primacy' to the military aspects. The book was an interesting read, although I would not recommend it as an introduction to insurgencies and guerrilla war due to the obscurities of its composition and its overwhelming amount of historical examples that may be better understood with foreknowledge.