The Unity of the Proposition Book

I Truth, Falsity, and Unity 1

1 Sentences, Lists, and Collections 1

2 Declarative and Other Kinds of Sentence 6

3 Declarative Sentences and Propositions 8

4 Sentences, Propositions, and Truth-Values 14

5 Sentences, Propositions, and Unity 18

6 Unity and Complexity 29

7 Reference and Supposition 33

8 Reference and Signification 39

9 Linguistic Idealism and Empirical Realism 42

10 Russell on Truth, Falsity, and Unity (I): 1903 45

11 Russell on Truth, Falsity, and Unity (II): 1910-13 48

12 Russell on Truth, Falsity, and Unity (III): 1918 53

2 Sense, Reference, and Propositions 56

13 Russellian Propositions, Fregean Thoughts, and Facts 56

14 The Location of Propositions 59

15 Proper Names, Concept-Expressions, and Definite Descriptions 69

16 Concept-Expressions and Carnapian Intensions 81

17 Carnapian Intensions and Understanding 85

18 Carnapian Intensions and Russellian Propositions 91

19 Russellian Propositions and Functionality 97

20 A Revised Semantic Map 104

21 Sentences as Referring Expressions 106

22 False Propositions at the Level of Reference 110

23 The World's Own Language 114

24 Signification and Supposition Revisited 119

3 Frege and Russell on Unity 128

25 Saturatedness and Unsaturatedness 128

26 The Copula as Secundum Adiacens and as Tertium Adiacens 131

27 Frege and the Copula 138

28 The Paradox of the Concept Horse 143

29 Russell on Unity and the Paradox 148

30 An Unsuccessful Attempt to Avoid the Paradox 153

31 The Paradox and the Level of Language 156

32 Reforming Frege's Treatment of Concept-Expressions 159

33 Concepts and Functions 165

34 The Reformed Frege: Refinements and Objections170

35 Frege, Russell, and the Anti-Fregean Strategy 176

36 The Anti-Fregean Strategy: The Case of Names 180

37 Disquotation and Propositional Form 184

38 The Context Principle 188

39 Pr&abar;bh&abar;kara Semantics and the Related Designation Theory 193

40 'For that is Not a Word which is Not the Name of a Thing' 195

41 The Impartial Strategy 202

42 Secundum and Tertium Adiacens, Matter and Form 204

4 The Hierarchy of Levels and the Syntactic Priority Thesis 208

43 Fregean and Anti-Fregean Strategies 208

44 The Anti-Fregean Strategy and Relations (I) 211

45 Interlude: The Subject-Predicate Distinction 214

46 The Anti-Fregean Strategy and Relations (II) 216

47 The Reality of Relations 221

48 Polyadicity, Monadicity, and Identity 223

49 The Anti-Fregean Strategy and Montague Grammar 226

50 Fregean and Anti-Fregean Strategies: Further Comparison 228

51 Ramsey on the Subject-Predicate Distinction 231

52 Dummett's Attack on the Anti-Fregean Strategy 236

53 Linguistic Idealism Revisited 241

54 Alternative Hierarchies and the Context Principle 245

55 The Linguistic Hierarchy and Categorial Nonsense 250

56 Logical Syntax and the Context Principle 254

57 Proper Names, Singular Terms, and the 'Identity' Test 258

58 Proper Names, Leibniz's Law, and the Identity of Indiscernibles 262

59 The Negation Asymmetry Test 266

60 Dummett's Tests for Singular Termhood 272

61 Discarding the Syntactic Priority Thesis 277

5 Logical Predication, Logical Form, and Bradley's Regress 280

62 Names, Verbs, and the Replacement Test 280

63 Analysis and Paradox 286

64 Simple, Complex, and Logical Predicates 292

65 The Grammatical Copula and the Logical Copula 296

66 Predication in Frege 300

67 Two Exegetical Problems in Frege 303

68 Inference and the Logical Predicate 310

69 Unity and the Logical Predicate 311

70 Bradley's Regress and the Tradition 314

71 Russell and the General Form of the Proposition 318

72 Wittgenstein's Criticism of Russell 320

73 Logical Form in the Tractatus 326

6 Bradley's Regress and the Unity of the Proposition 331

74 The Logical Copula and Theories of Meaning 331

75 Reference and the Logical Copula 338

76 Bradley's Regress and the Analysis of Meaning 344

77 Vicious Practical Regresses 348

78 Bradley's Regress and the Solution to the Unity Problem 350

79 Propositions, Sets, Sums, and the Objects Themselves 357

80 Bradley's Regress and the Infinite 365

81 Vallicella's Onto-theology 370

82 A Comparison with Other Innocent Regresses 374

83 Truth, Falsity, and Unity Revisited 379

84 Bradley's Regress, Realism, and States of Affairs 382

85 Unity and Use 390

86 The Unity of Sentences and the Unity of Complex Names (I) 394

87 The Unity of Sentences and the Unity of Complex Names (II) 399

88 Congruence, Functionality, and Propositional Unity 405

89 Davidson on Predication 415

90 Epilogue: The Limits of Language 418

References 421

Index 451