Reviews for Human Knowing: A Prelude To Metaphysics

The average rating for Human Knowing: A Prelude To Metaphysics based on 2 reviews is 4.5 stars.

Review # 1 was written on 2014-11-30 00:00:00 David Leyonhjelm I enjoyed it very much, even though it was difficult reading for me. I had to read quite a bit of other sources in order to understand some of the terms and concepts discussed in the book. It was rather mind-expanding on subjects of what is knowledge, how do we know what we know, what is the difference in science and non-science, whether it is possible ever to absolutely translate anything from one language to another, are there essential properties and characteristics of science as opposed to nominalism or conventionism and saying things are whatever we say they are? I was interested in the book because of my interest in the general concept of epistemological ontology, and so I found it to be quite rewarding for me on that subject, even though the main thesis of the book is more specifically the philosophy of science. The author is very thorough and detailed, walking through his arguments from fundamental concepts, through differing thinkers' opinions, to his own assertions. There are many references for further exploration, and there's a huge bibliography. I think this book helped me not only to understand more about epistemological ontology (with much reference to K. Popper's Three Worlds ideas, for instance), but also I think it helped me to understand something about personal knowledge states as orientating variables important in relating to the outside world and other people.

Review # 2 was written on 2013-03-03 00:00:00 Shane Toumey If there is an aspect to contemporary metaethics whose prospects are especially hopeless and unconvincing, and if you want to read a book that can help you to make a conclusion about the antecedent of that opening conditional, then you should read this book. Shafer-Landau's defense of moral realism is as flaccid as the moral realism he tries to defend. The many deep wounds I received from reading this book are still too fresh to allow me to face them in too much detail here, but the primary grounds for his defense of the truth of moral realism are by way of an analogy to the contemporary philosophy of mind; Shafer-Landau's real moral properties are ontologically analogous to consciousness. And if that dubious enterprise isn't enough to fill you with the kind of total despair that you've been searching for, then by all means, dive into this sea of argumentative retreat yourself, for I can assure you that your thirst can be slaked many times over in these 302 pages of delicate and sophisticated maneuvering. The two most prominently disagreeable features of this book, for me, are these. First, aware of the profound (if not even disturbing, I would add) difficulties that arguing in favor of moral realism's realism entails, Shafer-Landau opts for the far less satisfying strategy of insisting on the difficulties of proving moral realism false. Did you hear that? Instead of squarely arguing for the truth of his moral beliefs, much of the book is devoted to undermining arguments against moral realism: thus, moral realism could be true because it's hard to prove that it's false. One wonders: why doesn't he simply face the facts? Second, although he says early on "that [he] came to these views by way of argument, rather than (as is usual) by way of rationalizing preexisting convictions..." (8-9), don't believe him. The entire work is an obvious rationalization of preexisting convictions. This book is a manifest example of the theological nature of (at least) some of modern philosophy. Nietzsche's conviction that modern philosophy has'despite its profession to the contrary'inherited basic elements of Christianity will find strong support in this book.