Reviews for Existentialism 2e

The average rating for Existentialism 2e based on 2 reviews is 4.5 stars.

Review # 1 was written on 2020-12-26 00:00:00 Eileen Willems I went into it this book hoping to learn more about existentialism. I was left disappointed; there are only three chapters that are devoted to concepts distinctive of the existentialist-heavy philosophers (rather than to philosophers of phenomenology who have an existentialist bent, like Heidegger). The rest of the book is focused on articulating the particular strand of pragmatism that developed in Germany -- the phenomenological tradition (i.e., Husserl and Heidegger) and the social philosophy of Hegel and Marx. I have a background in the phenomenological tradition, so most of this book was redundant for me. I found that the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article on existentialism summed up all the key topics introduced in those final two chapters that are actually about existentialism; and this article is much more concise, and perhaps even theoretically richer. That aside, this would be the perfect book for readers who are totally unfamiliar with the phenomenological tradition and want to know more about existentialism. Cooper's key pedagogical move is that he recognizes that the principles of existentialism cannot be understood independently of the metaphysical-epistemological background provided by the phenomenological tradition. Often, existentialist ideas are presented independently of this background, and this yields misinterpretations of these ideas by the naive reader. Or, these ideas are presented by thinkers who are unfamiliar with phenomenology and so distort the articulation of them. So Cooper does a lovely job building up all the foundations required for understanding existentialism. In chapter 1, he gives an overall introduction of the history and public conceptions of existentialism. In chapter 2, he introduces the problem that drives the thinkers whose philosophies we identify as phenomenological and existential -- alienation. This is a practical problem which we encounter in our actual lives. Alienation happens when we have distorting assumptions about the world which makes us feel that our activities and efforts are futile. For example, assumptions that the items in the dyads of fact and value, reason and emotion, and subject and object, are metaphysically independent of one another yields a way of life which includes holding unachievable aspirations and pursuing means that are counterproductive or misleading. These dualisms are elaborated on in chapter 5. In chapter 3, Cooper begins introducing the phenomenological tradition. He sketches out Husserl's views, including the view that we are immersed in a "lifeworld" (the world as we experience it and that is imbued with values and meanings contributed by our subjectivity); that it is a worthwhile project to examine these meanings; and that there is a particular method for doing so (the "epoche", which involves bracketing our intuitive assumptions about the object at hand, noticing how our experience of the object changes according to these changes in subjectivity, and finding out what meaning the object might have after we've 'stripped' it of values that fall from our assumptions). In chapter 4, Cooper continues this introduction of phenomenology. He sketches out Heidegger's views, with focus on his distinctive views which break from Husserl's. These involve the existential view that we are irrevocably concerned with our own existence, with our projects and with how objects show up in the world for us in light of our projects. Also, our subjectivity is identical with the values that objects take on in our lifeworld; there is no 'inner' self, but the self is revealed through the world that shows up for the subject and the activities that subject may engage in. Moreover, it is important to distinguish between presence-at-hand and readiness-to-hand; these are two modes by which we might interact with objects, including our very selves, and the rejection of the way objects show up under the latter mode leads to many theoretical mishaps in western philosophy. In chapter 6, Cooper introduces the notion of the self and of interpersonal relationships as understood in the phenomenological tradition. He barely touches on a distinctively existentialist idea -- Sartre's idea of "the Look." I found this particularly striking. This refers to the phenomenon in which another person sees us, we are aware of her perception of us, and we come to experience ourselves in terms of her perception. This can be a source of alienation; we identify ourselves with another's perception of us, and if her perception drastically differs from the way we perceive ourselves, we end up with a disorientating conflict. Or, the ways others perceive us might get in the way of our projects. I'm very interested in exactly how "the Look" happens, and in what must be necessarily true about us, psychologically speaking, in order for this phenomenon to happen at all. Cooper doesn't do that, for it goes beyond the interests typical of existentialism; that's fine. In chapter 7, Cooper goes deeper into this kind of self-estrangement or alienation that follows from "the Look." He focuses on Sartre's concept of bad faith and also mentions social-political conditions that facilitate this kind of alienation. Bad faith is the condition where we fail to recognize our own freedom and instead treat ourselves as finite objects; we have a certain character and pattern of behaviors. We see ourselves as others might, particularly, others who "objectify" us, or who see us in terms of stereotypical identities or causal factors that explain our behaviors. Bad faith is especially terrible when one identifies with an objectified version of oneself to such an extent that this version feels most appropriate and natural; so one loses sensitivity to the fact that one is free and can go beyond this version. In chapter 8, Cooper introduces three key existentialist concepts: angst, death, and absurdity. Angst is a mood in which the everyday meanings of objects fail to show up. Instead, we feel that the world is meaningless. This is uncomfortable, but it is also a reminder that we are responsible for the meanings that show up, and in this way, it is a precondition for fully embracing our freedom. Death, or recognizing the fact that we will die, prompts angst. It also highlights the fact that all our pursuits are ultimately groundless or lack absolute meaning; we choose them and can choose to discontinue them. Absurdity is the fact of this ultimate groundlessness. In chapter 9, Cooper finally introduces the concept of freedom, which is often taken to be the heart of existentialism. Freedom is found in the fact that we can always choose how we respond to, or interpret, anything that we encounter. Do you have a stomach ache that makes you feel awful? You might not be able to control the fact that this awful feeling shows up, but you can control the meaning or significance you endow to this feeling, and thereby modulate the future behaviors and values that this feeling might contribute to. Cooper explains the differences between Sartre's and Merleau-Ponty's conceptions of freedom; Sartre, at certain points in his career, believed that this choice can be made immediately and absolutely, while Merleau-Ponty recognized that such choices can require long-term cultivation of habit and skill. In chapter 10, Cooper illustrates the ethics that falls from existentialism. It is based in a commitment to living freely, for oneself and for others. He explains how this freedom of oneself and of others are interdependent; if you objectify another person, you will likely not recognize how this person might recognize your own freedom. Given "the Look," this will make it unlikely for yourself to recognize your own freedom, since the version of your self that is handed to you by this other person (in your subjective experience) is an objectified one. So we must recognize the freedom of others in order to recognize our own freedoms. Overall, the ideas I am left wondering about include "the Look" (which I mentioned above). I am also interested in the socially-based limitations of freedom. Whenever we choose to respond to something that shows up for us, it seems to me that this choice must be governed by values based in one's current perspective -- and that is given to us by society. I guess the entry point where actual freedom might factor into this view would be that one's current perspective cannot be a straightforward copy of perspectives that others have in society, but is one's own, developed over long periods of time involving random variables and combinations and reflective effort. Analyzing how this development happens would be interesting. I am also interested in the mutual recognition as the precondition of freedom or lack of. What is the relationship between objectifying another person and feeling objectified oneself? It doesn't seem to be logically or causally entailed, as Cooper implies. Is there something special about our capacity for freedom, when it is put in the crucible of mutual recognition? Or, does any given feature of ourselves (e.g., level of confidence in a skill, beliefs one holds) receive similar effects as our capacity of freedom when it is at stake in a situation of mutual recognition? More generally, what are the inner workings of mutual recognition, and how do they differ from or relate to "the Look"?

Review # 2 was written on 2020-05-03 00:00:00 Paul Futch As someone interested in understanding Existentialism, three obstacles stood in the way. First, the fact that rather than a cohesive movement, I found that "Existentialism" was more of an umbrella term that grouped certain writers based on vague similarity. These writers did not have the same style or agenda and often fiercely disagreed. In fact, many even feuded and renounced their association with each other. Secondly, the primary texts of Existentialism are notoriously difficult. Specifically, Being and Time and Being and Nothingness. I wanted to know more about Existentialism, but maybe not that intensely. At least not yet. Thirdly, it was difficult to understand the Existentialists in the traditional philosophical terms: epistemology, metaphysics, and ethics. The best I could say is that the epistemology and metaphysics are melted together and ethics are nonexistent. So for these reasons, an honest summary was difficult to find. Luckily for me, I came across this book and I think the author, David Cooper, solved my problems. First, Cooper decides who is in the Existentialist club. Kierkegaard, Nietzsche and Husserl are precursors, not members. Camus and novelists are out. The two major members are Sartre and Heidegger and the minor members are de Beauvoir, Merleau-Ponty, Marcel, Jaspers, Buber, Gasset, and Ortega. Then he separates Existentialist thought into discrete parts and presents them one topic per chapter. Alienation, phenomenology, ontology, anti-dualism, self-identity, Angst, Absurdity and ethics are all covered in that order. The order is important because each chapter builds on the one previous and thus, builds Existential philosophy from the ground up. As I complained before, Existentialism is an interconnected philosophy and, just like tinkering with a radio, taking something apart and putting it back together is a fine way to learn. These discrete chapters are only possible because Cooper does an excellent job deciphering and synthesizing the congruent ideas among the many philosophers. I figured before that the Existentialists must be grouped together for some reason, but it was not obvious to me from cursory reading. Despite their individual styles and interests, Cooper is able to extract the common themes of these writers and translate them into understandable points. Cooper also clarifies this philosophy by creating the Existentialist. This is a hypothetical philosopher that embodies the best and most comprehensible form of Existentialism. When two writers make the same argument, Cooper chooses the clearest one for the Existentialist. When two writers seem to disagree, Cooper reconforms them to show their actual agreement and attributes the new formation to the Existentialist. When one philosopher is lacking in an area of analysis, Cooper will fill that gap with a philosopher who addresses it. Thus, you have the clearest and best ideas of Existentialism put into the head of the Existentialist. Cooper will also put the Existentialist to use by inferring what the Existentialist would think about things that are vague or unaddressed by the real Existentialists. Lastly, throughout the book he makes sure to dispel the many myths and stereotypes of Existentialism. I should note that because I have not read the primary Existentialist writings, I can't really claim that Cooper accurately describes Existential philosophy. I am sure that other philosophers would disagree with some of his interpretations. However, I can say that the arguments are convincing and the entire scheme of the book is coherent. So in Coopers attempt to teach Existentialism through synthesis and clarification, he might actually be contributing to Existential philosophy as well. In short, Cooper is successful in this introduction to Existentialism for two reasons. First, he reveals the ideas of Existentialism by dissecting them out of the complicated writings and displaying them in the light of clear language. Second, he takes the ideas he extracted and shows how they combine together.