Political Power and Corporate Control: The New Global Politics of Corporate Governance Book

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS vii
PREFACE xiii

CHAPTER ONE: Introduction and Summary Argument 1
Why Fight about Corporate Governance? 3
Great Variance and the "Great Reversals" 4
Putting the Pieces Together: In Search of a Political Explanation 10
Policy Consequences 12
Plan of Attack 14

CHAPTER TWO: Governance Patterns: What Causes What? 15
Outcomes: Dependent Variables and Patterns of Control 16
Capitalist Economic Policies, Minority Shareholder Protections, and Degrees of Coordination 20
Politics: Preferences and Institutions 22
Conclusion 26

CHAPTER THREE: Framing Incentives: The Economics and Law Tradition 27
Origins of the Debate 28
Incomplete Contracts and Private Order 30
Law and Regulation: Minority Shareholder Protections--Information, Oversight, Control, and Incentives 39
Varieties of Capitalism: Degrees of Coordination in Market Economies 51
Conclusion 55

CHAPTER FOUR: Politics: Preferences and Institutions 57
Mapping Financial Interests on Political Processes: A Causal Model 57
Preferences and Coalitions among Owners, Managers, and Workers 59
Political Institutions: Majoritarian and Consensus Mechanisms 67
Alternative Arguments: Legal Family and Economic Sociology 83
Conclusion 93

CHAPTER FIVE: Preference Cleavages 1: Class Conflict 95
Section 1: Owners and Managers Dominate Workers 96
The Investor Model 96
Analytic Narrative 123
Korea: Changing Institutions, Shifting Preferences 123
Section 2: Workers Dominate Owners and Managers 132
The Labor Power Model 132
Analytic Narrative 140
Sweden: The Exemplar of the Labor Power Model? 140
Conclusion 147

CHAPTER SIX: Preference Cleavages 2: Sectoral Conflict 149
Section 1: Cross-Class Coalitions 149
The Corporatist Model: Workers and Managers Dominate Owners 150
Analytic Narrative 159
Germany: From Corporatist Bargain to a Transparency Coalition 160
Japan: Concentration without Owners 167
The Netherlands: The Evolution of "Poldermodel" Corporatism 177
Section 2: Building Coalitions in Authoritarian Systems 187
The Oligarchy Model: Owners Dominate Workers and Managers 187
Analytic Narratives 189
Russia: Oligarchs and Politics 190
China: "Selectorate-Electorate" Coalition 192
Singapore: Shareholder Protections with "Guided" Democracy 199
Conclusion 203

CHAPTER SEVEN: Preference Cleavages 3: Transparency, Voice, and Pensions 205
Section 1: Workers and Owners Dominate Managers 205
From Class Conflict to Corporatist Compromise 206
Analytic Narratives 228
Chile: Authoritarian Roots of the Transparency Coalition 228
Malaysia: Ethnicity and Democracy in Governance Politics 232
Section 2: Managers Dominate Owners and Workers 237
"Managerism" 237
Analytic Narratives 241
The United States: A Contested Path from Oligarchy to MSP 241
United Kingdom: The Power of Majoritarian Political Institutions? 259
France: Without the State, Who Is in Control? 262
Conclusion 273

CHAPTER EIGHT: Conclusion: Going Forward 277
Questions and Answers: What Explains Variance? 277
Shortcomings and Guideposts for Future Research 285
Conclusion: Fighting over the Governance Debate 287

DATA APPENDIX 297
BIBLIOGRAPHY 313
INDEX 333