Perspectival Thought: A Plea for Moderate Relativism Book

Introduction 1 Context-Dependence in Language 1 Context-Dependence in Thought 9 Circumstance-Relativity and the Mode/Content Distinction 17 A Brief Summary of the Book 24 Book I Moderate Relativism 29 Part 1 The Framework 31 Chapter 1 The Distribution of Content 33 Chapter 2 Radical vs. Moderate Relativism 37 Chapter 3 Two Levels of Content 42 Chapter 4 Branch Points for Moderate Relativism 47 Part 2 The Debate over Temporalism (1): Do We Need Temporal Propositions? 53 Chapter 5 Modal vs. Extensional Treatments of Tense 55 Chapter 6 What Is at Stake? 61 Chapter 7 Modal and Temporal Innocence 65 Chapter 8 Temporal Operators and Temporal Propositions in an Extensional Framework 72 Part 3 The Debate over Temporalism (2): Can We Believe Temporal Propositions? 75 Chapter 9 An Epistemic Argument against Temporalism 77 Chapter 10 Rebutting Richard's Argument 82 Chapter 11 Relativistic Disagreement 87 Part 4 Relativization and Indexicality 95 Chapter 12 Index, Context, and Content 97 Chapter 13 The Two-Stage Picture: Lewis vs. Kaplan and Stalnaker 104 Chapter 14 Rescuing the Two-Stage Picture 108 Chapter 15 Content, Character, and Cognitive Significance 113 Book II Experience and Subjectivity 121 Part 5 Content and Mode 123 Chapter 16 Duality and the Fallacy of Misplaced Information 125 Chapter 17 The Content of Perceptual Judgements 130 Chapter 18 Episodic Memory 136 Part 6 Immunity to Error through Misidentification 143 Chapter 19 Implicit Self-Reference 145 Chapter 20 Weak and Strong Immunity 149 Chapter 21 Quasi-Perception and Quasi-Memory 155 Chapter 22 Reflexive States 161 Part 7 Relativization and Reflexivity 167 Chapter 23 The (Alleged) Reflexivity of De Se Thoughts 169Chapter 24 Reflexivity: Internal or External? 175 Chapter 25 What Is Wrong with Reflexivism 180 Part 8 The First Person Point of View 189 Chapter 26 De Se Thoughts and Subjectivity 191 Chapter 27 Memory and the Imagination 195 Chapter 28 Imagination and the Self 203 Chapter 29 Imagination, Empathy, and the Quasi-De Se 208 Book III Egocentricity and Beyond 211 Part 9 Unarticulated Constituents in the Lekton? 213 Chapter 30 The Context-Dependence of the Lekton: How Far Can We Go? 215 Chapter 31 Unarticulatedness and the 'Concerning' Relation 221 Chapter 32 Three (Alleged) Arguments for the Externality Principle 225 Chapter 33 Invariance 231 Part 10 Self-Relative Thoughts 237 Chapter 34 The Problem of the Essential Indexical 239 Chapter 35 Perry against Relativized Propositions 247 Chapter 36 Context-Relativity 253 Chapter 37 Implicit and Explicit De Se Thoughts 260 Part 11 Shiftability 267 Chapter 38 The Generalized Reflexive Constraint 269 Chapter 39 Parametric Invariance and m-Shiftability 275 Chapter 40 Free Shiftability 279 Chapter 41 The Anaphoric Mode: A Buhlerian Perspective 285 References 291 Index 301