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Preface to the First Edition | xiii | |
Preface to the Expanded Edition | xvii | |
Introduction | 3 | |
I | The Theory of Direct Reference | |
1 | The Theory of Singular Direct Reference | |
1 | A Formulation of the Theory | 9 |
1.1 | The Orthodox Notion of Sense | |
1.2 | Descriptional Singular Terms | |
1.3 | Relationally Descriptional Singular Terms | |
1.4 | Orthodox Theories and the Theory of Direct Reference | |
2 | The Arguments | 23 |
2.1 | The Modal Arguments | |
2.2 | The Epistemological Arguments | |
2.3 | The Semantical Arguments | |
2.4 | Contextual Factors in Reference | |
3 | Rigid Designators | 32 |
3.1 | Two Kinds of Rigid Designators: Persistence and Obstinacy | |
3.2 | Proper Names, Nondescriptionality, and Obstinacy | |
3.3 | A Criterion for Obstinacy | |
2 | The Theory Extended to General Terms | |
4 | A Reformulation of the Theory | 42 |
4.1 | Descriptional General Terms | |
4.2 | Common Nouns as Proper Names | |
4.3 | A Point of Disanalogy | |
4.4 | Designation | |
4.5 | Relationally Descriptional Designators | |
4.6 | Orthodox Theories and the Theory of Direct Reference | |
4.7 | The Traditional Theory of Cognition and Understanding | |
5 | The Arguments Reconsidered | 59 |
5.1 | The General Form of the Arguments | |
5.2 | An Obvious Objection | |
5.3 | A Reply: Putnam's Twin Earth Argument | |
6 | Rigid Designators Reconsidered | 69 |
6.1 | General Term Designation and Rigid Designation | |
6.2 | A Criterion for General Term Designation | |
3 | Reference and the Necessary A Posteriori | |
7 | Some Consequences of the Theory | 76 |
7.1 | Traditional Assimilations | |
7.2 | Necessary A Posteriori Identities | |
7.3 | The General Phenomenon | |
8 | Other Alleged Necessary A Posteriori Truths | 80 |
8.1 | The Examples | |
8.2 | Trivial Essentialism | |
8.3 | Nontrivial Essentialism Concerning Natural Kinds | |
8.4 | Nontrivial Essentialism Concerning Individuals | |
9 | A Crucial Question | 87 |
4 | Putnam's Theory of Natural Kind Terms | |
10 | Putnam's Theses | 93 |
11 | Initial Exegetical Remarks | 99 |
11.1 | The 'is' of Instantiation | |
11.2 | A Gross Misinterpretation | |
11.3 | A Subtle Misinterpretation | |
11.4 | A Difficulty in Interpretation | |
12 | First Formulations | 106 |
12.1 | An Initial Formalization | |
12.2 | Time-Slices and Possible World-Slices of Continuant Individuals | |
12.3 | An Initial Attempt to Eliminate Possible World-Slices | |
13 | Cross-World Relations | 116 |
13.1 | Cross-World Construal of Binary Relations | |
13.2 | Intra-World Attributes, Extra-World Attributes, and Cross-World Relations | |
13.3 | A Mechanism for Generating Cross-World Relations | |
13.4 | Nondenoting Singular Terms | |
14 | Reformulations | 136 |
14.1 | A New Attempt at Formalization | |
14.2 | Thesis (T3) | |
14.3 | Reductionism and Analysis | |
14.4 | Translation into Modal Operator Discourse | |
15 | Further Exegetical Remarks | 148 |
15.1 | Theses (T5) and (T6) | |
15.2 | Thesis (T4) | |
15.3 | Thesis (T7) | |
15.4 | Thesis (T6) Again | |
II | The Program to Derive Essentialism from the Theory of Reference | |
5 | The K and I Mechanisms | |
16 | Putnam on (T9) | 161 |
17 | Donnellan's Elucidations of (T9) | 163 |
18 | The OK-Mechanism | 166 |
18.1 | A Valid Modal Argument | |
18.2 | The General Case | |
19 | The General K-Mechanism and the I-Mechanism | 169 |
19.1 | The General K-Mechanism | |
19.2 | The I-Mechanism | |
20 | The Program | 174 |
6 | Hidden Essentialism in the K and I Mechanisms | |
21 | The First Two Premises | 176 |
22 | The Third Premise | 176 |
22.1 | Putnam and Donnellan on the Third Premise | |
22.2 | Formalization | |
22.3 | The K-Mechanisms | |
22.4 | The I-Mechanism | |
23 | The Failure of the Program | 183 |
23.1 | The Original Argument | |
23.2 | The K and I Mechanisms | |
7 | Arguments for the Essentiality of Origin | |
24 | Kripke and the Putnam Program | 193 |
25 | Kripke's "Proof" of the Essentiality of Origin | 196 |
25.1 | Kripke's Formulation of Argument | |
25.2 | Some Initial Considerations | |
25.3 | The Compossibility Premise | |
25.4 | The Unfinished Argument | |
25.5 | A Principle of Cross-World Identification | |
25.6 | An Alternative Argument | |
26 | Compossibility Principles and Cross-World Identification Principles | 214 |
Conclusion | 217 | |
Appendix I | Principles of Cross-World Identification | |
27 | Cross-World Identification Principles and the Ship of Theseus | 219 |
27.1 | An Argument for Contingent Identity | |
27.2 | A Fallacy | |
27.3 | A Better Theory | |
28 | The Four Worlds Paradox | 229 |
28.1 | The Argument | |
28.2 | One Solution | |
28.3 | A Better Solution | |
28.4 | Vagueness and the Paradox | |
Appendix II | The Essentialist Principles in the K and I Mechanisms | |
29 | Donnellan vs. Kripke | 253 |
30 | A Problem in the Epistemology of Modality | 253 |
31 | The Nonmodal Consequences | 255 |
32 | Connecting Statements | 260 |
32.1 | The Need for Connecting Statements | |
32.2 | The Theoretical Status of the Connecting Statements | |
33 | Conclusion | 264 |
Appendix III | Fregean Theory and the Four Worlds Paradox | |
34 | Fregean Theory | 265 |
35 | The Four Worlds Paradox | 268 |
Appendix IV | Modal Paradox: Parts and Counterparts, Points and Counterpoints | |
36 | Modal Paradox | 273 |
37 | A Modal Fallacy | 282 |
38 | Counterpart Theory | 286 |
39 | Modal Paradox and Sorites | 298 |
40 | Some Shortcomings of Counterpart Theory | 302 |
41 | More Shortcomings of Counterpart Theory | 312 |
42 | The Solution Refined | 321 |
43 | Vagueness and Modal Paradox | 326 |
44 | Twin Worlds | 331 |
45 | Necessity and Apriority | 335 |
46 | The Determinacy of Identity | 338 |
Appendix V | Cross-World Identification and Stipulation | |
47 | Haecceitism, Reductionism, and the Problem of Cross-World Identification | 345 |
48 | A Residual Problem of Cross-World Identification | 356 |
49 | A Third Problem of Cross-World Identification | 362 |
Appendix VI | Letter to Teresa Robertson | |
50 | If It Ain't Broke, Don't Fix It | 369 |
51 | If It Is, Do | 371 |
Appendix VII | Naming, Necessity, and Beyond | |
52 | Substitution | 377 |
53 | Are General Terms Rigid? | 382 |
54 | The Necessity of Water Being H[subscript 2]O | 393 |
Select Bibliography | 399 | |
Index of Labeled Expressions of Parts I and II | 419 | |
Index of Subjects of Parts I and II | 425 |
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Add Reference and Essence, In this new edition of an important work in the philosophy of language, Nathan U Salmon, one of the leading proponents of what has come to be called the new or causal theory of reference, presents his latest thinking on this promising area of study., Reference and Essence to the inventory that you are selling on WonderClubX
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Add Reference and Essence, In this new edition of an important work in the philosophy of language, Nathan U Salmon, one of the leading proponents of what has come to be called the new or causal theory of reference, presents his latest thinking on this promising area of study., Reference and Essence to your collection on WonderClub |