Auction Theory Book

Section I: Single Object Auctions
Private Value Auctions: A First Look
The Revenue Equivalence Principle
Qualifications and Extensions
Mechanism Design
Auctions with Interdependent Values
The Revenue Ranking ("Linkage") Principle
Asymmetries and Other Complications
Efficiency and the English Auction
Mechanism Design with Interdependent Values
Bidding Rings
Section II: Multiple Object Auctions
An Introduction to Multiple Object Auctions
Equilibrium and Efficiency with Private Values
Some Revenue Considerations
Sequential Sales
Nonidentical Objects
Multiple Objects and Interdependent Values
Section III: Appendices
A: Continuous Distributions
B: Stochastic Orders
C: Order Statistics
D: Affiliated Random Variables
E: Some Linear Algebra
F: Games of Incomplete Information
G: Existence of Equilibrium in First-Price Auctions
References
Index