The Economics of Informational Decentralization: Complexity, Efficiency and Stability Book

	Contributing Authors
	Preface
1	Information Flows Intrinsic to the Stability of Economic Equilibrium	1
2	Mechanisms for the Realization of Equilibria	35
3	Convergence Theorems for a Class of Recursive Stochastic Algorithms	53
4	Efficiency in Partnership When the Joint Output is Uncertain	79
5	Institutional Choice and Institutional Transformation: Perspectives from the Colonial Experience	101
6	An Axiomatic Characterization of the Price Mechanism	119
7	Structured Private Enterprise	131
8	The Last 1,945 sailing Ships	159
9	Sufficient Statistics, Utility Theory, and Mechanism Design	219
10	Information Processing in Firms and Returns to Scale	243
11	A Nash Solution for Multilateral Bargaining	281
12	Communication Requirements for Individual Agents in Networks and Hierarchies	311
13	On Modeling Cheap Talk in Bayesian Games	347
14	Feasible Nash Implementation of Social Choice Rules When the Designer Does not Know Endowments or Production Sets	367
	Index	435