Reviews for Ethics and the a priori

The average rating for Ethics and the a priori based on 2 reviews is 3 stars.

Review # 1 was written on 2008-09-21 00:00:00 James Gallagher i can't give this book a 1-5 star assessment. micheal smith's thinking has been such a spur to my own-- in some ways the papers in this book have shaped my thinking on moral agency as much as anything i've read. but i fundamentally disagree with almost every position he holds. he epitomizes the kind of morally philosophy that i take myself to be reacting against. so: no stars. my relationship to this book is too complicated.

Review # 2 was written on 2019-05-06 00:00:00 Barnypok Parbbkxwmuzlsxgpmta Here are the words I would use to describe Niebuhr, whom I've never directly read before: balanced, open-minded, wise, wordy. The last part is the only significant problem I had with the book. Luckily it was short because almost every sentence was a multifaceted workout that made you really focus. If you aren't at least somewhat used to dense philosophical writing then this might not be the book for you. But if you are interested in charting out a vital center liberalism (as I am) this is an essential read. Niebuhr spells out two philosophical schools in this book. The children of light include most liberals, French Enlightenment figures, Marxists, and almost any idealist with an overly positive view of human nature. Their big mistake is that they underestimate or ignore the power of human partiality and selfishness in all systems and all historical periods. They believe that human beings can be bound in cooperation by a common recognition of what is right and by the best set of laws or incentives. the CoL also tend to ignore their own partiality and self-interest, believing that they are merely imparting a beautiful ideology unto the world. This can become dangerous as they tend to persist in believing that whatever they do to bring about a better world must be acceptable because they couldn't POSSIBLY be the bad guys. He says at one point, for example, that liberals like Wilson believe that the only reason there isn't a world government is that no one has thought up a good enough organizational scheme yet. The CoL's naivete leaves their ideas open for manipulation from the children of darkness. Fascists might be the main children of darkness he's talking about in 1944. The CoD have such a dark and corrupted view of human nature that they believe only tyranny and violence can hold human societies together. From the inside and outside, they take advantage of the "stupid" CoL and corrupt their systems toward partial ends. He gives the example of Lenin and Stalin corrupting the more humane doctrines of Marx (this is disputable btw) in order to seize power and create a tyranny never seen before in history. Another example might be Christian plutocrats using charitable giving as a screen or justification for otherwise rapacious economic practices. Niebuhr's main defense of democracy is not the overly sunny one of the CoL, although he's a little vague on the "traditional defense" of democracy. Rather, he says that democracies must be founded on an accurate conception of human nature, one that he finds in his liberal Protestantism. He argues that human beings are not so evil that we are incapable of justice, enlightened self-interest, cooperation, and charitableness, because these positive traits democracy and a civil society would be impossible. On the other hand, human beings are not so good that they can be trusted with each other's interests indefinitely, nor that they can live without a variety of restraints: legal, communal, moral, etc.. I think that this is a very balanced view of human beings that is a crucial philosophical basis for democracy. Niebuhr's best chapter relates to the regulation of the economy and property. Here he once again charts a brilliant course through the extremes. On one side is the free market capitalism of Smith and the physiocrats, who believe that economic interests will be held in balance by the mechanisms of the free market. They follow the Lockean understanding of property wherein if an individual puts his labor into something it becomes his property. Niebuhr says this understanding of property is hopelessly outdated in the modern industrial age, when so much power and property are concentrated in a small set of hands. He concedes to the socialists and Marxists that they correctly argue that property in the modern era must be understood in part in a communal sense: we are all so wrapped up in the policies and fate of the local factory, for example, that it is unfair to the community . This is why Niebuhr supported New Deal type political controls on capitalism and the unfettered wielding of property. It would be a wise doctrine for us to revive today: how many towns and small cities turned to Trump (however foolishly) in part because companies with no concern for the communities that relied on them mechanized jobs or took them overseas? Niebuhr rightfully conceives of capitalist property as an instrument of power, something that can be wielded in a way that can destroy democracy and community if not held in political check. Just before you think this guy is some kind of weird Marxist Protestant, he also says our understanding of property and the community should be far to the right of Marxist dogma. The thing the Marxists get wrong is that ownership of property is not the only way to wield property as an instrument of power. Marxists expect that when property ownership is dissolved the main reason for injustice in the world will also dissolve. Never mind the fact that injustice is rooted in our partial, flawed nature, not just in social relations. The bigger problem is that someone in any hierarchical system will still have to manage property even if they don't own it (I'm looking at you, dictatorship of the proletariat), which opens the door for them to wield it as an instrument of power and self promotion, but now without any checks on their authority. If these managers of property have a CoL sense of self-righteousness (as the Marxist-Leninists did), we have a recipe for disaster. Thus Niebuhr has many uses for capitalist competition and private ownership of property, albeit within restrictions set by an accurate reading of human nature. This is just really great stuff: Niebuhr is anti-dogmatic, and he pulls the good stuff out of two diametrically opposed traditions to create something that will work in practice. The only philosophical problem I found in this book was the plea for religious humility as an important way to sustain religious tolerance and liberty in a free society. He means that believers should recognize that their view of what God wants is a faint shadow of his true intentions, given how far off and awesome God is, so we should never go into a political or religious debate with confidence or close-mindedness or a sense that we're "doing God's work." Coming from my skeptical perspective, I can buy many people are capable of this, but I'd say they are a minority. Holy texts and most religious traditions don't exactly encourage doubt about their followers having chosen the one true path to salvation. Why, then, should their followers approach the rest of the world with humility? History seems to attest to the unrealistic nature of what Niebuhr is calling for here. I don't doubt that he is capable of this kind of humility, but I don't think that faith (belief without evidence) encourages this in the vast majority of believers who aren't also brilliant philosophers. Ultimately this book is a plea for humility in what one believes and knows. The possibility that you could be wrong is one basis of respecting the right of others to worship, think, and speak freely, as well as to challenge your own beliefs. This is something I'd say does not come naturally to human beings, but Niebuhr makes a strong case that working toward this is essential for sustaining democracy.