Contemporary Debates in the Philosophy of Science Book

Notes on Contributors.

Preface.

Introduction: What is the Philosophy of Science?.

Part I: Do Thought Experiments Transcend Empiricism?.

1. Why Thought Experiments Transcend Empiricism: James Robert Brown (University of Toronto).

2. Why Thought Experiments do not Transcend Empiricism: John Norton (University of Pittsburgh).

Part II: Does Probability Capture the Logic of Scientific Confirmation or Justification?.

3. Probability Captures the Logic of Scientific Confirmation: Patrick Maher (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign).

4. Why Probability Does not Capture the Logic of Scientific Justification: Kevin Kelly (Carnegie Mellon University) and Clark Glymour (Carnegie Mellon University).

Part III: Can a Theory's Predictive Success Warrant Belief in the Unobservable Entities it Postulates?.

5. A Theory's Predictive Success Can Warrant Belief in the Unobservable Entities it Postulates: Jarrett Leplin (University of North Carolina, Greensboro).

6. A Theory's Predictive Success Does not Warrant Belief in the Unobservable Entities it Postulates: André Kukla (University of Toronto) and Joel Walmsley (University of Toronto).

Part IV: Are There Laws in the Social Sciences?.

7. There are no Laws in the Social Sciences: John Roberts (University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill).

8. There are Laws in the Social Sciences: Harold Kincaid (University of Alabama at Birmingham).

Part V: Are Causes Physically Connected to their Effects?.

9. Causes are Physically Connected to Their Effects: Why Preventers and Omissions are not Causes: Phil Dowe (University of Queensland, Australia).

10. Causes Need Not be Physically Connected to their Effects: The Case for Negative Causation: Jonathan Schaffer (University of Massachusetts, Amherst).

Part VI: Is There a Puzzle about the Low Entropy Past?.

11. On the Origins of the Arrow of Time: Why There is Still a Puzzle About the Low Entropy Past: Huw Price (University of Edinburgh).

12. There is No Puzzle About the Low Entropy Past: Craig Callender.

Part VII: Do Genes Encode Information About Phenotypic Traits:.

13. Genes Encode Information for Phenotypic Traits: Sahotra Sarkar (University of Texas at Austin).

14. Genes Do not Encode Information for Phenotypic Traits: Peter Godfrey-Smith (Stanford University).

Part VIII: Is the Mind a System of Modules Shaped by Natural Selection?.

15. The Mind is a System of Modules Shaped by Natural Selection: Peter Carruthers (University of Maryland).

16. The Mind is Not (Just) a System of Modules Shaped (Just) by Natural Selection: Fiona Cowie (California Institute of Technology) and James Woodward (California Institute of Technology).

Index