Mathematical Models of Social Evolution: A Guide for the Perplexed Book

Preface     ix
Theoretician's Laboratory     1
The structure of evolutionary theory     3
The utility of simple models     4
Why not just simulate?     8
A model of viability selection     11
Determining long-term consequences     16
Nongenetic replication     27
Animal Conflict     37
The Hawk-Dove game     38
Retaliation     46
Continuous stable strategies     52
Ownership, an asymmetry     55
Resource holding power     58
Sequential play     60
Altruism & Inclusive Fitness     71
The prisoner's dilemma     72
Positive assortment     76
Common descent and inclusive fitness     78
Rediscovering Hamilton's rule     82
Justifying Hamilton's rule     97
Using Hamilton's rule     99
Reciprocity     123
The Axelrod-Hamilton model     124
Mutants and mistakes     132
Partner choice     145
Indirect reciprocity     150
Reciprocity and collective action     156
Animal Communication     173
Costlysignaling theory     174
Cheap, honest signals     192
Signaling and altruism     201
Social learning     206
Selection among Groups     223
Three views of selection     225
Deriving the Price equation     228
Selection within and between groups     232
Dispersal     249
Sex Allocation     261
Fisher's theory of sex allocation     262
Reproductive value and Fisherian sex ratios     263
Using the Shaw-Mohler theorem     267
Biased sex ratios     271
Breaking the eigen barrier     281
Sexual Selection     295
Quantitative genetic models     298
Fisher's runaway process     305
Costly choice and sensory bias     309
Good genes and sexy sons     313
Appendixes     333
Facts about Derivatives     333
Facts about Random Variables     335
Calculating Binomial Expectations     337
Numerical Solution of the Kokko et al. Model     343
Solutions to Problems     349
Bibliography     393
Index     409