Reviews for Nixon's Vietnam War

The average rating for Nixon's Vietnam War based on 2 reviews is 4 stars.

Review # 1 was written on 2018-04-15 00:00:00 Logan Laux A careful, well-researched history of US policy in Southeast Asia under Nixon. The book is a bit dated, but it does a good job explaining what happened and in correcting the narrative that Nixon and Kissinger put out. Kimball explains the illusions the administration operated under, the decisions made, and how these affected US policy. Kimball discusses Nixon's desperation for a formula that could end the war and still maintain US credibility by keeping the Saigon government in power. He covers the strong belief that firm military pressure could achieve breakthroughs in diplomacy, the inconsistent "madman theory," the "linkage" concept, and how tightly Nixon wanted control of policy. Kimball also discusses how these led to the the bombing and invasion of Cambodia, the bombing of Hanoi, the mining of Haiphong, and 1972 Christmas bombing, and how they all came just short of crippling Hanoi (Nixon and Kissinger did claim that the bombing coerced Hanoi to accept peace, but Kimball points out that Hanoi did not make any new, important concessions because of it) The book is not always particularly well-written, and bogs down in detail at times. Also, at one point Kimball writes, inaccurately, that James Gritz commanded the Son Tay raid. Still, a great synthesis overall.

Review # 2 was written on 2017-02-01 00:00:00 Jason Jackson Meticulous, scathing critique of Richard Nixon's cynical attempts at achieving "Peace With Honor" in Vietnam. Kimball, author of several books on Vietnam (most recently Nixon's Nuclear Specter), concludes that Nixon, far from his later spin (still propagated by apologists) that he made the best of a bad hand inherited from his predecessors, exacerbated things with an erratic policy based on expediency, political calculation and, it often seemed, the President's own whims. Hence the "Madman Theory" of threatening North Vietnam with massive retaliation if they failed to surrender while simultaneously pushing for Vietnamization; hence the Cambodian and Laotian "incursions," the former a tactical success but a political disaster, the latter a debacle on all fronts. Nor did Nixon or Henry Kissinger care about prolonging the war or "saving" South Vietnam from Communism after Nixon's reelection, as Kimball (and later authors like Larry Berman and Ken Hughes) makes painfully clear. Perhaps Kimball overstates his thesis in a few particulars, downplaying ARVN's generally solid performance during the Spring Offensive of 1972 (albeit backed by heavy American air power) and the degree to which any President taking office in 1969 would have struggled to extricate the country from Vietnam, with or without "honor." Still, this book provides a devastating rebuttal to those stubborn revisionists who claim that Nixon "won" the war only for those damn liberals to punt it away.