Reviews for The Crisis in Kashmir: Portents of War, Hopes of Peace

The average rating for The Crisis in Kashmir: Portents of War, Hopes of Peace based on 2 reviews is 4 stars.

Review # 1 was written on 2018-08-20 00:00:00 Matthew Measmer Reflections of a Pandit Pundit Kashmir interests me on several levels, and not just because of the increase in our trade and business relationships with people on the subcontintent. As a Canadian Federalist I see elements both common and different with Quebec separatism - and Quebec was in "crisis" around the same time. As a liberal centrist my concern is about societies that polarize themselves, or fall to one extreme or the other - and here the Indian nation as a whole has done reasonably well navigating the waters. But to see how it got there one needs to look at the history. To summarize the situation is not to do it full justice. Historically the valley of Kashmir and the adjacent territory of Jumma formed a single Raj with a Muslim majority, but one that was ruled by Hindus. The region is the north of India abutting Pakistan, Afghanistan, China and unilaterally annexed (by China) Tibet. (Ganguly provides 2 reference maps at the opening of the book.) In 1947 the goal the Indian National Congress was to create a secular and democratic state. In contrast the goal of Pakistani nationalists was to create a religious Muslim state for South Asian Muslims (pp8). Kashmir, physically between the two, could have gone either way. A third option, independence for the landlocked region was a weak alternative. Interestingly enough, and I found this a fascinating point, Kashmiri independence was opposed by China who viewed it as a similar signal for Tibet. From the Indian POV, Pakistan and the ISI were the agents behind fomenting insurgent in Kashmir since the late 1970s, through funding madrassas and training guerilla fighters among the youth and encouraged towards Islamic fundamentalism. Pakistan's argument was to appeal to nationalist and Islamic identity, citing corruption, betrayal, despotism, religious discrimination and other memes designed to broker discontent. In the 1965 insurgency featuring infiltratrators from Pakistan did not received local support, most Kashmiris would up siding with the Indian government and many of the mujahadeen were turned in. Overall Pakistan's attempts at instigation backfired badly. Not only were these allegations too sweeping, they paled against the same behaviour exhibited by the accusers, writ large in the accompanying democide that occured during the 1971 secession of Bangladesh. Ganguly emphasizes that in the Indian model Kashmir is not the only province where a federal minority is a local majority - the Sikhs of Punjab being the closest example. If Kashmir were to leave that might lead others to follow. As such most Indians regard Kashmir as an integral part of the country (the same can be said of English Canada's regard for Quebec), and though the feeling inside Kashmir itself is mixed the argument for pluralism is that it has offered more opportunities for growth, liberty and advancement that the alternative next door in Pakistan. Which is not to say that the central government did not make it's share of mistakes, and Ganguly does a good job of detailing the negative impact of Indira and Rajiv Ghandi's drift to centralize state power. Another problem was the central government's granting a concession restricting against selling land in Kashmir and Jammu for Indian nationals from outside the region. New Delhi also tended to ignore corruption and mismanagement in Khashmir itself, rather than stirring up trouble with Sheikh Abdullah and other Muslim leaders. Ganguly concludes with his assessment of options going forward. The book does have a few drawbacks, one of which is the large number of players in the conflict, some key, others fleeting, that are mentioned. There is a profile of the various insurgent groups in one of the appendices at the back, but a timeline and a dramatis personae reference would also have helped. At times I found it difficult to keep track of the relationships and allegiances. Ganguly's book was written in 1997. At the risk of speaking too soon, the crisis in Kashmir is over. The Federalists won. The separatists and insurgents lost. The Kashmiri economy is growing and the Pakistani alternative offers little attraction. That doesn't mean that the government in New Delhi can be complacent or that secession is still not a possibility - but that is a problem for another read.

Review # 2 was written on 2008-02-10 00:00:00 David Giles Gives a good account of the events that led to the insurgency in Kashmir from a realist perspective. But the analysis is extremely biased.