Economics and Liability for Environmental Problems Book

	Acknowledgements
	Series Preface
	Introduction
	The Role of Liability
1	Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral	5
2	Liability for Harm versus Regulation of Safety	45
3	A Comparison of Taxes, Regulation, and Liability Rules under Imperfect Information	63
4	A Model of the Optimal Use of Liability and Safety Regulation	77
	The Incentive Effects of Liability
5	Strict Liability versus Negligence	89
6	Strict Liability vs. Negligence in a Market Setting	115
7	When Does the Rule of Liability Matter?	121
8	Strict Liability in a Principal-Agent Model	137
9	On Liability and Insurance	151
10	The Influence of Litigation Costs on Deterrence under Strict Liability and under Negligence	165
11	Bankruptcy and Care Choice	177
12	Tort Law as a Regulatory Regime for Catastrophic Personal Injuries	187
	Conceptual Models
13	The Effects of Environmental Liability on Industrial Real Estate Development	209
14	Lender Penalty for Environmental Damage and the Equilibrium Cost of Capital	231
15	Sharing Damages Among Multiple Tortfeasors	245
16	Indivisible Toxic Torts: The Economics of Joint and Several Liability	299
17	Liability for Groundwater Contamination from Pesticides	315
18	The Structure of Penalties in Environmental Enforcement: An Economic Analysis	333
	Empirical Models
19	Controlling Stochastic Pollution Events Through Liability Rules: Some Evidence from OCS Leasing	357
20	Risk Premiums for Environmental Liability: Does Superfund Increase the Cost of Capital?	367
21	Strict Liability as a Deterrent in Toxic Waste Management: Empirical Evidence from Accident and Spill Data	397
22	Liability and Large-Scale, Long-Term Hazards	427
	Liability Reform
23	Environmental Liability Reform and Privatization in Central and Eastern Europe	451
24	Economic Models of Compensation for Damage Caused by Nuclear Accidents: Some Lessons for the Revision of the Paris and Vienna Conventions	473
	Name Index	497