Feminist Interpretations of Richard Rorty Book

I am inclined toward David Carr's view that Husserl's phenomenology is mis-read as a transcendental "idealism" and either explicitly or implicitly a metaphysics of the subject. He makes the argument clearly, draws from both early and later Husserl to show that his commitment to transcendental philosophical critique of experience (yep) was constant, and that Heidegger's lumping Husserl in with metaphysicians is missing the critical point of phenomenological philosophy. Where I think the book is not as helpful as it could be is in examining this issue in greater depth. It will not convince anyone in the Heidegger mob, and may not be convincing to those without such a view, because the idea that Husserl's phenomenology is a transcendental philosophy like Kant's, and therefore a critical philosophy rather than a doctrinal philosophy, is not widely understood to begin with. This may have something to do with the way Husserl presented phenomenology--"critical" is not a word that comes to mind to describe his approach, so it can appear that he was building up an account of the existence of consciousness, rather than the series of the appearance of conscious experience.