Reviews for Parting the curtain

The average rating for Parting the curtain based on 2 reviews is 4 stars.

Review # 1 was written on 2010-06-08 00:00:00 Yoji Ishihara In his revealing and fascinating tome, Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War, 1945 – 1961, Walter L. Hixson examines official U.S. government efforts to use propaganda and culture to destabilize communist regimes in the Soviet Union and in the Soviet-dominated states in Eastern Europe. In his introduction, he explains, “Although these efforts usually remained on the periphery of Cold War strategy, I have found that they were more significant that generally recognized.” (ix) His focus in the book is on propaganda and culture as components of national security policy, and laments “cultural diplomacy has yet to receive the attention it deserves.” (x) He inserts a third layer of analysis to the traditional military and economic categorization of international relations – suggesting that international relations are intertwined with intercultural relations. Hixson’s central thesis is that “American mass culture has been one of the country’s greatest foreign policy assets,” and “The nation’s rise to world power was inextricably linked with the dissemination of images of affluence, consumerism, middle-class status, individual freedom, and technological progress.” (xi) Hixson is a knowledgeable scholar on the subject of the cold war. He is a professor of history at the University of Akron and the author of several books and articles in scholarly journals, including The Myth of American Diplomacy: National Identity and U.S. Foreign Policy, The Myth of American Diplomacy: National Identity and U.S. Foreign Policy, several works on George F. Keenan, and several on the Vietnam War. In addition to his noteworthy credentials on the subject, he has masterfully used primary sources from the United States Information Agency (USIA) and the CIA, as well as numerous secondary sources to support his arguments. Hixson notes the aversion of the American public and government to propaganda, or even the term, in the wake of the use and misuse of the device by the Bolsheviks during the revolution and the Nazis during World War II. President Harry S. Truman overruled them when he authorized the continuation of the Voice of America (VOA), though sharply curtailed by funding cuts, the USIA. The introduction of the Marshall Plan to revive Western Europe was a propaganda coup countered by the Soviets by their formation of the Cominform (Communist Information Bureau) in 1947. The Soviets bombarded developing nations with Cominform propaganda and cultural exchanges, while the U.S. responded with the Fulbright educational exchange program, miniscule in comparison to the Soviet effort. The Soviets began to purge their society of western influence, so Congress passed the Smith-Mundt Act to promote propaganda and cultural exchanges abroad. The “Campaign of Truth” was initiated by Truman in 1950 as the propaganda clash of the cold war began, spurring a “renaissance” in psychological warfare. (16) When Eisenhower became president, he rejected Truman’s containment policy against communism and embraced a “liberation” policy, intending to use propaganda and covert operations to achieve it. (22) The opening salvos of the cold war were fired on the radio, by VOA, the effectiveness of which the Soviets acknowledged by jamming the broadcasts. Jamming could not stop the “whisper propaganda,” however, Soviet citizens passing VOA depictions of western life from person to person. (52) Even with the expansion of propaganda outlets with the establishment of the ostensibly privately owned Radio Free Europe (RFE), Radio Liberty (RL), and Radio in the American Sector (RIAS), use of propaganda declined in favor of cultural exchanges. American propaganda had erroneously convinced East Germans, Poles, and Hungarians that the U.S. would militarily support “liberation” during an uprising, which they discovered, to their chagrin, was not the case. Evolution, rather than liberation, became the watchword as the focus toward cultural exchanges began. Hixson criticizes Eisenhower sharply for missing an opportunity for détente with his rejection of Stalin’s “Peace note” and his following the advice of John Foster Dulles to eschew negotiations with the Soviets. This, he claims, led to the nuclear and conventional arms race of the cold war. Eisenhower’s “Atoms for Peace” and “Open Skies” proposals were merely propaganda stunts, according to Hixson. Nevertheless, Eisenhower was genuinely enthused by the opportunity for East-West exchanges and cultural contact, which he believed could turn the tide of Soviet public opinion. Hixson’s reviews the 1958 cultural agreement that led to the American exhibit in Moscow in 1959. “While the Soviets hoped that the rival exhibition would spur their own economic development,” he explains, “Washington sought to exploit an unprecedented opportunity for propaganda and cultural infiltration of the USSR.” (165) The exhibition in Solkoniki Park was a huge success, especially in view of the Soviet response to try to sabotage its effectiveness. The ensuing temporary thaw in relations and the genuine effort on the part of Khrushchev and Eisenhower to improve relations between their countries came to a screeching halt when the Soviets shot down Francis Gary Powers’ U-2. Thus, “Eisenhower left office bitterly disappointed over having failed to achieve a breakthrough in the Cold War”. Hixson lays the blame on Eisenhower himself, charging “his own lack of leadership accounts in large measure for the inability to achieve a wider détente.” (224) Hixson’s book is well written, thoroughly researched, and explores a part of American diplomacy that Hixson says “has yet to receive the attention it deserves.” (x) By supporting his thesis with solid research, he has rectified that shortcoming, as the reader inevitably concludes that American mass culture has indeed been one of the country’s greatest foreign policy assets.

Review # 2 was written on 2013-06-13 00:00:00 Chase Fenn Good info, but a very dense and not exactly reader friendly text.