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Book Categories |
Preface | v | |
Acknowledgments | ix | |
Introduction | 1 | |
1 | NAFTA, GATT Uruguay Round, and Fast Track 1998: A Brief Legislative History | 5 |
North American Free Trade Agreement | 5 | |
GATT Uruguay Round Agreements | 9 | |
Fast Track 1998 | 11 | |
2 | Analytical and Empirical Framework | 15 |
Political Economy Framework | 15 | |
Econometric Model | 17 | |
3 | Empirical Results | 25 |
NAFTA and GATT: House Votes | 25 | |
NAFTA and GATT: Senate Votes | 30 | |
Fast Track 1998 | 33 | |
4 | Conclusions | 41 |
Appendices | ||
Appendix A | 45 | |
Appendix B | 49 | |
References | 51 |
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Add Congressional trade votes, The unwillingness of the US House of Representatives to renew fast-track authority in 1997 and 1998 means that further trade liberalization for the United States is likely to slow down or grind to a halt, since negotiators elsewhere know that any agreemen, Congressional trade votes to the inventory that you are selling on WonderClubX
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Add Congressional trade votes, The unwillingness of the US House of Representatives to renew fast-track authority in 1997 and 1998 means that further trade liberalization for the United States is likely to slow down or grind to a halt, since negotiators elsewhere know that any agreemen, Congressional trade votes to your collection on WonderClub |