Reviews for Nature, justice, and rights in Aristotle's Politics

The average rating for Nature, justice, and rights in Aristotle's Politics based on 2 reviews is 3.5 stars.

Review # 1 was written on 2011-03-14 00:00:00 Peter Rontogiannis An interesting defense of an aristotelian morality. It all boils down to an objective view of what morality is: every individual has a telos, a goal, which they are meant to achieve. To achieve this goal (or perhaps purpose is a better word) they must reflect on the life they are living. In order to live a good life one must think rationally and understand why we have a certain life style. This moral view is therefore meta-ethical since it is non-prescriptive; no rules can be decided beforehand, the individual must make use of his rationality to understand what is the right thing to do in a certain situation. Building on that the authors ask the question: Which order allows human beings to flourish? Since no one can know a-priori what an individuals telos is, freedom is needed. A liberal society provides a frame work in which social animals can find happiness. All in all it is an interesting work, although a bit too scholarly at times.

Review # 2 was written on 2010-11-12 00:00:00 Vance Cook One of the perennial weaknesses of libertarianism (and often to liberalism more generally) is the sparse conception of the individual in the theoretical foundations. The idea is always to develop the full theory with a parsimony of assumptions, but the lack of "thick" realism (motivations beyond self-interest, acknowledgment of human sociality, etc) always casts a long, skeptical shadow over the whole enterprise. Rasmussen and Den Uyl do a splendid job of giving libertarianism a thick Aristotelian foundation. Indeed, Liberty and Nature probably mentions children, disability, and infirmity in nontrivial ways more than every other libertarian work I've read combined. The book begins with a discussion of Aristotelian ethics and its metaethical underpinnings. I lapped this up, but it could be a slog for a reader more interested in the political implications. The authors demonstrate well the resources a realist (or objectivist) naturalism has for addressing relativist, rationalist, and other critiques. The authors present an account of human flourishing that places individual autonomy and rational action at the center. Only an individual can make the decisions and plans and experience the emotional responses that ultimately constitute flourishing. The authors thus stress that, though human beings are social creatures and human flourishing can only occur in a social context, no social collective or state can implement or ensure flourishing. The role of the state is thus limited to providing the necessary conditions so that individual flourishing could be *possible*. Public policy can't maximize flourishing; policy can only provide the conditions so that individuals might flourish. I'm giving the book 4 stars instead of 5 only because the discussion of property rights is really flawed (really I'd love to give the book 4.5 stars). Their derivation persuasively demonstrates the need for strong property rights not only from the consequentialist angle of their necessity for human flourishing but from the idea that property is a kind of manifestation of the individual's actions in the world. This is well and good (and a place where the authors' Randian influences are apparent). But they make some serious leaps in their case for *absolutist* property rights. First of all, it's easy to conceive of some Hoppean hellhole where property rights absolutism directly defeats the possibility for some individuals belonging to derided classes to even have a chance at flourishing. The authors at one point casually dismiss the Lockean proviso--that in acquiring property one must leave "enough and as good" for those who come after--with the dubious argument that no objects truly have any value until they have been transformed in some way by human action. But this is cold comfort to systematically marginalized or oppressed persons. Second, nothing in their argument for *strong* property rights requires *absolute* property rights, and it invites the reader to wonder how exactly a state would fund its admittedly necessary services if taxes are disallowed. Strong property rights enable individuals to think, act, and plan with the secure belief that the fruits of their efforts will not be wholly or massively expropriated such that their efforts couldn't plausibly be seen as their own. But this is surely a matter of degree: fair and predictable taxes at one end and confiscatory taxes at the other. Because of the necessity (acknowledged by the authors) of some role for the state, some level of reasonable taxation could more gainfully be construed as just a cost of living in society--similar in kind to reasonable levels of noise pollution, traffic congestion, babies crying on airplanes, and ugly neighbors with ugly homes. Backing off the absolutism of property rights--which themselves of course involve some level of coercion and the boundaries of which involve some level of public justification--just a little bit would enable the state (or whatever collectivity) to provide a more believable set of conditions for making flourishing possible for individuals. I should add at this point however that the authors do allow that for *practical* reasons the actual set of rights defended by a state will involve public discussion and getting people to agree. I would just promote this notion a little beyond the mere practical.