|
|
Sold Out
Book Categories |
| Assessing the Effects of Institutions | 1 | |
| Evaluating Governmental Effectiveness | 5 | |
| A General Model of Government Capabilities | 7 | |
| Parliamentary and Presidential Systems | 11 | |
| Variations among Parliamentary and Presidential Systems | 19 | |
| Other Influences on Governmental Capacity | 30 | |
| Comparing Capabilities | 37 | |
| Research Strategy | 40 | |
| Innovation, Coordination, and Implementation in Energy Policy | 42 | |
| Institutions and Policy Capabilities | 44 | |
| The Cases | 50 | |
| Starting Points and Policy Responses: An Overview | 50 | |
| The United States | 53 | |
| Canada | 65 | |
| France | 74 | |
| Germany | 83 | |
| Japan | 89 | |
| Imposing Losses in Pension Policy | 110 | |
| Institutional Structure and the Politics of Loss Imposition | 111 | |
| The Cases | 114 | |
| Pension Policies, Program Structure, and Loss Imposition | 115 | |
| Targeting Resources for Industrial Change | 151 | |
| Institutions and Industrial Policy | 152 | |
| The Cases | 156 | |
| Industrial Policy in Sweden | 157 | |
| Industrial Policy in Japan | 165 | |
| Industrial Policy in the United States | 175 | |
| Governmental Institutions and Industrial Change | 183 | |
| Governments versus Budget Deficits | 187 | |
| Government Capabilities and Government Deficits | 188 | |
| Case Study Countries | 195 | |
| From Expansion to Restraint: Fiscal Policy in the OECD Countries | 197 | |
| Battling the Deficit: Two Disappointments, One Success | 199 | |
| Political Capacity | 224 | |
| Representing Diffuse Interests in Environmental Policymaking | 237 | |
| Institutions and Diffuse Interests | 238 | |
| Case Study Countries | 240 | |
| Comparing Environmental Policies | 242 | |
| Patterns and Explanations | 265 | |
| Conclusion: Evaluating Institutional Opportunities and Risks | 270 | |
| Political Institutions and Cleavage Management | 272 | |
| Identifying Failures of Conflict Management | 273 | |
| Institutional Mechanisms for Cleavage Management | 274 | |
| The Cases: Cleavage Management in Four Democracies | 278 | |
| Political Institutions and Democratic Stability | 287 | |
| Separation of Powers and Cleavage Management | 302 | |
| Political Institutions and Cleavage Management | 303 | |
| Cleavage Management: A Macroquantitative Evaluation | 307 | |
| Institutions and Cleavage Management in the United States | 314 | |
| Appendix: Quantitative Data | 338 | |
| Maintaining International Commitments in Trade Policy | 345 | |
| Institutions and Capabilities | 347 | |
| The Making of International Policy in Three Nations | 350 | |
| Patterns of Trade Policy | 359 | |
| Explaining Trade Policy | 362 | |
| Nuclear Weapons and Policy Stability | 370 | |
| Political Institutions and Government Capabilities | 371 | |
| The Cases | 373 | |
| Policy Stability and Weapons Procurement: The U.S. Case | 374 | |
| Policy Stability and Conflict Management: The British and French Cases | 390 | |
| Military Security Policy | 412 | |
| A Useful Comparison? | 413 | |
| Policy Capabilities and Their Determinants | 416 | |
| Historical Legacies | 419 | |
| Security Givens | 421 | |
| Party and Electoral Systems | 427 | |
| Administrative Institutions | 432 | |
| Defense Private Sector | 436 | |
| When and How Do Institutions Matter? | 445 | |
| Overall Patterns of Institutional Influence | 446 | |
| Institutional Influences on Specific Capabilities | 453 | |
| Institutional Reform and Constitutional Design | 462 | |
| Questions for Institutional Reformers | 462 | |
| General Caveats about Institutional Reform | 465 | |
| Institutional Reform in the United States | 467 | |
| Institutional Reform and America's Central Policy Concerns | 477 | |
| Chapter Authors | 483 | |
| Other Conference Participants | 484 | |
| Index | 485 |
| Price | Condition | Delivery | Seller | Action |
| $99.99 | Digital |
| WonderClub |
Lori Meehan
reviewed Do Institutions Matter?: Government Capabilities in the U.S. and Abroad on March 28, 2015
Do Institutions Matter?
In Makers and Takers: How Conservatives Do All the Work While Liberals Whine and Complain the author, Peter Schweizer, contrasts what the left spouts confidently as factual with more scientific survey-based truth and blasts what liberals hope what they want the general public to accept as true. This was the tactic used by Hitler and the National Socialists (Nazis) used, to paraphrase: Make the lie big, make it simple, keep saying it, and eventually they will believe it! This is so obvious when you take a skeptical look at what is being claimed as fact. The author points out that in many of these cases those putting out false accusation as facts are essentially doing what they claim the targets of their propaganda are doing. Their philosophy can be summed up as Do as I say, not as I do. Examples are plentiful and are presented by the author throughout the book. He draws on national polls and academic studies, along with actual testimony by liberals themselves. He also states that the emergence of this type of liberalism as a philosophy of selfishness is a direct result of big government.
Login|Complaints|Blog|Games|Digital Media|Souls|Obituary|Contact Us|FAQ
CAN'T FIND WHAT YOU'RE LOOKING FOR? CLICK HERE!!! X
You must be logged in to add to WishlistX
This item is in your Wish List
X
This item is in your Collection
Do Institutions Matter?: Government Capabilities in the U.S. and Abroad
X
This Item is in Your Inventory
Do Institutions Matter?: Government Capabilities in the U.S. and Abroad
X
You must be logged in to review the productsX
X
X
Add Do Institutions Matter?: Government Capabilities in the U.S. and Abroad, , Do Institutions Matter?: Government Capabilities in the U.S. and Abroad to the inventory that you are selling on WonderClubX
X
Add Do Institutions Matter?: Government Capabilities in the U.S. and Abroad, , Do Institutions Matter?: Government Capabilities in the U.S. and Abroad to your collection on WonderClub |