Reviews for The engine of reason, the seat of the soul

The average rating for The engine of reason, the seat of the soul based on 2 reviews is 4.5 stars.

Review # 1 was written on 2009-09-22 00:00:00 Larry Landrum In calculus, one can find the area under any curve by filling it with rectangles, and then making the rectangles smaller and smaller until there is no space left unfilled. In neurophilosophy, one can explain any phenomenon of consciousness by describing neurological functioning, and then making the description more and more detailed until there is nothing left to explain. This is the agenda of Paul Churchland and neurophilosophy, and I am not sure if he succeeds because there is nothing left to explain, or because he has worn me out with the exercise. His descriptions are beautifully complicated, and they are not just inventive or ingenious, but rather thoroughly methodical and soundly scientific. The question is whether they really address the philosophical problems. Much of what he does seems to be mathematical modeling, which would be theoretical neurology more than descriptive or empirical neurology. He starts with the model of parallel distributed processing (PDP) such as a computer might do, although most computers work on the basis of serial processing. In PDP one starts with a variety of digitalized input (which could be sensory) and through a process of self-correction and refinement one arrives at digital output which is the completion of a cognitive task. For example, one can take input from the optic nerves, run it through PDP, and come out with "Yes, a square." Obviously, I am glossing over many details. But the technique is strong enough to account for progressively more complicated cognitive tasks: recognition of shapes, letters, colors, tastes, sounds, words, faces, emotional expressions, grammatical patterns, social situations in time, etc., etc. After a point, one wonders if there really is anything left to the life of the mind that cannot be accounted for in this way. Churchland identifies the three knottiest problems of reducing consciousness to neural processing as 1.) meaning or semantic content (Can PDP do more than manipulate symbols?), 2.) mathematics (Can PDP do math as humans do, including Kurt Godel?), and 3.) the old problem of sense-qualia (Can PDP see red?). He makes an energetic charge on each of these problems, discussing the research with PDP which would suggest progress in addressing them. He himself acknowledges no final conclusions on these questions, but the efforts being marshaled to answer them are formidable. This book feels like the textbook for a new science, a new paradigm for neurology. The logical development is exciting. In the past, when I studied neurology, it has been like studying a map of Afghanistan. But in this book I see a technique for using PDP laid out, with its consequences, which is similar to other epiphanies in science, such as encountering Euclid's geometry, or chemical bonds, or plate tectonics, for the first time. I am grateful for the experience. Yet on a gut level I resist the effort to reduce or eliminate the mind, even in a theoretical sense. Churchland himself occasionally speaks of the self or the soul in an informal sense, but as distinct from the mind. I can't help but feel that it is with the mind that we understand the universe (including neurology). It is the mind that finds the orderliness in chaos, and sums it up in general principles. How then can the mind explain itself away, like the Cheshire cat disappearing and leaving only its smile? How can one use wonderful resources to explain away those wonderful resources? One can, perhaps, explain everything except the explainer.

Review # 2 was written on 2012-11-08 00:00:00 Ashley Stockdale Churchland's Engine of Reason is dated, and that's too bad, because I actually think it is one of his more well written pieces, probably even more than Plato's Camera [which I gave 5-stars]. The problem is that the change of material in neuroscience and cognitive science make it hard for writing to stay current for very long now; that's not Churchland's fault, but the way that he structures the book makes it far easier for the content to become obsolete, compared to contemporaries like Dan Dennett. I think that what should be said is that one of the reasons that Engine of Reason has become dated is part of what makes it great as a piece of philosophy: it is current and in touch with the scientific literature that surrounds it. [That isn't to say that other philosophers aren't, but many are more hesitant to bombard readers with scientific content.] Churchland is unabashed about his knowledge of the contemporary literature in the science and, as a result, the book feels almost more like something that would be written for an interdisciplinary audience attempting to talk about the neurosciences than anything in philosophy. This is one thing that I absolutely love about Churchland. The major criticism that will get tossed at Churchland will come down that same line: This doesn't feel like philosophy. That's true. Of course, if you some of the content of the book, you start to understand why. This book is a part of a conversation in philosophy of mind that happened around the time of the publishing, where philosophers raised concerns about the invocation of traditional intuitive concepts that seemed totally inviable for moving the discussion forward, because the concepts themselves were either incoherent, not meaningful, or not supported by the science. Churchland was largely responsible for championing the view that the terms that don't seem to be doing work should take a backseat to the things that can. That is a fight that Churchland seems to have won in the technical literature. Paul Churchland's influence on contemporary philosophy, often as the far wing of a spectrum of people concerned with the ability to talk about consciousness in strictly neural terms, is hard to minimize. He has had a major impact as a philosopher of science, generally, and is one of the best ways into a scientifically literate philosophy of mind. Churchland's attempt to understand a broad array of topics in the field is something that should be admired, and his attempt to bring that technical knowledge into the conversation is something that he shares only with the best in professional philosophy of mind. There are some issues that I take with the literature that don't seem to have gone away from Churchland's writing. He's always very neurocentric. He is incredibly interested in the metaphor of digital computation while acknowledging that the brain is clearly an analogue entity. He limits himself a lot through the use of that approach, which has become something of a standard for him. I do think that for those looking to seriously pursue philosophy of mind, this is a must-read at some point, largely because it fleshes out some of his points about the use of vectors and why they matter. However, I think that Plato's Camera is something to be taken a little more heavily, as it is far more developed in terms of the ideas in philosophy of mind. Also, this really isn't for those just looking for a casual introduction; make sure you have some familiarity with the literature before diving into any of Paul Churchland's work.