Free to be responsible Book

This book is one of the most important documents of moral philosophy, yet was not intended to be be so. Kant wrote the treatise as a general introduction to moral philosophy, setting out the basic concepts that he would later expand upon in the "Metaphysics of Ethics" ten years later. Yet, that larger work lacks the historical influence of this "lighter" volume. One puts "lighter" in quotation marks because calling a Kant treatise of philosophy "light" no matter the length is like calling a composition by Mahler a "light" classic (thanks to Tom Lehrer for that idea). Even when Kant is writing supposedly for a non-expert audience, his prose is still formidable, which is to say that at times it is virtually unreadable. Kant sets a kind of standard of writing philosophy that runs through Hegel and on to Heidegger and thence to the post-structuralists, which is to write in almost pure abstraction, using long, subordinated sentences that use phrases to make distinctions between ideas. Often, these distinctions rest upon peculiarities of the language of the writing. The purpose of this book is to establish whether there are grounds for the idea of an objective morality, that is a morality that is not based on or subject to empirical facts and human dispositions, even when the morality has an explicit relationship to those things. Thus, Kant is writing about "metaphysics," or as he sees it "pure" ideas and "pure" reason. These are pure in the sense of being untainted by influence from empirical facts. For Kant, our ability to reason proves that the ability itself, which he calls "reason," exists prior to any use of it. Reason is a priori, and since morality is a kind of reasoning, it, too, must be a priori. But what kind of reasoning is it? Thus, Kant takes it upon himself to lay the groundwork (an alternative and perhaps more accurate translation of "grundlegung" than "foundation") for identifying just what pure moral reasoning would be, and for the primary justifications in favor of his theory. Even such a modest (in comparison to other of Kant's philosophical writings) endeavor requires Kant to disregard specific moral concerns, which he calls matters of psychology or anthropology, and regard mostly the "pure ideas" of morality. It was never going to be easy reading. Kant's method is to declare a definition of a key term, justify the definition, then move on to the next definition of another term that requires knowing the definition of the term previously defined. Definition builds on definition. If A definition is true, then B definition ought also to be true; by pure reason A definition is true; therefore, B definition is true. Then, repeat this process to derive C from B (and perhaps A as well), and so on. Because so many of these definitions are not simple, but instead rely upon definitions of abstractions using other abstractions, it is easy to become lost in what Kant is trying to do. Here is an example, selected almost at random, but certainly typical of Kant's style: "The hypothetical imperative which represents the practical necessity of an action as means to the promotion of happiness is an assertorical imperative" (p. 32, p. 416 in German collected works version, volume IV). Got that? The sentence forces the reader to return to early parts of the argument and get reacquainted with what "hypothetical imperative" and "practical necessity" and "happiness" mean in Kant's usage, and to puzzle out what he means by "assertorical." That such sentences are the norm rather than the exception makes reading this work daunting, even though it is less that 100 pages long. Thus, this work could not really be said to be entertaining, and few could be criticized for simply giving up in frustration. Nevertheless, the reward, and what makes this book so influential, comes from the conclusions that Kant makes through this process. His categorical imperative, especially the second formulation, and his claim that the basis for all morality is that rational beings must treat other rational beings as ends in themselves and not as means to ends, are difficult to defeat logically. The point is that he is not merely stating these propositions, he is justifying them in the sense of proving that they "exist" a priori as products of pure reason. This is the groundwork. So, the treatise is a mixed bag as far as a reading experience. It is often frustrating and tiring to read. However, it provides so much material for continued contemplation long after the reading is over that those who enjoy thinking about what they are reading will find a multitude of rewards.