On willing selves Book

"On Tyranny" consists of a helpful foreward that frames the dense writings of Strauss and Kojève, Strauss's reprint and commentary on Xenophon's Hiero (an obscure Greek dialogue), Kojève's critique, and Strauss's response to the critique, as well as letters between the two, who, despite occupying vastly different philosophical positions, maintained a close friendship.

Strauss (and Kojève, for that matter) can be a frustrating read. In my estimation, there were two main points of contention in the Strauss-Kojève debate: firstly, the relationship between philosophy and society (both believe that the two are in conflict, but for different reasons and with different upshots) and secondly, implications on the philosopher's relationship to political action, and by extension, the two writers' concept of meaning in history.

In a word, the book could perhaps be summarized by the notion that, where Strauss's patron saint is Plato (and the ancient Greeks, generally), Kojève's is Hegel. Kojève believed that philosophers can only enjoy subjective certainty in private, so must prove their ideas in the "marketplace" of the world, both to gain recognition as well as an epistemic criterion of validity. Public verification, according to him, is necessarily political, since it involves convincing others. Thus, the philosopher finds him or herself caught between their desire to contemplate the Good and the need to become a ruler. Kojève resolves this apparent conflict by invoking Hegelian dialectic, whereby philosophical ideas express themselves politically through history. Somewhat rigidly, he applies the Hegelian system in arguing that the end state of history is the "universal, homogeneous state", wherein the totality of the earth's population subscribes to and recognizes a final philosophy.

To Strauss, this universal state was a disquieting conclusion. Where Kojève invokes Hegel, Strauss appeals to the ancients, who believed that only an elect few could hope to achieve true understanding and virtue (a view that Kojève and many view as an aristocratic elitism). A few select quotes, since Strauss will say it better than I could ever hope to paraphrase it:

“Did Hegel not say something to the effect that the state in which one man is free is the Oriental despotic state? Is the universal and homogeneous state then merely a planetary Oriental despotism?”

“But if the final state is to satisfy the deepest longing of the human soul, every human being must be capable of becoming wise. The most relevant difference among human beings must have practically disappeared. We understand now why Kojève is so anxious to refute the classical view according to which only a minority of men are capable of the quest for wisdom. If the classics are right, only a few men will be truly happy in the universal and homogeneous state and hence only a few men will find their satisfaction in and through it.”

“Kojève in fact confirms the classical view that unlimited technological progress and its accompaniment, which are indispensable conditions of the universal and homogeneous state, are destructive of humanity.”

“But neither the wise men nor the philosophers will desire to rule. For this reason alone, to say nothing of others, the Chief of the universal and homogeneous state, or the Universal and Final Tyrant will be an unwise man, as Kojève seems to take for granted. To retain his power, he will be forced to suppress every activity which might lead people into doubt of the essential soundness of the universal and homogeneous state: he must suppress philosophy as an attempt to corrupt the young.”

One can never be sure of exactly what Strauss thought of the two contentions I outline above, since he allegedly wrote as esoterically as he believed the ancient Greeks to have written. In my estimation, Strauss viewed philosophy as inherently and necessarily subversive of society. As such, the two could never integrate as Kojève suggested, since, the moment philosophy is accepted, it ceases to be philosophy. Indeed, the Hegelian "final state" is one in which philosophy (and, as a result, humanity) is destroyed, once and for all. Strauss, however, agreed with Kojève that the philosopher should seek to communicate his views through the marketplace – but only for the purpose of finding like-minded, elite individuals. Though not explicitly written in the book, it can be inferred that the means through which philosophers accomplish this seeking is through oblique, esoteric writing. An open question for me is whether or not Strauss saw any responsibility of (or, indeed capacity for) philosophical subversives to impact society and history. He, true to his style, omits commentary here, leaving the reader to simply infer.

Unsurprisingly, the two bards lived out their respective worldviews and each chose a characteristic medium of influence: where Kojève was instrumental in the formation of the EU (what modern conservatives might see as a universalist, globalist project), Strauss became a professor of political philosophy at the University of Chicago.