Aristotle and Augustine on Freedom: Two Theories of Freedom, Voluntary Action and Akrasia Book

	Preface
Pt. I	Aristotle
1	The Limits of the Voluntary	3
1.1	'Positive' and 'Negative' Theories of Freedom	3
1.2	Compulsion, Duress, Persuasion and Free Action	6
1.3	The Varieties of Ignorance	18
1.4	Irrationality	25
2	Freedom, Ability and Knowledge	32
2.1	Function, Process and Ability to Do Otherwise	32
2.2	Aristotle's Epistemology	47
3	Practical Reasoning	55
3.1	Proairesis	56
3.2	The Difference between Action on Proairesis and Voluntary Action	61
3.3	Deliberation	66
3.4	Practical Reasoning and the 'Practical Syllogism'	71
4	The Varieties of Akrasia	88
4.1	How to Solve the Problem of Akrasia	88
4.2	Aristotle's Account	98
4.3	The Varieties of Akrasia	112
Pt. II	Augustine
5	Voluntariness and Responsibility in Augustine	121
5.2	The Linking of Voluntariness and Responsibility	122
5.3	Two of Augustine's Conditions of Voluntary Action	125
5.4	Ignorantia and Difficultas	130
5.5	From the Earlier to the Later Theory	134
6	Voluntas and the Voluntary	140
6.2	The Nature of Voluntas: Two Requirements	141
6.3	Ability to Do Otherwise	144
6.4	The Cause(s) of Voluntas Again	149
6.5	A Reflexive Will?	150
7	The Good Will and the Good Life	154
7.2	Practical Reason and Practical Wisdom in Augustine	155
7.3	Aristotle and Augustine on the Directedness of Action	160
7.4	Felicitas	162
7.5	Good Will and the Order of the World	172
8	Bad Will and the Mystery of Evil	176
8.2	Bad Will	178
8.3	An Incomplete Account?	184
8.4	A Necessarily Incomplete Account?	187
8.5	Manichaean Dualism and Privatio Boni	193
8.6	Incompleteness Again	197
8.7	Augustine and Voluntarism	198
8.8	From Augustine's Rationalism to Augustinian Voluntarism	202
	List of Works Cited	208
	Index of Names	213