Confederate Emancipation: Southern Plans to Free and Arm Slaves during the Civil War Book

An informative, readable and well-researched if somewhat poorly edited history of Confederate emancipation that allows Cleburne and other Confederates to speak for themselves.

In a thorough and well-written narrative Levine describes the context and origins of the Confederate debate, the main figures, and their motives. The most important motive of the proponents of emancipation was simply military necessity, given Confederate manpower shortages and how the idea was resisted by many Confederates, especially the planter class. These men were not enlightened abolitionists of any kind; they were simply willing to go to great lengths to ensure Confederate independence (and keep the majority of slaves in bondage while doing so)

The "emancipation," of course, was not a proposal to end slavery but a proposal to control it. Although poorly though out, the basic goal was to emancipate enough slaves to compensate the Confederacy's manpower shortages. If this allowed the Confederacy to somehow win the war, of course, the majority of slaves would still be kept in bondage. While there were some proponents of complete abolition, they were decidedly a minority.

Levine describes how many Confederates were willing to send their sons off to war but were unwilling to do the same for their slaves. Such figures as Robert E. Lee and Judah Benjamin and, of course, Patrick Cleburne were proponents of the idea. When the Confederates did come around to enlisting blacks, the effort was halfhearted at best, and resistance to the measure was always strong. Many slaves also doubted the sincerity of those who were promising freedom. When blacks did enlist, they eagerly surrendered to Union lines rather than fight. Levine also disputes the idea that Davis or even Lee were hostile to slavery in principle: "they certainly did not eagerly await its early demise."

There are only a few problems. Levine's constant references to the "Cleburne-Davis" proposal do not always emphasize the differences between the two men's views, and Levine writes that if the Confederates somehow won the blacks who enlisted would receive a "minimal amount of personal liberty," without ever expanding on what he means. The grammar is quite shoddy in places. And according to Levine the US secretary of war was one Henry M. Stanton and George Thomas defeated Joe Johnston at Franklin and Nashville (huh?)

A balanced, readable and well-organized work.