Reviews for The rebirth of classical political rationalism

The average rating for The rebirth of classical political rationalism based on 2 reviews is 4 stars.

Review # 1 was written on 2015-02-09 00:00:00 Kyle Mcguire A great introduction into a titanic thinker. Best known for his Neocon disciples and his theory of hidden, esoteric meanings in ancient texts, Strauss studied under Heidegger and, in the climate of a crisis of rationalism and the decline of European civilisation, absorbed the master's belief that the answers lay in a return to the Classics, and a pre-Modern way of life. Unlike Heidegger, though, who found succor in a type of Existentialism, and later in a mystical turn away from society, Strauss engaged with political philosophy, seeing in the pressing questions of our time an iteration of the ancient question of what consists the good life. Strauss sees the two constituent traditions of Western culture, Athens and Jerusalem - rationalism and Biblical morality - as engaged in an ongoing dialectic tension in which each can learn from and enrich the other. In the modern-day crisis of rationalism, then, he sees the result of too-great reliance on the power of Science, the detached, disinterested observation of nature. Applying this methodology in the social sciences, without the backgrounded rubric of values - Biblical morality had been discredited and finally torn down by Nietzsche, while the philsophical branch of Ethics was seen as irrelevant to science - had led us to moral relativism, and Strauss relentlessly assaults his fellow social scientists for their attempts to circumvent this inevitable conclusion. Fiery, erudite and gripping, Strauss strings together his argument, in this collection of ten assorted essays, from close readings of Thucydides and Xenophon, from Lukács and Isaiah Berlin, and from allcorners of the social sciences. Whether or not one accepts all of his ideas, he is required reading for anyone interested in Classical or medieval philosophy, or in modern-day questions of liberalism, pluralism and democratic values. ----- Below I've copy-pasted the rough notes I took while reading. Proceed with caution. Intro Socrates believed that the goal of philosophy was to discover the good. Thus, the best political philosophy would be aristocracy - the rule of 'arete', virtue. The big change in the Enlightenment, was that thinkers like Locke and Spinoza decided that democracy would be better - abdicating the decision of the just to the individual, and letting each one try to find "happiness". They thought this would lead to "the end of history", but in fact it led to the "joyless pursuit of joy" - a society devoid of values. I 1 The cautious relativism of modern social science rejects any chauvinist claims of the Western tradition as provincialism. However, the "preliterate tribes" who practice their own traditions it lauds as authentic, in that they do not aspire to universalism. This approach fails when we consider a tribesman confronted with, and rejecting, western culture. This rejection does not come from a sympathetic ("histrionic") understanding (because on what basis could one decide definitively, if rationalism is not a fair criterion?) but from an equal provincialism. Thus, social scientists only apply a quasi-moral relativism, and the resolution of this - between the embrace of Western values, or complete rejection of absolutism - is the most pressing philosophical issue in the social sciences. 2 Strauss weighs various approaches to moral relativism. Isaiah Berlin speaks of two types of liberty - negative (freedom from) and positive (freedom to). He stresses the first, because the second can often preclude the first - the freedom to achieve something great can sometimes only be achieved in an authoritarian society, and jettisoning personal freedom is too much of a risk. Thus Berlin is a sort of quasi-relativist - rejecting any absolute values, except for "freedom from absolute values", which he considers as self-evident - the "line between the civilised man and the barbarian". So even this attempt to flee absolutism must fall back on some absolutist ground, and cannot escape the sceptic. Strauss compares Positivism, founded in the social sciences by Weber, with Marxism, as presented by Lukacs. Marxism claims that although all truths are relative, in our current society, we can reach an objective understanding as part of the ongoing dialectic - we know we are reaching closer to the truth. This is cold comfort, if not outright obfuscation: was the Reign of Terror better for the upward historical trajectory of the French Revolution? And even Marxists beg the relativist question, one must accept their historicist narrative on faith, becaue their principles are no more absolute than any others. Next, he turns to the Existentialism which presents the best repsonse to relativism, best presented by Heidegger, but tracing its genealogy to Kierkegaard and, most importantly, Nietzsche. Nietzsche responded to Hegel, who was the first to understand historicism - that our values are contingent on our cultural mores. In response to this idea, Hegel was forced to claim that although all other societies were on a path of change and development, his own was at the pinnacle. Nietzsche rejected this and thus came up with the relativity of values. All of our values are nothing but inertia, superstition...but perhaps his 'will to power' was a replacement of nature for history, and just another relapse into absolutism. The attempt to rescue unflinching relativism from Nietszche's "metaphysical turn" is existentialism. 3 Strauss picks up the "value question": if the scientific method is the only rational way to proceed in the social sciences, and if science can never answer value ("ought") questions, then how do we avoid moral relativism? Heidegger found the answer in existentialism - reducing the human experience to the fleeting, lived experience (Plato and Aristotle found the highest value in that which is always - Heidegger found it specifically in that which is mortal), turning objective into the false and misleading, and the subjective into the true (unlike Kant's transcendental subjectivity, Heidegger's system doesn't claim that there is hidden truth in the objective). Heidegger never claimed to have found an existential ethics, though, and ultimately gave up on existentialism. His criticism of it was the same as Hegel's of Kant: he historicised it. Existential anguish was only applicable to a certain time and place, Europe in decline. Nietzsche's response to Hegel was to advocate a strengthened European spirit (Übermensch) to lead a world society. After the two world wars Heidegger felt terrible despair, technology was becoming the new world religion. Technology is scientism, rationalism, Greek thought. What was necessary to resist the force of technology and recover Being (Sein) was to go back to the roots of Western civilisation and mix it with the Eastern ideal of Being, a kind of not-knowing. Hence in a sort of quasi-mysticism Heidegger finds the antidote to our modern malaise. II 4 Classical political philosophy must be distinguished both from general philosophy, which asks more fundamental questions, and from political science, which (purportedly) makes no judgements, but only describes, in the scientific spirit (Hegel insisted that political philosophy must describe, not legislate). The ideal political philosopher plays the role of the citizen par excellence, an umpire or arbitrator unconcerned with personal glory. The most fundamental, or constitutional question is not the merit of a political order at all - that is presupposed - but of who should rule, with the virtuous being the most obvious answer. The question then becomes the entirely theoretical one of "what is virtue?" but this in fact is how Plato construed political philosophy: not as philosophy of politics, but as a political (as in public) form of philosophy, an introduction for the layman to the necessity of philosophical inquiry. 5 Thence the famous Straussian distinction between exoteric and esoteric meaning - it becomes clear that ancient philosophers believed in political instruction as a medium for teaching the idea of the good, through simplified, 'exoteric' forms. Living the good life is ultimately outside the cave of politics, but the polis must be lead to virtue through more accessible routes. (Exoteric rhetoric is the outward conveyance of esoteric philosophical truth - "dumbing down" truth for the people.) 6 A political historian needs a republican interest in the political, combined with wisdom. Thucydides sees two states of a civilisation: rest and turmoil. Turmoil creates the greatest achievements, but is also unstable - leads to imperialism, which was the immediate cause of the Peloponnessian war. Contrary to Plato's view of the philosopher's role being outside of politics, Thucydides sees his role as to lead: he prefers the dynamic creativity of conflict to the placid rest. Thus Plato's history (book III of the Laws) is essentially fatalistic, while Thucydides sees a small margin of human agency. He takes the question of how to live for granted, and sees the role of the leader of applying the good to the city. And that is why his history doesn't talk about culture: because the greatest wisdom can only be described in deeds. (He is famously misquoted as saying "the nation that draws a line between its scholars and its warriors will have its thinking done by cowards and its fighting done by fools".) Both Plato and Thucydides seek the good, but Plato looks in the long term - for the ultimate good; while Thucydides takes a short term view. His view is more like the pre-Socratics. like Heraclitus, he believes that the whole is not synonymous with the sum of its parts. Since Socrates rebuffed the pre-Socratics, Xenophon took over from Thucydides in a much more Socratic direction. And for centuries history was seen as synonymous with political history, and the goal of social science to describe the best society - a special case of philosophy. Now, however, History/Soc Sci has become the description of culture, a good thing; but it has also become neutral, instead of the Platonic ideal of the philosophical pursuit of the good. But Plato is not wrong. History, says Strauss, is still ultimately political history. 7 i) One of the earliest presentations of Socrates is in the comedies of Aristophanes - an essentially satirical portrayal, but one not without envy and respect. (Strauss quotes Hegel to the effect that Aristophanes cannot be understood without appreciation of his essential comedy.) Aristophanes seeks both to edify, and to teach; his plays have a social lesson (the value of the pastoral life), but even this lesson is humourous in its frankness. To achieve justice, it is necessary to revolt against the harsh and punitive gods. Hegel, the greatest modern scholar of Aristoph, sees in his plays the triumph of a radical subjectivity which lampoons the expectations of society. Aristophanes sees the family unit, as preceding the political unit (nomos), but even more, it is the caprices of the individual himself - the ultimate subjectivity - as supreme over nomos. But what Hegel gets wrong is that this subjectivity is in fact the study of nature - synonymous for the ancients with philosophy. ii)Strauss analyses the Clouds in depth. The closing debate, in which the unjust speech triumphs over the just speech, signifies for Hegel a kind of victory for subjectivity over rationalism or social norms. But, as we have said, and as this as well as Aristoph's other plays bear out, it is the study of nature which is ultimately being lauded. Yet Aristoph is also cognisant of a tension between nature and nomos, and the need for both. It is this tension which Socrates addresses. Socrates is "amusic", i.e. unerotic and unpoetic. His philosophy transcends the human and is thus unpolitical. Unlike poetry, it is incapable of affecting the polis. The realisation that philosophy must also address the human race is the origin of political science. The later Socrates, as presented by Plato and Xenophon, was the first philosopher to realise this. We shall start with Xenophon. Xenophon was a military leader who understood the need for discipline in order to lead men. Not for nothing were his other writings about training dogs and horses. His Socrates understands noetic heterogeneity, the essential difference between the political and the true good. And implicitly, the primacy of the political, which must protect the inner sanctum of true philosophy. iii)Aristophanes saw the poetic experience as primary, one that Socrates' rationalism cannot appeal to. Xenophon distinguishes political wisdom from the philosophical - it is different, and, if not superior, certainly primary. This is the principle of noetic heterogeneity: there are essential, irreducible differences between the law of the polis and the truth. The political is sui generis. This allows the philosopher to engage in politics. Since the wise can never convince the unwise by arguing, nor rule by force, they must enact laws. The political is thus "wisdom diluted by consent". (Xenophon's modern reputation is as a supporter of oligarchy over democracy.) We now move on to Plato, and the central tension between philosophy and poetry. (interim summary: Aristoph: poetry> philosophy> politics; Xenophon: philosophy =/= politics) iv) In the republic, Plato's Socrat claims that the wise must rule a city founded and logic, not myth (since if the basis is myth, the problematic behaviour of the gods arises), enforced by a noble lie. Ultimately, though, the republic seems a bit of a bust; it is unworkable, hopelessly theoretic, some think it is all an exercise in irony. Was Aristophanes right, that Socrates is a naïf? Not at all. A clue to the distinction is in the republic being the only one of Plato's dialogues which is compulsory, not voluntary. Socrates abstracts human desire into spiritedness (similar to the biblical "heart") and eros (in Thomistic terms, the irascible and the concupiscible). Spiritedness is unerotic, it exists to protect thwarted desire. It represents anger and murder. It is thus innately subservient, yet it is the guiding emotion of the republic. It is ruled over by philosophy. To Plato, philosophy is identical with Eros - his greatest point of agreement with Aristophanes. (Something about the theory of the forms, and the heterogeneity of matter being represented in the city, and the identity of the part with the whole - I didn't quite follow it.) v) Having grasped the significance of the Idea, by which reality can be understood, Plato stands for political philosophy against the Sophists, in whose materialist conception of the world there is no room for rigid values. But the enemy in his sights is now poetry, and he resolves this conflict by making poetry the vehicle of the noble deception, which makes it subservient to philosophy. This is how the citizens are convinced to follow their assigned roles; though in the process, the highest (because autonomous, independent) poetry is sacrificed. What is the relationship between autonomous poetry and truth? Third-hand, since poetry mimics reality, which is itself a mere "shadow" on the wall of the cave, reflecting but not identical with the truth. Nietzsche has said that artists at all times were the valets of a morality or religion. but poetry, in reflecting the contradictions and ambiguities of the human soul, is psychologia kai psychagogia, the very platonic science of the human. Against the materialism of the Sophists, it sees the Idea as pre-eminent. Ultimately, though, its goal is different: Plato sees finding the truth as the goal of life. Poetry doesn't consider that an option. It thus presents the epitome of the nonphilosophical life: either as a fruitless search for happiness (tragedy), or as taking refuge in the absurd (comedy). Ultimately, it remains ministerial to philosophy. II 8 Socrat shows Euthyphron to be a dangerous heretic, since he doesn't believe (like Socrat) in piety independent of the gods, yet he does not believe (like the common people) that piety consists merely of tending to the gods (since he accused his father of impiety, and disobeying ancestral custom goes against the gods, and implies a morality independent of wisdom received from the elders). Piety is for the many, wisdom for the philosopher; attempts to fuse the two, instead of judging between them, ill follow Socrates' example. 9 When approaching medieval philosophers, we can only understand them properly if we approach them sympathetically, admitting at least the possibility that they are right, not just "for their time" but objectively. This has added salience in a time when philosophy is in crisis, torn between being a handmaiden of science, or else an "autobiographical field" completely cut off from rationality. Medieval Jewish/Islamic philosophy has a far more tenuous relationship with faith than in Christiandom, owing to Christianity's theological vs Islam/Judaism's legalistic natures. In Islam and Judaism, philosophy is a more secretive, hermetic art; and religion is the social structure - religion is, in effect, political philosophy. 10 Many Jews are now returning to Judaism, which sees the past as superior to the present, and has no exact word for progress. Yet this return isn't just a continuation of the past, it's a post-critical, qualitatively different Judaism. The idea of a) continual, upward progress b)continuing forever c) coupled with social progress, is a hybrid that exists neither in the Greek nor the Judeo-Christian tradition. The 17th century quarrel between the Ancients and the Moderns was not just about French drama vs classical, but a referendum on the idea of progress. Post-Enlightenment, dazzled by the successes of science, people rejected the Bible's truth, while continuing to subscribe to its moral norms - until Nietzsche. Auschwitz sufficed to show the danger of replacing good and bad with "progressive and reactionary", and virtues with rights or freedoms. Greek and Biblical ideology have in common a commitment to justice, in obedience to the law, but where the Bible values humility, the Greeks praise magnanimity - there are few "gentlemen" in the Bible. Also, the Bible foresees a Messianic end to history, and projects an omnipotent God who requires humility from mortals. (This is why Maimonides summarises the difference between the two traditions in Aristotle's seeing the world as eternal - and the implied lack of divine oversight.) Religion assumes a concept of the "way", the derekh, or dharma - of cultures, animals, or nature. The ancestral holds inherent stabilising value. However, almost every culture lays a claim to universality in some sense. How do we judge between them? The Bible alludes to this: Elijah on Mount Carmel provides proof, albeit miraculous and not dialectic. Rationalist critics of religion (e.g. Hume) have attacked miracles, or the unified integrity of the text, but assuming rational grounds (eg, God should write with a consistent voice!) is a false starting point. (Take Spinoza: given his opening grounds, substance is that which is in itself and is conceived through itself, everything follows; but those first principles are arbitrary.) Philosophy's critiques of religion ultimately only work within its own framework; so do religion's critiques of philosophy. Ultimately, Strauss claims, rationality begs the question in its critique of religion (on rational grounds, which cannot ever judge the revelatory), and religion is unable to refute philosophy (the true, Eros-driven search for the rational good life; not the neutered handmaid of Christianity that is "religious philosophy"). The strength of the Western tradition is the tension between these two conflicting traditions of Athens and Jerusalem. No-one can judge between them, and it is impossible to bridge them, if they are practiced meaningfully. What we need, Strauss says, are philosophically open theologians, and theologically open philosophers.

Review # 2 was written on 2008-03-27 00:00:00 Bernard Haake I had to read this book for a class on Postmodern Political Thought. Our goals in that class were narrow, and generally the lesson plan revolved on Heidegger's work (whom the professor regarded as the creator, and only worthy purveyor, of modern existentialism)and Strauss' response to it. While Heidegger is a mind without equal in modern philosophy, Strauss holds his own in this introductory work. I found the last essay, "Progress or Return?", to be particularly enlightening. One always hears how society must progress to a more just state but nobody is willing to acknowledge the existence of a metaphysical phenomenon like justice. So then what, exactly, are we progressing to? This is a grossly understated paraphrase of his argument but its difficult to summarize the work in a few seconds. If you refuse, like some, to read Strauss because of the oft-cited relationship to Neo-Conservatism you're really missing out. Like the other reviewer I don't feel that is a treatise on conservative political thought and It would be unfortunate to ignore and engaging and insightful work simply because of your partisan political identity. And if that is such a big deal to you here's some food for thought; Heidegger, the founder of modern existential thought which seems to have influenced modern political thought more than any other, was a Nazi...