Reviews for The New world order

The average rating for The New world order based on 2 reviews is 3 stars.

Review # 1 was written on 2012-06-12 00:00:00 Adam Doe This book is more like a series of 3 long essays with some loose connections. The general message of the book is that with the restraints of the Cold War lifted the US now faces the imperial temptation. This means that the US risks pursuing an overly militarized foreign policy that balances against aggression everywhere rather than a specific threat (the USSR, GR, or JP), or a global policeman type role. Tucker argues that the US has the power to do this but not the will or tradition to follow through on the consequences of imperial interventions. In other words, he sees a US at risk of intervening in lots of places because of this expansive role but not tying up the loose ends. We would have the Hamiltonian tradition of a strong military (shorn of the realpolitik) combined with Jeffersonian idealism (shorn of the anti-militarism) resulting in an expansive, destructive position in the world. I'm perfectly okay with this argument, but I don't think it applies to his main case study: Desert Storm. Tucker argues that in Desert Storm the US rushed into the defense of the New World Order against aggression anywhere, fought the Iraqis, but then withdrew from the whole mess, leaving SH in power and the Kurds and Shia to be crushed. He argues that the US should have chosen one of 2 options: 1. Go to war, but finish the job. Embrace the imperial responsibility and impose a MacArthur-like sovereignty over Iraq in order to rehabilitate it as a nation. 2. Pursue the sanctions route, draw down troops levels in Saudi Arabia, and wait the Iraqis out. This might not work in getting SH out of KW, but it avoid stirring the pot too much, keeps the international coalition in check, and doesn't impose undue suffering on the Iraqis in a war. Instead, he criticizes Bush for choosing the irresponsible imperial role. I think Tucker's warnings about an imperial role are all well and good. Everyone and their dog who wasn't a neocon was making this kind of warning in the early 1990's. The problems were that the Gulf War was not an imperial war, that the sanctions route probably would not have worked, and that not invading and reconstructing Iraq was the much safer and more responsible route. I would be happy to spell this argument out further, but I'm tired right now. Sorry. This book's central argument about the Gulf War isn't correct, but the book has lots of redeeming value in its thoughtful essays about American foreign policy traditions. It is very well historically versed, concise, and thoughtful. It's really only of interest to scholars of foreign policy, but it should remain on the list of those interested in post-Cold War transition and the Gulf War in particular.

Review # 2 was written on 2016-06-05 00:00:00 Devora Romo not sure maybe I read this already