Reviews for Can God Intervene?

The average rating for Can God Intervene? based on 2 reviews is 3.5 stars.

Review # 1 was written on 2014-01-18 00:00:00 Mark West A fine and in depth critique of modern attempts to create a theodicy--that is, a philosophical work that attempts to provide God with a justification for the evils in this world. A theodicy should be contrasted with a defense. That latter provides only a possible explanation or what Peter van Inwagen calls a "just-so story" for the existence of evil. More on this later. I should say, however, that from the outset that I am at a certain disadvantage in evaluating much of Tilley's work as he might wish. This is because Tilley explicates his critique using the techniques of language philosophy, following J. L.Austin. Not knowing much about speech acts, I am not sure how to evaluate its taxonomy, whether Tilley's is firmly established or any weaknesses in such an approach. I feel a bit like one who would attempt to critique Alvin Plantinga's ontological argument with having taken a serious look at his theory of names and essences. The basic idea I do get, however, namely that the theodicist in not understanding contexts in which she draws her argument invalidates her argument and does violence to those sources. It is fortunate, however that most the sources he has chosen--The Book of Job, Augustine's Enchiridion, The Consolation of Philosophy by Boethius, Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, and George Eliot's Adam Bede--have been so examined that I found his case quite plausible, even though I had to filter it through the poor resources at my disposal. In reviewing the Book of Job and the works of Augustine and Boethius, Tilley goes to great pains to show that none of these intended to present a theodicy and that Job is designed to frustrate any nascent attempts (even a cursory glance shows, the "justification" is given to us at the beginning the story and God never provides it to Job, moreover, after God grants Job an audience, it is Job friends who are finally taken to task). Tilley goes into much more detail, asking the sort of questions which make any presentation of Job as a theodicy collapse upon itself. This treatment is a welcome contrast to the more recent work of Bart Erhman (God's Problem) which sees in the Bible a graveyard of theodicies. By extension, Tilley argues that neither Augustine or Boethius present theodicies, but instead both are addressing how is dealing with evil. He takes Augustine as giving instruction to Christians on how to face evil, both teacher and disciple assume both God's goodness and power and the reality of evil as a given. Tilley does allow that The Enchirdion contains a defense. In the case of Boethius it is a clarification between fortune and happiness (a point that later Medieval writers take to heart--for instance in Aquinas' commentary of Job). In his dealing with the Dialogues, Tilley asks who speaks for Hume. The answer would be surprising. It is generally maintained that the character of Philo speaks for Hume, but Tilley argues that it is the dialogue itself does this, that Hume is calling into question the terms of the entire debate. This figures in later when Tilley taeks direct aim at theodicies. I rather wish I knew anything about Adam Bede. The essay is very engaging, even for someone who does not know much about literary criticism. Among the many points Tilley makes here, there is one that ties into Humes Dialogues that I did not mention above: that evil should not be seen simply as evil acts or suffering. Evil is structural in nature and that the easy dismissal that both theodists and the critics make of this nature (and with it "metaphysical evil," comes at the expense of misjudging and perpetuating evil. With all this out of the way, Tilley is ready to make his two charges against theodicies. First, theodists are far too abstract. Their solutions to the problem of evil can only provide comfort to those who are not afflicted or can draw on other resources. Responses to real and crushing evil are dismissed as pastoral. My reaction to this characterization was at first to say that of course its abstract, that's the nature of philosophical reasoning. If a theodicy cannot comfort the suffering, it shows only a limit it what it is suppose to do, not that real suffering is thereby dismissed. Perhaps I just have a weak view of what a theodicy is suppose to do, but given Tilley's critique of a number of theodicists (Hick and Griffin are given particularly harsh treatment here, though others, such as Swinburne are given attention as well), it may well be that I am in the minority how strong a theodicy is suppose to be. The second point I've already alluded to. Theodicies mis-characterize what evil is. In doing so, they provide a blind eye to certain evil and essentially allow them to fester, with their blessing. The third problem is that any real "justification" of evil can be extended to those who formulate the justification. Should the theodicist find herself in an analogous position to she has argued that God is in, she can justify an analogous action for herself. Just a couple of notes. Tilley's skepticism regarding the possibility of finding a justification of evil makes him less sanguine about how God will resolve the issue than some individuals (and here I have Marylin McCord Adams in mind) who would otherwise share a fair bit of his project. One does not here Tilley speak of defeating evil as Adams does. Although he does not discuss defenses much, Tilley generally approves of them and seems them to be largely free the defects found in theodicies. For instance, aside from criticizing Plantinga's freewill defense as accepting the notion of evil as constrained to suffering and actions, Tilley seems to endorse the project. However, defenses, no less theodicies place certain metaphysical constraints on how we view God and our relation to God. The assumption or criticism of Middle Knowledge says something about human nature and God's options with dealing with it. Perhaps that, however, is another book

Review # 2 was written on 2009-04-19 00:00:00 Gerald Fisher This book is very good for people just starting to think about 'The Problem of Evil'. It a short and easy read, and covers the basic that are considered in more in-depth analyses, like that of Hume's 'Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion', which is referenced towards then end. It's also great for the naive atheist who thinks that the problem of evil is a 'logical problem', rather than a probabilistic one. The main flaw, which if addressed could have made this a fair bit better, was the surface-level consideration of free will, and the taking for granted that we have it because we seem to feel we have it.