The Rise and Fall of Elites: An Application of Theoretical Sociology Book

This is a brief powerful book, written at the turn of the 20th C, which was said to have been subsequently favored by fascists; however, the author condemns equally old elites, new elites, nationalism, anti-Semitism, Catholicism, socialism, Marxism. He is also disillusioned with the bourgeoisie - and so the book is critical of all sides in the never-ending battle he sees as unfolding, the succession of elites, as one elite weakens and is supplanted by a new more vigorous elite. About the only group he consistently applauds is labor unions, which he sees as forming part of the new elite - fueled by the secular religion (as he sees it) of socialism. Ultimately, though, he has little hope for any elite group, or for the longevity of any elite group, to retain power - he says all elites become exclusive, and eventually give way to new elites.

There are some unnervingly accurate observations in this very powerful book, which is almost the length of a long essay. He is scornful of the promises of each new elite group that comes along, which usually enlists the downtrodden and the poor, deceives them, and then exploits them once it achieves power. He says this is always what happens to the poor, and that despite the promises of each new elite group to come along, the poor remain poor. Here's how he puts it with respect to a new elite of the ancient world, which of course, either arose from or enlisted the help of the poor or proletarians of its age: "Many centuries have passes since the day when the Carmi Sibillini promised to man that "there would be no more rich and poor, no more tyrants and slaves, norwould anyone be greater or smaller; no more kings or leaders; all things would be held in common." The poor wretches still wait for these promises to come true. There is every likelihood that the new big promises will have the same outcome, and this can be expected within an equally short time. After the victory the new aristocracy will perhaps allow some concessions of form and language to the new proletarians; that is, to the weak, the improvident, or the incapable, but actually these latter will probably have to bear an even heavier yoke than the one they are bearing now. The new masters will not, at least for a little while, have the senile weaknesses of our bourgeoisie."

And regarding how the elites treat businesses, specifically with respect to taxes: "Experience taught the Roman masters that it was profitable for them to let the slave keep a certain nest egg for himself, as this would spur him on to work and produce more for the master. Similarly, experience has taught certain democratic governments that to despoil the contractor and the capitalist entirely was precisely to kill the hen that laid the golden eggs. Therefore they let them keep certain earnings and are satisfied to take from them as much as is possible without discouraging them from using their intellectual gifts and their wealth in the interests of economic production. Thus they exploit them in the best possible manner, just as the master exploited the slave. It is not certain whether the new elite will have as much patience in allowing itself to be robbed as has the present one..."

Regarding the Dreyfus affair:

"The Dreyfus affair is simply an episode in the contest between the present and the future elite. A not very large segment of the present elite had tried, especially in the years 1850 to 1870, to rely upon freedom, reason, and good sense. These people have now seen their mistake, realizing that men are governed by sentiment and not by reason; the only possible choice therefore is choice of the kind of sentiment, or rather of the kind of religion. Hence, that bourgeois minority had again drawn closer to the majority which, consciously or unconsciously, had always held similar ideas.
What could one oppose to the invading socialist religion? The higher class in France did not have much to choose from. It sought to invigorate old religious forms, especially the Catholic one. It tried to turn certain aversions against socialism to its advantage, thus giving rise to Antisemitism; and finally, it too had a new religion in the guise of "nationalism." This latter had the enormous advantage of being useful in seducing the army. It should be well noted: I do not even hint that such a plan was premeditated and then deliberately carried out. Indeed the facts prove that most of those who follow this plan do so under pressure of the circumstances in which they find themselves, without being aware of it. Perhaps one or another more cunning and artful leader may see in which direction the movement is driving, but he will take every care not to refer to it so as not to weaken the blind faith of his companions."

The author wraps up quite presciently:

"There always remains an unknown element of future social modifications, and there exist changers with could produce long wars among the civilized nations. These would probably have the effect of imposing a military dictatorship on some European nation. But what the relationship between such a dictatorship and the new would be, escapes us. Those who judge by the movements of the subjective phenomenon alone will be convinced that a military dictatorship can benefit only the present elite, but he who is principally concerned with the objective phenomenon will not accept such a hypothesis without considerable doubt."

In short, the author believes that the decay and fall of old elites is inevitable, the movement giving rise to the new elite usurping the old, is usually marked by an upsurge in religious feeling - in his era, he feels that socialism has become the new secular religion, and that in fact, certain Protestant forms of Christianity with their emphasis on social service, are nearly indistinguishable from socialism. The old elites become decadent, and no longer defend their interests; he identifies the Roman Catholic establishment as having almost been entirely swept away by the Reformation, for example, and discusses the circumstances of the French Revolution at length. He claims that old elites become weaker as they become more focused on humanitarian concerns - but he equally criticizes all elites in this way, and states that it is inevitable that new elites become old, decay and are overthrown. Thus, I at least do not read the book as being a blueprint for fascism - or any particular ideology for that matter, since according to Pareto, all elites eventually fall. If some passages are taken out of context, then I suppose a fascist could find "justification" for brushing aside and supplanting the decadent bourgeois old order, but the next new elite to come along would simply do the same thing. The take-away of the book is that no elite lasts forever - each elite is in a way doomed to decay and be overthrown. The old elites become totally senile and deluded, and cease to defend themselves, but help their adversaries instead. More vigorous, energetic individuals rise up either from the bourgeoisie itself or from the proletariat, and overthrow either all of society or the elite leadership. Yet they too are eventually doomed to fall victim to the new elites which rise up.

Pareto is obviously highly learned and erudite and gives excellent supporting examples for his theses. The book is prescient in that the 20th C was marked by two bloody wars in Europe and the rise of a murderous military dictatorship in Germany, exactly as Pareto predicted 30+ years before Hitler assumed power in Germany.

The book is bleak in that the author is basically saying the same thing, with supporting examples, over and over again. It is a thought-provoking book of great power - in that it's eye-opening. Is Pareto oversimplifying the course of history as a succession of revolutions overthrowing sclerotic and senile elites? Is Pareto's view perhaps unconsciously modeled on the succession of generations - the younger generation eventually supplanting the older generation, with sons and fathers reversing roles as fathers weaken and become senile, they end up being cared for by their sons instead of vice versa? Of course, that too is an oversimplification of Pareto's theory, which is quite a bit more elaborated than that. Simpler yet is the analogy to vegetation. A perennial plant is vigorous in the Spring, powerful in the Summer, only to weaken and decay in the Fall and finally die out as Winter snow falls. The following Spring though, the same plant will start sending up shoots again, to repeat the same growth-efflorescence-decay-death process again. Is human society really only an analog of the life of a perennial plant? Pareto's implication that the matrix from which each new elite is drawn, from elements of the proletariat or sometimes from the bourgeoisie, means the organism (society) auto-regenerates itself - each elite is, despite the succession of ideologies/religions, really the same elite since each new elite is drawn from the same matrix (elements).

This book may be annoying to some - because clearly, if taken out of context, some of what Pareto says could be seen as pointing to the excesses of fascism (a movement which had yet to occur when Pareto wrote this book). He is disdainful of what he sees as the inevitable softening of any old elite - as they become focused on humanitarian concerns and so forth. However, as repeatedly stated above, Pareto believes every old elite weakens, becomes decadent and is eventually supplanted. His view is in the end hopeless - perhaps too realistic in its assessment of human history from a teleological perspective. Thus, any reader of any ideology - at least any reader who reads the entire book - will realize that Pareto doesn't actually exempt any ideology or belief system held by any elite, from the eventual fate of all elites. There's no way to avoid the fate of all elites, Pareto says. In fact, he's quite critical, as in his above quotes, of the devious routes by which would-be dictators seize power and seduce segments of society. As noted above, he is however, very impressed with labor unions.

There is one other quote that is worth reading:

"To many bourgeois the Christian religious wave on which they ride seems to be a means for combating socialism. That is to say that among the many manifestations of the religious sentiment, they choose, or rather believe they choose, the one which is least opposed to their interests. This reason for their choice has certainly had some effect, but much less than would be imagined. Sometimes it has existed a priori, but more often it was found a posteriori, in order to provide a reason for the religious movement. Be that as it may, if there was a strategic thought behind it, it failed to produce the desired effect. The governing classes wished to use the old religious beliefs in order to keep the people subdued, and it so happened that the people are now becoming more detached from these beliefs and turning to the new ones, particularly to the socialist belief; the bourgeois were successful only within the ranks of the bourgeoisie itself. Take the case of a general who wants to hypnotize the solders of the enemy so as to defeat them more easily; yet with all the ado, he does not hypnotize a single enemy, but instead his own men become hypnotized, and therefore an easier prey for the adversary. Such was precisely, insofar as it was conscious, the achievement of the bourgeoisie, not only as regards the old forms of religion, but with regard to the new ones as well."

And:

"The divergence between the subjective and the objective phenomenon produces many illusions. Thus, many people imagine that they can effectively combat socialism by combating he theories of Marx, just as others believed it possible to combat Christianity effectively by pointing out the scientific errors of the Bible. There are few educated people today who would not recognize those errors. And yet, what damage has it done to Christianity? None. It prospers more than ever. The Marxian theory of value is not valid; after they had tried out various and subtle interpretations, we now witness some of the most educated Marxists going so far as to say that Marx never intended to set up a theory of value. All this has hurt the socialist faith little or not at all. It was not the book by Marx which has created the socialists; it is the socialists who have made Marx's book famous. It was not the works of Voltaire which, toward the end of the eighteenth century, produced skepticism; it was that skepticism which gave the writings of Voltaire their reputation. This is meant only to define the principal aspect of the phenomenon, for it must be added that form, too has value. Voltaire and the Encyclopedists, expressing the existing sentiments of the French higher class in a select form, endowed those sentiments with new vigor. A similar observation must be made with regard to Marx."

This book was written in 1901, and the author considered the French revolution and the succeeding dictatorship as a relatively recent example of old elites becoming decrepit and giving way to new elites.

The book includes a good albeit somewhat critical introductory essay by Hans Zetterberg. Here is what Zetterberg says about Pareto's work:

"...what he [Pareto] wanted to find was a rational explanation of irrational behavior. But it is equally true that Pareto was not in agreement with the philosophies of the Enlightenment, which held that the critical factor in the survival of an elite is the extent to which it allows reason to control sentiments; a government by intellectuals, for example, Pareto held to be a near-certain disaster.
The inability to solve the problem of the role of reason in the circulation of the elites is most obvious when the issue is phrased as reason versus sentiment. It is neither reason nor sentiment that should be maximized to insure the survival of an elite, but efficiency. And efficiency is produced through a delicately balanced mixture of reason and sentiment, working not against one another, but in harness. In the last analysis, is is only the efficient elites, whether elected, appointed, or self-chosen- that gain substantial support from those who are on the receiving end of their decrees, who buy their goods and services, who attend their sacred rites, who receive their knowledge. It is the overall-all efficiency in the tasks of generating and distributing order, riches, knowledge, beauty, sacredness, and virtue that slowly makes the elites perceived as "legitimate," and thus helps insure their tenure."

This book refreshingly doesn't have much technical jargon and the introductory essay certainly helps place the book in the context of Pareto's thought. Zetterberg notes that "... Pareto himself was a proud, detached, and ironic man without much desire to align himself with any political movement. His bias-- which is loud and clear--is rather against people of all political persuasions who favor social ossification over social change, ascription over achievement, and softness over toughness." And: "Pareto obviously thinks of himself as a sophisticated visitor to the theater of historical drama who early discovers the entire plot which the rest of the audience still is misled by dramatic gestures, moralistic speeches, and the comings and goings of the actors. Pareto took pride in his superior sophistication in this respect, and he sees no reason to hide it. Many readers are apt to be annoyed with him for being so smugly sure."

This is a worthwhile book to read, if only to glimpse a (perhaps rather cynical) viewpoint into how and why elites rise and fall. Whether Pareto's theory is cynical or enlightened I suppose depends on the reader's world view and/or level of ingenuousness.