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Reviews for Business Law

 Business Law magazine reviews

The average rating for Business Law based on 2 reviews is 3 stars.has a rating of 3 stars

Review # 1 was written on 2011-08-20 00:00:00
0was given a rating of 3 stars Jamie Browning
It is an uncontroversial statement that the Falklands War was not a clash of critical interests. Freedman admits as much when he writes that Democracies have little to fight for other than principle. But it’s an interesting story for (possibly) unexpected reasons. The Pointy End of the Stick The United Kingdom sailed a task force across hemispheres and took back the Falkland Islands and its Dependencies. In describing the fighting, this book is adequate. It is efficient and operationally focussed, featuring some back-biting between commanders. Freedman details how certain whiz-bang weapons often failed to work which, in the case of the Rapier missile, was then hidden from the public to protect export sales down the line. The Falklands War feels like a very specific one from a military perspective. Freedman does slap together a chapter in on Lessons Learned with sombre tones of self-reflection, with the occasional pat on the United Kingdom’s back for retaining “expeditionary” capabilities. I would counter that “lessons” were not always “learned”: - The experiences of low-level airfield denial raids over Stanley by the Harriers didn’t prevent punishingly high casualty rates by Tornadoes trying the same thing in Iraq. - The SAS moved from trying to camp on a glacier during a snowstorm in 1982 to drinking irradiated water in the desert in 1991. War is Politics by Other Means Politics added further complications. The UK depended on international support not only in its diplomatic efforts but also in logistics and material support. So even if a military conclusion was assumed, the political dimension could not be disregarded. Some actions might therefore have to be eschewed because their political impact would outweigh their military impact. Want to lose the Falklands War? Well, do any of these: • sink too many Argentine ships • shoot down certain Argentine military aircraft* • bomb Argentina • formally declare war • bankrupt Argentina • fail to propose diplomatic resolutions • fail to (at least pretend to) listen to your American “allies” None of the above involved the United Kingdom losing a single ship, plane or man, and this is what elevates the book to an important read. Skip the military campaign if you want. The heart is the talking; the Security Council resolutions; proposed terms for negotiations; telling the Secretary General to ignore the Panamanian representative; lobbying the non-aligned countries; deciding whether “views” is an acceptable substitute for “interests” when it comes to self determination; telling the French President you will nuke Argentina if he doesn't lend a hand. The United Kingdom had a lot to do beyond stabbing the pointy end of the stick at the enemy, and this book is an impressive introduction to politics and diplomacy. Stuttering attempts at managing the media and cornering the market for Exocet missiles provide some extra colour. Rules of Engagement had to be set, discussed, altered, and sometimes communicated as a warning to Argentina to constrain the latter’s actions, or provide the United Kingdom justification for warlike acts. Unsurprisingly, the United Kingdom’s military did favour the maximal response where possible: In one annotation one official observed that the speed of transmission seemed to vary in proportion to the aggressiveness of the instruction. Another major player in this book is the United States, primarily via Secretary of State Alexander Haig. While any views of his shuttle diplomacy will be coloured by the righteousness of either side’s claim, Freedman portrays him as a bumbler, misreading intentions and creating negotiating positions for the parties that did not exist. He also fluffed a vote in the United Nations, failing to instruct the American representative properly as army commanders apparently do not give orders direct to company commanders. It’s an interesting narrative on why the messenger does matter. I would caveat my comments on diplomacy and political conduct by saying that this unapologetically is the Official History from the United Kingdom’s perspective. The Argentines are often portrayed as disorganised or possibly drunk. This is fine in the sense we are talking about the United Kingdom’s perspective of Argentine behaviour, but you should make external reference to Argentina’s views separately. *One did turn out to be a Brazilian airliner, so perhaps caution was warranted generally.
Review # 2 was written on 2011-08-20 00:00:00
0was given a rating of 3 stars Angelia Senters
Talk about being disorganize…….every idiot had his say as whether or not there was going to be a conflict. Then you get the village idiot Haig in there and christ what a bloody ………..!!


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