Reviews for Unemployment & Occupational Training: [lectures Delivered at a Course Held at The] University of Salford, 4 November 1971 - 24 February 1972

The average rating for Unemployment & Occupational Training: [lectures Delivered at a Course Held at The] University of Salford, 4 November 1971 - 24 February 1972 based on 2 reviews is 3.5 stars.

Review # 1 was written on 2019-05-01 00:00:00 Steven Ritter I thought this was really cool! The overarching military, KGB, and GRU that comprised what was the Soviet Military Intelligence entity. You ever notice in older movies when they mention something like "This is Colonel Boris Shevchenko, Soviet intelligence"? That's because military order & discipline, ranks, support & logistics, and command structure ran the intelligence sector. They weren't military perse but mirrored the military on a strategic level. The author explains recruiting agents, deep cover operatives, illegals, cultural/linguistic immersion to pass as someone else, radio/enciphering transmissions, "sleeper agents". These things are only the tip of the iceberg. I really enjoyed reading this and learning about how significant these operations existed during the Cold War. I enjoyed the author's writing style, the readability, and his message in the end (I won't ruin it for you). Top notch in my opinion! Thanks!

Review # 2 was written on 2019-12-21 00:00:00 Johnny Dawson This is a somewhat poorly written book that contains an interesting description of the early history, organization, purpose, and methods of the GRU, the Soviet military intelligence organization, up until the mid-1980s. It reads as though the author sat down and wrote several somewhat random chapters on different aspects of the GRU that came to his mind. Written by an ex-GRU officer, the details he presents strike me as being generally reliable, though the historical accounts are somewhat hard going if you do not possess an understanding of the turmoil of the early Soviet Union before World War II. One thing that does come across is how very paranoid the Soviet intelligence services were, and how very inefficiently they repeatedly purged themselves of potential traitors or political opponents. From that point of view, this likely provides an example of how not to run an intelligence organization for those who want to avoid unnecessary bloodshed, despotism, or political instability. Written in the mid-1980s, this book has some of the feel of the Cold War in the pages, and is of interest to those who would like to learn about the great lengths the Soviet union went to, in some cases, for the preservation of their military readiness vis-a-vis the West, and in particular, the United States. There are some statements the author makes that may be doubtful, such as about the superiority of Soviet made weapons systems as a result of the plans of multiple foreign weapons systems being stolen and aggregated so as to choose the best characteristics of them all. While this may be true in some cases, such as the Kalashnikov rifle (AK-47), this claim does not generally ring true. However, Suvorov does make it clear what the specific aims of the GRU were, and how generally successful they were in their operations, which was apparently rather considerable. This book is a worthwhile read for those with a particular interest in the intelligence capabilities of Soviet military intelligence of the 1980s, but it is not exactly an exciting or fun read, and some of the information may not be particularly accurate, as it is not a scholarly work, and is not clearly supported by a rich body of documentary evidence.