Spitfires and Yellow-Tail Mustangs: The 52nd Fighter Group in World War Two Book

Most airpower history books tend to deal with the big stuff: large bombing campaigns, changes in technology, the policies and politics behind airpower doctrine, and the like. James Corum and Wray Johnson have provided a very useful work that surveys several small conflicts where insurgencies or terrorism were the main methods used by one side or the other, and examine the ways in which airpower was used in these conflicts.

Some reviewers have complained that the authors spend a lot of time dealing with ground fighting of each conflict instead of talking only about airpower. It's true that about half of each chapter explains the "big picture" of the conflict at hand, which necessitates talking about the ground war. I found this incredibly useful and necessary, especially considering how well of a job they did with these sections. Understanding the role of airpower in these conflicts requires understanding how it fit into the larger scheme of the war itself, and the authors do a brilliant job with this.

While each reader will likely find more interest on chapters that relate more to their own area of interest, the book covers a lot of ground, going from the first introduction of early aircraft all the way up to modern day current conflicts. Several threads emerge from these studies. The authors show chiefly that in attempting to fig insurgencies, using methods designed for conventional war are not very helpful. Large strategic bombing campaigns are not very useful against guerilla warriors. Rather, using airpower for supply, troop movements, and close air support (CAS) of ground forces tends to be effective in most of these conflicts. Helicopters are given a lot of credit for their capabilities in all these roles, despite their vulnerabilities.

The book is fairly balanced until the end, where the authors come across as a little bit hawkish. When they break from discussing operations and start talking about politics, they lean fairly heavily to the right. The list of recommendations they give for future developments of airpower are in some ways good summations of the books main points, but also seem a little out of place. I prefer my military history to not attempt to derive specific operational "lessons" from previous conflicts and prescribe them for the future.

Despite these minor weaknesses, the book is very well researched and serves as a great primer on the uses of airpower in the types of conflict that are becoming commonplace in the modern world. It's also very well written. The prose flows very well and is always interesting and engaging with solid structure. These men know their craft, and their content. And, if nothing else, it is an excellent jumping-off point for further research into any of these wars. And airpower historian would do well to have this on the shelf.