Introduction to Phenomenological Research Book

	Translator's Foreword	xiii
	Preliminary Remark
Part 1	[Phi]Ainomenon and [characters not reproducible] in Aristotle and Husserl's Self-Interpretation of Phenomenology
Chapter 1	Elucidation of the expression "phenomenology" by going back to Aristotle
1	Clarification of [characters not reproducible] on the basis of the Aristotelian analysis of perceiving the world by way of seeing	4
a)	[characters not reproducible] as a distinctive manner of an entity's presence: existence during the day	4
b)	[characters not reproducible] as anything that of itself shows itself in daylight or darkness	7
2	The Aristotelian determination of [characters not reproducible]	9
a)	Talk ([characters not reproducible]) as a voice that means something ([characters not reproducible]); [characters not reproducible] and [characters not reproducible]	9
b)	The ostensive talk ([characters not reproducible]) that reveals ([characters not reproducible]) or conceals ([characters not reproducible]) the existing world in affirming ([characters not reproducible]) and denying ([characters not reproducible]); the [characters not reproducible]	14
c)	The possibility of deception, the [characters not reproducible] and the [characters not reproducible]	18
d)	The three aspects of [characters not reproducible]. The factical existence of speaking as an authentic source of deception. Circumstantiality and elusiveness of the world	23
e)	Speaking and the world in its possibilities of deception. The shift of the meaning of [characters not reproducible] into illusion	29
f)	[characters not reproducible] and [characters not reproducible] as the realm of the possibilities of the true and the false	30
Chapter 2	Present-day phenomenology in Husseri's self-interpretation
3	Recapitulation of the facts of the matter gathered from the interpretation of Aristotle. Anticipation of the predominance of care about the idea of certainty and evidence over freeing up possibilities of encountering fundamental facts of the matter	32
4	Consciousness as the theme of present-day phenomenology	35
a)	Greek philosophy without a concept of consciousness	36
b)	Phenomenology's breakthrough in Husserl's Logical Investigations and their basic tendency	37
c)	The orientation of Greek philosophy and the question of its reversal	38
5	The theme of "consciousness" in the Logical Investigations	39
a)	The Logical Investigations between a traditional orientation and primordial questioning	39
b)	Ideal meaning and acts of meaning; emptily meaning something and meaning-fulfillment; consciousness as the region of experiences; intentional experiences as acts; consciousness as inner perception	40
6	The care about already known knowledge, in which consciousness stands	42
a)	Care and its possibilities of disclosing, holding onto, and shaping what it takes care of; its commitment to and loss of itself in what it takes care of	42
b)	Care about already known knowledge	43
7	Husserl's polemic with contemporary philosophy in the essay "Philosophy as Rigorous Science" and the care about already known knowledge at work in it. The general aim of this essay	45
8	Husserl's critique of naturalism	47
a)	Naturalization of consciousness	47
b)	Naturalization of ideas	49
c)	Nature's being as experimental psychology's horizon	50
d)	The peculiar being of consciousness as the true object of philosophy and the method of discerning essences to acquire universally binding sentences	51
9	Clarification of the problems as purification and radicalization of their bias. The care about securing and justifying an absolute scientific status	52
10	Clarification of problems	53
a)	The question and its structures	54
b)	The problem and the factors of its being: clarifying the problem as a matter of co-deciding on what is to be interrogated, what it is asked, the regard in question, and the tendency of the answer	56
c)	Husserl's clarification of the tendency of the problem of naturalism through transcendental and eidetic purification of consciousness. Absolute validity and evidence	58
11	Order of the inquiry and clue to the explication of the structure of all experiential connections	59
a)	Orientation toward connections among disciplines: philosophy as a science of norms and values	59
b)	Theoretical knowing as the clue	60
12	Characteristic factors of care about already known knowledge in Husserl's critique of naturalism: back-flash, falling-prey, pre-constructing, ensnarement, neglect	61
13	Husserl's critique of historicism	64
a)	The different basis of this critique	64
b)	The neglect of human existence, in the deficient care, care about absolute, normative lawfulness	65
14	Critique of historicism on the path of the clarification of problems	66
a)	Husserl's critique of Dilthey	66
b)	Historical existence as the object of neglect	67
c)	Origin and legitimacy of the contrast between matter of factness and validity	68
d)	The reproach of skepticism and the care revealing itself therein, care about already known knowledge as anxiety in the face of existence	69
e)	The preconceptions about existence at work in this care	70
15	Making more precise what care about already known knowledge is	72
a)	Care about justified knowledge, about a universally binding character that is evident	73
b)	"To the matters themselves": care about matters prefigured by a universally binding character	73
c)	Care about the rigor of science as derivative seriousness; the mathematical idea of rigor, uncritically set up as an absolute norm	74
16	Disclosing the thematic field of "consciousness" through the care about already known knowledge. Return to the historical, concrete instance of the care	75
a)	Care's circumspection and aim	75
b)	Descartes' research as a factically-historical, concrete instance of the care in its disclosing of the thematic field of "consciousness"	76
Part 2	Return to Descartes and The Scholastic Ontology That Determines Him
Chapter 1	Making sense of the return to Descartes by recalling what has been elaborated up to this point
17	The hermeneutic situation of the investigations up to this point and of those standing before us	79
18	Becoming free from the discipline and traditional possibilities as a way of becoming free for existence. Investigation as destruction in the ontological investigation of existence	81
19	Return to the genuine being of care about already known knowledge in its primordial past as a return to Descartes	83
20	Destruction as the path of the interpretation of existence. Three tasks for the explication of how, in its being, care about already known knowledge is disclosive. The question of the sense of the truth of knowledge in Descartes	85
Chapter 2	Descartes. The how and the what of the being-qua-disclosing of care about knowledge already known
21	Determinations of "truth"	89
22	Three possibilities of care about already known knowledge: curiosity, certitude, being binding	91
Chapter 3	Descartes' determination of falsum and verum
23	Preview of the context of the question	94
24	The cogito sum, the clara et distincta perceptio, and the task of securing, in keeping with being, the criterion of truth	95
25	Descartes' classification of the variety of cogitationes. The judicium as the place for the verum and falsum	98
26	The distinction between the idea as repraesentans aliquid and its repraesentatum; realitas objectiva and realitas formalis sive actualis [the distinction between the idea as representing something and what it represents; objective reality and formal or actual reality]	101
27	The question of the being of the falsum and error	107
a)	The constitution of error: intellectus and voluntas as libertas; Descartes' two concepts of freedom	107
b)	The concursus of intellectus and voluntas [the concurrence of the intellect and the will] as the being of error. Theological problems as the foundation of both concepts of freedom	112
28	The sense of being of error: error as res and as privatio, as detrimental to the genuine being of the created human being (creatum esse). Perceptum esse and creatum esse as basic determinations of the esse of the res cogitans	116
Chapter 4	Going back to Scholastic ontology: the verum esse in Thomas Aquinas
29	The connection of the verum and the ens: being-true as a mode of being (De veritate, q. 1, art. 1)	120
30	The genuine being of the verum as convenientia in intellectus (De veritate, q. 1, art. 1-3)	126
31	In what sense the verum is in the intellectus (De veritate, q. 1, art. 9)	132
32	The grounding of verum's genuine being in the primordial truth of God (De veritate, q. 1, art. 4 and 8)	137
33	The ways of being able to determine God's being from the perspective of Aristotelian ontology (Summa theologica, vol. 1, q. 2-3)	142
Chapter 5	The care of knowledge in Descartes
34	Descartes' determination of knowing's manner of being as judging, against the horizon of being as creatum esse	148
35	The regimentation of judging: clara et distincta perceptio as a universal rule of knowing	152
36	The origin of clarity and distinctness. Descartes' idea of science and the rules for the direction of the mind	156
37	The care of knowing as care about certainty, as mistaking oneself	168
38	The care that tranquilizes. Descartes' interpretation of the verum as certum while retaining Scholastic ontology	171
Chapter 6	The character of being of the res cogitans, of consciousness
39	The certum aliquid as what is sought by the care of knowing	174
40	The caring search as dubitare, remotio and suppositio falsi	175
41	The path of the caring dubitatio in the First Meditation subject to the regula generalis: the being of the searcher (ego sum) as the first thing found	176
42	The caring search in the Second Meditation for what the ego sum is under the guidance of the regula generalis: the ego cogito	184
43	What is found by the care about certainty: a valid, universally binding proposition	186
Part 3	Demonstrating the Neglect of the Question of Being As a Way of Pointing to Existence
Chapter 1	Misplacing the question of the res cogitans' specific being through care about certainty
44	Descartes' perversion of "having-oneself-with" into a formally-ontological proposition	191
45	Summary characterization of the res cogitans found by Descartes: misplacing the possibility of access to the res cogitans' genuine being	194
Chapter 2	Descartes' inquiry into res cogitans' being-certain and the lack of specification of the character of being of consciousness as the thematic field of Husserl's phenomenology
46	Descartes and Husserl: fundamental differences	196
a)	Descartes' way of doubt (remotio) and Husserl's reduction	199
b)	Descartes' cogito and Husserl's consciousness	200
c)	The absolutum of Descartes' res cogitans and the absoluteness of Husserl's pure consciousness	202
d)	Descartes' res cogitans as ens creatum and Husserl's pure consciousness as ens regionale	203
e)	The connection that ultimately motivates Descartes' research and the tendencies that are ultimately decisive for Husserl's phenomenology	203
47	Husserl and Descartes: connection and uniform basic tendency in the care about certainty	205
a)	Undiscussed appropriation of the cogito sum	205
b)	Explicitly laying claim to the certitudo for the absolute region of being	205
c)	The uprooting that occurs in taking over the cogito sum as the certum for the process of setting up consciousness' absolute self-evidence as the nucleus	206
d)	Care about certainty as care about the formation of science	206
Chapter 3	Husserl's more primordial neglect of the question of being, opposite the thematic field of phenomenology, and the task of seeing and explicating existence in its being
48	Husserl's mangling of phenomenological finds through the care, derived from Descartes, about certainty	208
a)	Intentionality as specific, theoretical behavior	209
b)	Evidence as theoretical knowing's evidence in grasping and determining	209
c)	Eidetic reduction of pure consciousness under the guidance of ontological determinations alien to consciousness	210
49	Investigation of the history of the origin of the categories as a presupposition for seeing and determining existence	211
50	Retrieval of the characteristics of the care of knowing that have been run through and pointing to existence itself in terms of some fundamental determinations	213
a)	Three groups of characters of care about already known knowledge and their determination as a unity	214
[alpha])	Overstepping oneself, mistaking-oneself, tranquilizing, and masking as remoteness from being	215
[beta])	Misplacing, rise of needlessness, and falling prey as the absence of existence's temporality	216
[gamma])	Obstructing and diverting as leveling being	217
b)	Flight of existence in the face of itself and the uncoveredness of its being-in-a-world, burying any possibility of encountering it, distorting as a basic movement of existence	217
c)	Facticity, threat, eeriness, everydayness	220
Appendix	Supplements to the lectures from the lecture notes of Helene Weiss and Herbert Marcuse
	Supplement 1 (to p. 4)	223
	Supplement 2 (to p. 6)	223
	Supplement 3 (to p. 21)	224
	Supplement 4 (to p. 22)	224
	Supplement 5 (to p. 30)	225
	Supplement 6 (to p. 36)	227
	Supplement 7 (to p. 41)	227
	Supplement 8 (to p. 52)	227
	Supplement 9 (to p. 65)	228
	Supplement 10 (to p. 69)	228
	Supplement 11 (to p. 69)	229
	Supplement 12 (to p. 74)	229
	Supplement 13 (to p. 74)	230
	Supplement 14 (to p. 77)	231
	Supplement 15 (to p. 79)	231
	Supplement 16 (to p. 93)	233
	Supplement 17 (to p. 98)	233
	Supplement 18 (to p. 106)	234
	Supplement 19 (to p. 107)	234
	Supplement 20 (to p. 112)	234
	Supplement 21 (to p. 116)	235
	Supplement 22 (to p. 123)	236
	Supplement 23 (to p. 152)	236
	Supplement 24 (to p. 160)	237
	Supplement 25 (to p. 189)	237
	Supplement 26 (to p. 197)	239
	Supplement 27 (to p. 207)	239
	Supplement 28 (to p. 208)	239
	Supplement 29 (to p. 210)	240
	Supplement 30 (to p. 221)	240
	Editor's Afterword	245