Reviews for The cognitivity of religion

The average rating for The cognitivity of religion based on 2 reviews is 5 stars.

Review # 1 was written on 2011-07-11 00:00:00 Robert O. Worley Hegel, Religion and Christianity Today: A Thought Experiment Why read Hegel on Christianity and Religion when, according to the Zeitgeist, all three are thought to be almost equally passé? After all, most educated people today believe that modern enlightened thinking has obviously refuted them. But can we say that modern times has achieved such a level of tranquility and satisfaction that past philosophical views can be dismissed with such thoughtless certainty? A glimpse at any newspaper would show that there is perhaps some room for doubt... If one believes, as some even now do, that the Hegelian Dialectic is both a genuine philosophical method and also that the progressive emancipatory dialectic that first becomes fully conscious in Hegel has somehow 'gotten lost' then one must go back and try to figure out why, and also where, this dialectic got derailed. A possible contender for the cause of derailment is the claim that Christianity failed to be *in fact* the Universal World Religion that Hegelian Theory both believed and expected it to be. Thus the 'education' that this specific Religion was to provide Mankind was never *in fact* provided. (I do not understand this 'failure', btw, to be fundamentally a failure of either Dialectical Theory or Christianity; rather, the numerous obstacles Christianity faced on the road to an actual global universality were merely practical and included differences in language, culture, family type [i.e., kinship, an anthropological category] and also, of course, politics and geography. It was simply not possible in practice for any premodern religious movement to overcome these and other contingencies and be truly universal.) Now, this is why I believe it would not be merely an error for someone steeped in Hegelian dialectical thought (and I mean either left or right Hegelian thought) to come to think that the best Humanity can hope for today (in these precise circumstances) is the rise of a new Universal Religion. Thanks to modern technology (e.g., airlines, television, the internet) a Religion could now rise everywhere and thus *in fact* be Universal. - But hasn't the Universal Religion already risen? It is, according to Hegel, Christianity. And didn't he, after all, call it 'absolute'? But Hegel himself said that everything happens twice in History; and yes, yes, ...we are, of course, always here reminded that Marx observed that the second time was farce. Now, this last observation, in my opinion, is not, strictly speaking, dialectical. For Hegel, the fact of this 'twiceness' is itself a part of the process of the education of Man in History. It is the educative value of (ahem) 'dialectical repetition' that is of philosophical importance. Indeed, dialectically speaking, the same lesson could occur 100 times instead of merely twice, and so long as the lesson was eventually learned a dialectical sublation would have occurred. Some are coming to think that the rise of a new Universal Religion today would be an educational repetition in this precise dialectical sense. A close study of all three volumes of Hegel's 'Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion' would perhaps clarify (for Hegelianism) what is and what is not to be expected of this endeavor. This small review cannot even pretend to rise to that level of depth and detail. Instead, in this review I will concentrate on how Hegel chose to end his Lectures on Christianity in order to bring out some of what he meant by Spirit - and Community. Specifically, the situation of the Christian Community in his time. And also, a little on the Relation between Spirit and Christ. But first, A Note on the Text: This book is comprised of four lectures given by Hegel in 1821, 1824, 1827 and 1831. These separate lectures have been redacted by our team of editors and translators from Hegel's own Manuscript (Ms.) of the 1821 lecture, "auditor's' notebooks or transcripts of the 1824 lectures", the 1827 lecture is the Lasson edition compared and checked against other sources, while the 1831 lecture is derived from a transcript of D. F. Strauss. Hegel published very few books. (- Only the "Phenomenology of Spirit", 1807; "Science of Logic", 1812, 1813, 1816; "Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences", 1817, 1827, 1830; and the "Philosophy of Right", 1821.) Much of the material that we have today regarding Aesthetics, History, Philosophy and Religion comes from various editions of his manuscripts and also the notes and transcripts of students. We are told that Hegel titled these lectures on Christianity either "Die vollendete Religion" (The Consummate Religion) or "Die offenbare Religion" (The Revelatory Religion), or some variation/combination of these two. He never titles these lectures "Die absolute Religion". Why is any of this important? Our editor explains as follows: "[...] while the object or content of religion is the absolute, religion itself does not entail absolute knowledge of the absolute: that is the role of philosophy. The representational forms of religious expression, even of the Christian religion, must be "sublated" (annulled and preserved) in philosophical concepts. Thus in Hegel's scheme of things there is an absolute knowledge (the science of speculative philosophy) but a consummate religion. Whether religion as such is to be superseded by philosophy is another question..." (Editorial Introduction, p. 4) Religion is not Philosophy; therefore it cannot rise to Hegelian 'Absolute Knowledge'. Now, in the course of these lectures, Hegel does occasionally use the phrase 'absolute religion' regarding Christianity. Thus, while for Hegel only Philosophy can attain Absolute Knowledge, the term 'absolute' when applied to a Religion, or so I would maintain, is, and can only be, an honorific that philosophy occasionally elects to bestow. Another decision that I found particularly interesting is the decision of our editor's to never translate Vorstellung as either 'picture-thinking' or 'conceptual-picture'. We are told that: "Some adjustments in the translation of specific terms have occurred in Volume 3 as compared with Volume 1, occasioned partly by the different context in which they occur and partly by the experience of the translation team." (Editorial Introduction, p. 8) Now, our Volume III first appears in 1985 as a hardcover. (I have the 1998 paperback. And all page numbers in this review refer to this paperback edition.) Volume I, as a hardcover, appears in 1984. One finds oneself wishing for a fuller discussion of the 'experiences' that occurred which led to changes in the translation of certain words in the third Volume... "In the case of Vorstellung we have found it necessary to be more flexible when it is used in non-technical contexts, as it often is in Volume 3. We have employed 'image' and 'imagination' (as when one has a hundred thalers in one's 'imagination'), 'view' (e.g., the Reformed 'view' of the sacrament of Communion) and even 'notion,' although rarely (such 'notions' are not worthy of further consideration). To maintain the distinction between Vorstellung, Begriff, and Idee, we never use 'notion' for Begriff, or 'idea' for Vorstellung, and we avoid such expressions as 'conceptual picture' or 'picture thinking' for Vorstellung. Begriff is consistently translated as 'concept,' Idee as 'Idea,' and in its technical sense Vorstellung remains 'representation'." (p. 8-9) I do not understand the point of saying that the terms "conceptual picture" and "picture thinking" are merely avoided as translations of Vorstellung instead of admitting they were never used; I do not recall one instance of the term 'picture thinking' being used in this volume. I am not blaming the editors for anything here. Choices naturally have to be made between readability and painstaking accuracy. But every translation is an interpretation, whether it wants to be or not. For instance, the mere identification by the editors of 'non-technical contexts' requires an interpretation of the text. Now, everywhere Hegel used the term 'Vorstellung' in these lectures he would have been well aware that the resonances of its previous uses were available to the attentive student. However, when Vorstellung is translated as representation, image/imagination, view, and even notion(!), those resonances are necessarily lost to the reader of this translated text. Again, this is not a criticism of this translating team. All translation involves this risk. For instance, my copy of the Bilingual edition of the 1964 Musa translation of Machiavelli's Prince admits to using twelve different English words to translate the crucial Machiavellian term 'virtù'! But Musa very helpfully provides a list, in his Introduction, of each place in the text that the word virtù was used. I really would have liked to have seen that done here (at least) for the equally crucial term 'Vorstellung'... In any case, what one ends up suspecting is that just as the Philosopher Hegel 'honors' Christianity by occasionally calling it 'absolute' so too our editors, here in the third volume, have elected to 'honor' Christianity (the 'Consummate Religion'!) by never translating 'vorstellung' as 'picture-thinking'. Note that the following symbols are used throughout by the editors of these lectures: [...] Editorial insertions < ... > marginalia | page number and/or page break - indicates a grammatical break between sentence fragments in the MS. -...- textual variants A Note on Christianity, Community, and Spirit: In this section of the review I will concentrate only on the 1821 manuscript since that can be assumed to most accurately reflect Hegel's view. Now, what will perhaps first surprise the modern reader most is the extent to which, according to Hegel, philosophy stands alone in the world. It is radically distinguished from both the faithful common people and the 'Enlightened' throughout the concluding remarks (on Spirit and Community) of each of our four lectures. The next surprise is the crucial importance of the believing community for religion. It is no accident that these lectures always end with the Community (and Spirit). And perhaps the last surprise is how greatly Hegel feared Christianity, thanks to her Theologians, failing this very Community! Now, this Community, according to Hegel, must be thought of as virtually (that is to say, possibly) endless! In the 1821 manuscript we read the following: "In a formal sense [the following sequence applies to historical phenomena]: origin, preservation, and perishing, with the latter following upon the former. But ought we to speak here of this sequence [if] the kingdom of God [has been] established eternally? If so, then perishing or going under would [in fact] be a passing over to the | kingdom of heaven [and would apply] only for single subjects, not for the community; the Holy Spirit as such has eternal life in its community. To speak of a passing away would mean to end on a discordant note. (p. 158, Hegel's Lecture Manuscript)" The Holy Spirit has Eternal Life in the (or, if you prefer, His) Community! While the Risen Christ merely saves individual souls... Now, for Hegel, Spirit is always a living moving thing. By saying that the 'Spirit has eternal life in its community' Hegel has 'immortalized' the community and has thus transformed each of its sublimations (i.e., its changes) into a passing over into a 'new heaven'. So, while individuals merely die and go to Heaven, the Community Itself sublimates itself into a higher form - it is eternally becoming its own heaven. Well then, it's 'all good' right? - Wrong! At this point in the margins of the manuscript Hegel unexpectedly compares modern times (that is, his time) to ancient Rome. "<[The Roman age was one] when rationality necessarily took refuge solely in the form of private rights and private goods because the universal unity based on religion had disappeared, along with a universal political life. [Ordinary people,] helpless and inactive, with nothing to trust, left the universal alone and took care for themselves. [It was an age] when what subsists in and for itself was abandoned even in the realm of thought. Just as Pilate asked, 'What is truth?' [John 18:38], similarly in our time the quest for private welfare and enjoyment [is] the order of the day; moral insight, [the basis] of personal actions, opinions and convictions, [is] without objective truth, and truth is the opposite. I acknowledge only what I believe subjectively. [For some time,] the teaching of the philosophers has corresponded [to this view]: we know and cognize nothing of God, [having] at best a dead and merely historical sort of information.> (p. 159, Hegel's Lecture Manuscript)" As it was yesterday in Hegel's time and in ancient Rome so it is today. With Universalism, both secular (either liberal or socialist) and religious (Christianity most especially), abandoned in our postmodern times there is only 'bread and circuses'; that is to say, the market and entertainment. By 'philosophers' Hegel here means most especially the Kantian view but also the whole of contemporary 'enlightened' philosophy. This comparison with Rome is no mere aside. It was in Rome, in the milieux aptly described here by Hegel, that Christianity itself rose to prominence and became a World Religion. Perhaps one could be forgiven for drawing the conclusion that whenever a genuine lived universalism evaporates from the scene of history into a sky bereft of all save private obsessions, then the world is ripe for the rise of a new universalism. But certainly the common people of Hegel's time and also the theologians were fighting against this decadence? Well, yes and no: "Although among the people, i.e., the lower classes, [there is still] faith [If] the clergy, whose office [is] always to stimulate religion, [renounces] this service,[it falls into] mere argumentation, a particular [i.e., not universal] history, i.e., something past. When [religious truth is] treated as historical, that spells an end [to it]; then it no longer [lives] in immediate consciousness, i.e., in actuality, [as] the unity of the inner and the outer. {When] moralistic views and motivations , moralistic or subjective feelings and virtuosities, [prevail], then [something else] is put in its place - certainly not the speculative truth! (p. 159 - 160, Hegel's Lecture Manuscript)" Hegel is arguing here that faith cannot be justified philosophically ('by the concept') or even by the force of church rules and laws of the state. Justification comes by faith alone, that is to say, a living active faith. Thus the theologians (insofar as they are trying to imitate philosophy) are actually aiding the destruction of their religion. Their arguments no longer stimulate religious belief and, as argumentative particularities, only add to the further fragmentation of Christianity. Everything they say is 'past'; it no longer lives in the heart or soul of anyone. Now, ...does any of this sound familiar? And so, what follows? <[when every] foundation, security, the substantive bonds of the world, [have been] tacitly removed; when [we are left] inwardly empty of objective truth, of its form and content-[then] one thing alone [remains] certain: finitude [turned] in upon itself, arrogant barrenness and lack of content, the extremity of self-satisfied dis-enlightenment.> (p. 160, Hegel's Lecture Manuscript)" Of course, the German word for enlightenment is Aufklärung. The word translated as dis-enlightenment is Ausklärung. Noting this wordplay our editor explains that there might be another meaning. He delicately explains that a "more vulgar overtone may also be intended since Aus-klärung means literally 'clearing out,' suggesting perhaps a kind of intellectual diarrhea. (see p. 160-161, note 255)" The 'Enlightenment' as mere criticism has drowned the world in sh*t! Hegel, at times, really is too funny! Note that this particular lecture ends in a most memorable fashion: "Instead [of allowing] reason and religion to contradict themselves, [we must] resolve the discord in the manner [appropriate] to us - [namely,] reconciliation in [the form of] philosophy. How the present day is to solve its problems must be left up to it. In philosophy itself [the resolution is only] partial. These lectures have attempted to offer guidance to this end. Religion [must] take refuge in philosophy. (For [the theologians of the present day], the world [is] a passing away into [subjective reflection because it has as its] form merely the externality of contingent occurrence.) | But philosophy, [as we have said, is also] partial: [it forms] an isolated order of priests--a sanctuary--[who are] untroubled about how it goes with the world, [who need] not mix with it, [and whose work is to preserve] this possession of truth. How things turn out [in the world] is not our affair. (p. 162, Hegel's Lecture Manuscript)" Karl Barth once asked “why did Hegel not become for the Protestant world something similar to what Thomas Aquinas was for Roman Catholicism?” Well, one reason is that try as I might, I can't imagine Aquinas writing a sentence indicating that the outcome of theological strife was 'not our affair'. But sentences that are unavailable to philosophy in medieval circumstances became unavoidable in high modernity... For some of us, perhaps the most stunning admission at the end of this lecture is the 'partiality' of philosophy. The implication (to me) is that Thought (i.e., Philosophy) and Being (or Actuality) are not and perhaps can never be exactly the same! By comparison, even the apathy of that final sentence should not shock us. After all, in his Preface to the "Philosophy of Right" Hegel says: "A further word on the subject of issuing instructions on how the world ought to be: philosophy, at any rate, always comes too late to perform this function. As the thought of the world, it only appears at a time when actuality has gone through its formative process and attained its completed state. This lesson of the concept is necessarily also apparent from history, namely that it is only when actuality has reached maturity that the ideal appears opposite the real and reconstructs this real world, which it has grasped in its substance, in the shape of an intellectual realm. When philosophy paints its grey in grey, a shape of life has grown old, and it cannot be rejuvenated, but only recognized, by the grey in grey of philosophy; the Owl of Minerva begins its flight only with the onset of dusk." (H.B. Nisbet translation) This philosophical Owl devours (that is to say, knows) only the dead. Now, if Christianity (like every other existing Religion) is past rejuvenation and only recognized in philosophy then - ...what? Continued in Comments

Review # 2 was written on 2013-05-19 00:00:00 Terry Pink The volume of Hegel's Lectures is certainly his most interesting and profound. Though understanding it requires the tedious trek through the opening of vol. 1 wherein he discusses the basic principles of his philosophy of religion, it's interesting to see where this all leads and his "synthesis" of his philosophical system and Christianity. While I can't help but feel as though some of the claims are a stretch I do give him credit for an innovative take both on the Christian faith and the topic of religion as a whole. It's easy to run to Kierkegaard, read say...the Postscript, and then take a shot at Hegel after being mesmerized by Søren's attack on him without first having read the German and giving his theories a chance. I'm still up in the air about who is right, given that Kierkegaard advances little constructive philosophy of his own and given the fact that a great deal of what Hegel says about geist and the Christian spirit seems to make sense