Language, Truth and Ontology Book

	Preface
	The Basic Ontological Categories	1
2	The Basic Concepts	2
3	Individual Things and Events	5
4	Beginnings and Processes	5
5	Necessary Substance	12
	Properties	14
1	Why We Should Admit Properties	15
2	Universals vs. Tropes	22
	On Negative and Disjunctive Properties	28
	Particulars, Individual Qualities, and Universals	37
	Characteristica Universalis	48
1	Preamble	48
2	From Leibniz to Frege	49
3	Directly Depicting Diagrams vs. Existential Graphs	51
4	Some Conditions on a Directly Depicting Language	53
5	The Oil-Painting Principle	56
6	Primitives and Definitions	57
7	Substance	64
8	Accidents	67
9	Sub-Atoms (Mutually Dependent Parts of Atoms)	70
10	Boundaries and Boundary Dependence	71
11	Universals	73
	Definite Descriptions and the Theory of Objects	78
1	A New Explanation	78
2	An Application of the Foregoing Explanation	82
	Truth Makers, Truth Predicates, and Truth Types	87
	Worlds and States of Affairs: How Similar Can They Be?	118
1	Motivation	118
2	Salmon's Counterexample	120
3	The Branching Conception	125
	Was Frege Right about Variable Objects?	133
	Logical Atomism and Its Ontological Refinement: A Defense	157
2	Logical Atomism, What	157
3	Examples of the Avoidance of Unnecessary Facts	161
4	Disputed Case I: Negative Propositions	163
5	Disputed Case II: Universal Generalization	166
6	Other Higher Order Functors	168
7	Statistical Generalizations and Probability	170
8	Laws of Nature and Causality	171
9	Applied Mathematics, Dispositions, and Others	174
10	Resolution and Ultimate Facts	175
	Intentionality and Tendency: How to Make Aristotle Up-To-Date	180
2	The Problem	181
3	Aristotle	182
4	Newtonian Self-Change	183
5	Intentionality	186
6	Temporally Extended Entities	188
7	The Duality of Intentions	189
8	Formal Ontology Today	190
	Leibniz on Properties and Individuals	193
	Index of Names	205
	Index of Subjects	208