Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs Book

Synopsis xv

1 The background 1

1.1 Introduction to the project 1

1.2 Reflections on methodology 4

1.3 Introducing the rationality constraint 9

1.3.1 Interpretation and rationality 10

1.3.2 Features of beliefs 11

1.3.3 Rationality for beliefs 14

1.3.4 The rationality constraint on belief ascription 18

1.4 Introducing delusions 21

1.4.1 Definitions of delusions 23

1.4.2 Delusion formation 27

1.4.3 The two-factor theory 31

1.4.4 Delusions and self deception 37

1.4.5 Delusions and obsessive thoughts 41

1.4.6 Delusions and confabulations 43

1.4.7 Delusions and hypnotically induced beliefs 50

1.4.8 Delusions and irrational beliefs 55

summary of chapter 1 59

2 Procedural rationality and belief ascription 61

2.1 Bad integration in delusions 62

2.1.1 Bad integration and meaning 64

2.1.2 Dissonance and double-bookkeeping 68

2.1.3 Delusions as imaginings or alternative realities 73

2.2 Bad integration in beliefs 77

2.2.1 Preference reversals 79

2.2.2 Beliefs about the probability of events 82

2.2.3 Dissonant beliefs 84

2.3 Recovery after 'Socratic tutoring' 86

2.3.1 Restoring rationality 86

2.3.2 Excuses for bad integration 88

2.3.3 Subscription to norms of rationality 90

2.3.4 Charity and explicability 92

2.4 The indeterminacy argument 96

2.4.1 Delusions and interpretation 97

2.4.2 Two notions of rationality 99

2.4.3 Interpreting in the real world 102

2.4.4 Heuristics versus constraints 107

Summary of chapter 2 109

3 Epistemic rationality and belief ascription 113

3.1 Delusions and epistemic rationality 115

3.1.1 Cognitive probing 116

3.1.2 Anti-doxastic arguments: delusions aren't probable explanations 118

3.1.3 Anti-doxastic arguments: delusions aren't responsive to evidence 121

3.2 Delusions and faulty reasoning 125

3.2.1 Empiricism and evidential support 126

3.2.2 Competence versus performance 128

3.2.3 Jumping to conclusions 133

3.2.4 Attributional biases: me and others 135

3.2.5 Resisting counterevidence 138

3.3 Badly supported beliefs 140

3.3.1 Beliefs about causes 140

3.3.2 Beliefs about intentions 143

3.3.3 Self-serving beliefs 146

3.4 Unrevisable beliefs 148

3.4.1 Racial prejudice 149

3.4.2 Religious beliefs and religious delusions 152

3.4.3 Conservatism 153

Summary of chapter 3 154

4 Agential rationality and belief ascription 159

4.1 Delusions and failure of action guidance 161

4.1.1 Are delusions action guiding? 162

4.1.2 Are delusions acceptances? 167

4.2 Beliefs and failure of action guidance 171

4.2.1 Hypocrisy 172

4.2.2 Poor self prediction 173

4.3 Delusions and failure of reason-giving 175

4.3.1 Authorship and agential rationality 176

4.3.2 Are delusions authored? 178

4.3.3 Giving reasons: deliberation and justification 183

4.4 Delusions and framework beliefs 187

4.4.1 Can we author framework beliefs? 188

4.4.2 Are delusions framework beliefs? 190

4.4.3 Do delusions conflict with framework beliefs? 193

4.4.4 Can framework beliefs be justified and revised? 195

4.5 Beliefs and failure of reason-giving 197

4.5.1 Bad reasons for attitudes 198

4.5.2 Dating couples 201

Summary of chapter 4 203

5 Beliefs and self knowledge 207

5.1 Authorship and first-person authority 209

5.1.1 Routes to knowledge of the self 210

5.1.2 The deliberative Stance 212

5.1.3 Authorship challenged 214

5.1.4 Rationality and stability of attitudes 217

5.1.5 Causal efficacy 219

5.1.6 Knowing why 222

5.1.7 Authorship rescued 225

5.2 "Inserted" thoughts 227

5.2.1 What is thought insertion? 228

5.2.2 Thought insertion as a failure of ownership 231

5.2.3 Thought insertion as a failure of endorsement 235

5.3 Self narratives 242

5.3.1 Self narratives: truth or fiction? 242

5.3.2 Delusions: bad scientific theories or unreliable autobiographies? 247

5.3.3 Mental time travel and agency 250

5.3.4 Coherence versus correspondence 253

Summary of chapter 5 256

6 Conclusions 259

6.1 On delusions 259

6.2 On beliefs 261

6.2.1 Beliefs are integrated in a system and have some inferential relations with other intentional states 262

6.2.2 Beliefs are sensitive to evidence or argument 262

6.2.3 Beliefs can be manifested in behaviour 264

6.2.4 Beliefs can be self ascribed and some beliefs can be defended with reasons 264

Bibliography and reference list 267

Index 295